Written by Nikolaus von Twickel
Summary
The separatists gleefully praised the Putin-Biden videocall as a success for Russia and a failure for Ukraine, while saying little about the growing talk of a Russian invasion and nothing about the latest restrictions against the OSCE Mission. Russian “investor” Yevgeny Yurchenko took control of another plant, while “DNR” leader Pushilin again made rosy promises about the economy. COVID-numbers finally appeared to fall.
“DNR” delighted at Putin-Biden call
The geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West over Ukraine were hardly reflected in separatist-controlled news outlets. However, separatist figures expressed delight at the 7 December videocall between Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin: The fact that the Presidents of Russia and the US talked about Ukraine without Ukraine “clearly shows that this country has finally lost its sovereignty”, “DNR” parliamentary “Speaker” Vladimir Bidyovka was quoted as saying by the official DAN news site. Bidyovka went on to claim that “millions of Ukrainians had become hostages to US policies”.
The most significant development on the ground in Donbas also was nowhere mentioned in official media – a ban against the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) from crossing the Line of Contact in the Luhansk region imposed by the Luhansk “People’s Republic”. OSCE monitors faced the first denials of passage on 23 November and have reported them regularly since. On 9 December, the Mission was even told by a member of the armed formations that there is a “clear order from those in control (of Luhansk) not to let the OSCE SMM cross”.
The separatists have imposed restrictions on the Mission before, most notably in the spring of 2020, when both “People’s Republics” banned OSCE patrols from crossing the Line of Contact for many weeks under the pretext of the coronavirus pandemic (see Newsletter 75). In October of this year, the “DNR” orchestrated a “protest” outside the Mission’s hotel in Donetsk, effectively curtailing its work for more than one week (see Newsletter 96).
Such restrictions also stoke fears that Russia is using the reduced presence of international observers to carry out clandestine military preparations.
Rostov court “mistake” reveals Russian forces in Ukraine
Meanwhile, a Russian court verdict that mentions the presence of Russian troops inside the “People’s Republics” caused considerable embarrassment for the Kremlin, which has stubbornly denied any involvement in the conflict.
The ruling from the neighbouring Russian city of Rostov-on-Don sentenced a local man for bribing military officials to keep a contract about food deliveries to “military units of the Russian Armed Forces stationed on the territory of the self-proclaimed DNR and LNR”. The 10 November decision became widely known after being published by the anonymous Ukrainian Twitter account “NecroMancer” on 15 December.
Ensuing media reports forced Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov to declare that the text must be a mistake: “Because it is impossible. There are no Russian forces on the territories” of the “Republics”. Hours after Peskov’s comments the verdict vanished from the court website, which spokespeople tried to explain as due to maintenance works. However, it remained accessible on archive.today.
Kirill Mikhailov, an analyst with the Conflict Intelligence Team group, pointed out that the amount of food mentioned in the verdict – 90 tons per day – is enough to feed the 34,000 troops believed to be stationed in both “People’s Republics”. The fact that the food contract was with Russia’s Southern Military District means that the Russian Military does more or less feed the entire separatist “People’s Militias” (armed formations), mainly made up of volunteers from Ukraine and Russia under the command of Russian officers of the 8th Combined Arms Army. That army, based in Novocherkassk (Rostov region), is thought to have been set up especially for the war in Donbass (see “Beyond Frozen Conflict”, p 117 f).
“DNR” leader Denis Pushilin said during the screening of a Russian propaganda film in Donetsk on 17 December that Russian soldiers were “brothers in arms” (soratniki).
Yurchenko’s holding gets Luhansk cast iron plant
Meanwhile, the new Russian “investor” Yevgeny Yurchenko consolidated his industry holdings in the “People’s Republics” by taking control of the Luhansk Casting and Mechanical Plant. On 15 December, the official LITs outlet reported that Yurchenko had integrated the plant into his Southern Mining and Metals Complex (Yuzhny gorno-metallichesky complex – YuGMK).The holding said last month that it would ramp up production after President Vladimir Putin removed trade barriers between Russia and the “People’s Republic”, effectively creating a customs union (see Newsletter 97).
Yurchenko claimed that production levels had risen at the plant and that its products were very interesting for Russian and European markets. The Luhansk plant, which mainly produces cast iron-radiators and manhole covers, said in July that its some 500 workers were working full-time and that it was seeking to hire another 40 people. As previously, Yurchenko promised that workers would receive stable and fair wages.
Yurchenko also claimed that he had covered all unpaid wages’ debt at the Alchevsk Metals Factory, where workers had gone on strike during the past years to protest against arrears. The hitherto obscure Russian businessman, who has not been active in the mining or metals industries before, made similar optimistic statements about his new assets in the “DNR”, without offering any proof.
Yurchenko was introduced as “investor” to the region’s main plants in June, when he took over factories hitherto controlled by the super-secretive Vneshtrogservis holding. The Russian is widely seen as a stooge to allow the Kremlin take direct control of the plants previously managed by fugitive Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Kurchenko, a former close acquaintance of deposed President Viktor Yanukovych, who is thought to be living in Moscow.
Grain for Crimea
Russia’s efforts to boost trade ties were also visible at a 14 December meeting in Donetsk, where officials and businessman from the “republics”, South Ossetia and Russia discussed economic cooperation. “DNR” leader Pushilin told at the meeting that the economy had stabilized and that state income had risen by 20 per cent compared to 2020. By all accounts, 2020 was an exceptionally bad year which saw significant drops in production and exports (see our Annual Report, p. 7).
The event’s organizers said that six local enterprises had signed cooperation agreements with Russian partners – among them a presumable grain delivery contract between a bread factory in annexed Crimea and the Donetsk-based “Agrarny Donbass” holding.
On the same day, the foreign “ministers” of the “DNR” and South Ossetia held talks about opening diplomatic missions in each “country”. It is unclear why after more than six years of “diplomatic relations” both entities have not managed to open “embassies” – despite the fact that “missions” were declared open in Luhansk and Donetsk back in 2015.
United Russia issues 100 membership cards each
Meanwhile, the Kremlin further deepened “political integration with Russia” by handing out the first membership cards for Putin’s United Russia party. As is typical for Moscow-orchestrated events, 100 cards each were issued to select separatist functionaries in Donetsk and Luhansk on 30 November. “LNR” leader Leonid Pasechnik was among the recipients at the Luhansk rally, while his “DNR” colleague Denis Pushilin got his card from United Russia chairman Dmitry Medvedev at a party convention in Moscow on 4 December. The fact that both “heads of state” now belong to the main political party of their neighbouring state does not only speak volumes about their independence. It also caused mockery by independent observers, who pointed out that Russia continues to misname the conflict as a “civil war”.
The Kremlin party has held a de facto monopoly for political campaigning in Donetsk and Luhansk in this summer’s run-up for the 19 September Russian Duma elections – eclipsing other pro-Kremlin parties like A Just Russia and the LDPR. United Russia and separatist leaders claimed that some 200,000 Russian passport-holders from the “DNR” and “LNR” had voted – out of more than 600,000 locals who have been given Russian passports under a fast-track scheme introduced by Putin in 2019 (see Newsletter 95).
Speaking to activists in Moscow after getting party membership, Pushilin said that all inhabitants of his “DNR” would get Russian passports. The exact number of inhabitants who remain in the People’s Republics” is not known. A census conducted in the “People’s Republics” in 2019 was never published, triggering speculation that the separatists found the population drain too embarrassing (see Newsletter 78). An estimate based on the birth rate puts the real population figure at 1.8 million, well below half the official figure.
Is the Delta wave finally receding?
After weeks of record high death and infection figures, the coronavirus pandemic seemed to recede in both Donetsk and Luhansk – in line with downward trends in Russia and Ukraine.
The “DNR” health “ministry” reported 190 weekly deaths as of 20 December, well below the 325 and 314 deaths respectively in the previous two weeks. Throughout November, the “DNR” had reported weekly death tolls of above 300, and in October even above 400.
That notwithstanding, the “DNR” official cumulative death toll is appallingly high. As of 20 December, the “DNR” reported a total of 8,944 COVID-deaths. Assuming a total population of 1.1 million, this translates into 8,130 deaths per million – higher than Peru’s 6,057 – the highest of any country in the world.
The “LNR”, which has always published dubiously low figures, reported just 24 weekly deaths by 20 December, compared to 46 each and in the two previous weeks. Health “minister” Natalia Pashchenko claimed on 13 December that the number of infections and hospitalizations had gone down – without naming concrete figures.
Both „Republics“ continued vaccination campaigns with the Russian single-dose Sputnik Light vaccine, the first component of Sputnik V. Despite catastrophic case and death numbers, vaccinations in the “People’s Republics” have been sluggish, not least because Sputnik Light, the only available vaccine, has been in short supply for months. On 25 November a Russian aid convoy delivered some 150,000 doses to the “LNR”, and 290,000 to the “DNR”. While separatist-controlled media campaigned heavily for vaccination, they did not disclose how many people have been vaccinated in total. Previous figures suggest a rate of just 20 per cent of the population (see Newsletter 96).
(edited)
