Written by Nikolaus von Twickel
Summary
Six weeks after Russia annexed them, the “People’s Republics” went through fresh government reshuffles, with more Moscow-trained professionals taking senior positions. The “LNR” Foreign Ministry and Prosecutor General’s office were the first institutions to be dissolved with similar moves expected in the “DNR”. But it remained to be seen if and how incorporation into Russian state structures will affect local politics.
“LNR” dissolves Ministry, appoints Rosatom-linked Russians
The “LNR” on 11 and 12 November disbanded its Foreign “Ministry” and Prosecutor General’s office. The decrees about their dissolution were signed by Luhansk leader Leonid Pasechnik. They said that the processes will be organized two commissions – led by Foreign “Minister” Vladislav Deinego and prosecution official Alexander Mikhailichenko.
In the case of the Prosecutor General, the two top positions have been vacant since 16 September, when “LNR” Prosecutor General Sergei Gorenko and his deputy Yekaterina Steglenko were killed by a bomb blast in their office.
The Foreign “Ministry’s” website was still accessible but displayed a notice that it would cease to exist within two weeks. The “Ministry’s” Telegram channel kept reposting content from Russian state sources.
Similar dissolutions were expected in the “DNR”. Curiously, Donetsk Foreign “Minister” Natalya Nikonorova traveled to Syria and discussed post-annexation cooperation with President Bashar Assad on 21 October. “DNR Ambassador” to Moscow, Olga Makeeva, said on 21 October that she was reorganizing her “Embassy” to a representation of a Russian region. “LNR Ambassador” Rodion Miroshnik announced on on 9 November that he was leaving his post and would begin “new projects” (the “LNR” never bothered to open a representation in Moscow).
The “LNR” also appointed two more Russians to its energy “Ministry”: Ilya Yashin (unrelated to the Russian opposition politician) was announced as a new first deputy minister and Pavel Reich (Raikh) as deputy minister on 14 November.
According to their official biographies, both Yashin and Reich previously worked for Atomstroyexport, the Russian company engaged in constructing nuclear facilities abroad. This surely is no coincidence – the current “LNR Minister” Konstantin Zavizenov was a director at Atomstroyexport befor moving to Luhansk in August (see Newsletter 105). The Atomstroyexport connection is also a clear Kremlin footprint because it is a subsidiary of state nuclear holding Rosatom, which for many years was headed by Sergei Kiriyenko, who is currently the Kremlin official overseeing the occupied regions in Ukraine.
Nine deputy prime ministers in Donetsk
Russian officials were also promoted to influential positions in the “DNR government”: Rustam Mingazov and Yevgeny Solntsev were appointed first deputy prime ministers on 11 November.
Mingazov had been an official in the Russian Industry and Trade Ministry before moving to Donetsk in August as an advisor to “DNR” Prime Minister Vitaly Khotsenko, himself a former Moscow government official. Khotsenko and Mingazov had previously worked together in the Russian Trade Ministry and in the government of the southern Stavropol region, according to Russian media reports.
Solntsev is a former Russian Railways official who worked as an aide to Russian Construction Minister Irek Faizullin before moving to Donetsk in June, where he became one of Khotsenko’s deputies.
Pushilin also confirmed two deputy prime ministers in office – Vladimir Yezhikov (a former official in the Sevastopol city government) and Tatyana Pereverzeva (who had been overseeing budget since 2018) and elevated four officials to become deputy prime ministers in addition to their government posts: Chief of staff Denis Tsukanov, Energy Minister Andrei Chertkov, Industry Minister Vladimir Rushchak and Agriculture Minister Artyom Kramarenko.
Already on 8 November, Pushilin sacked deputy prime minister Vladimir Antonov, who had been overseeing social policies, and replaced him with Larisa Tolstikova, who hitherto headed the Labour “Ministry”.
The reshuffle means that Prime Minister Khotsenko will govern with a whopping nine deputies. Pushilin justified the move with a need to give more competences to ministers – who, as he claimed, had often cited a lack of authority when faced with criticism about their work.
Russia has in the past months transferred at least 23 officials to work in the “governments” of the “People’s Republics”, 14 of them in Donetsk. The transfers were explained with the need to implement “active integration” with Russia and its system of government.
Worries about Pasechnik
Meanwhile, there were signs that “LNR” leader Leonid Pasechnik is falling out of favor.
On 21 October, his Donetsk rival Pushilin got “elected” to the job of regional secretary of Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party. In Luhansk, however, Pasechnik put up a brave face while “LNR parliamentary speaker” Denis Miroshnichenko got elected to that post, which marks an upward climb on the career ladder – the Kremlin has used United Russia as a key vehicle to build political support inside the occupied Ukrainian territories.
It was unclear if this is related or not, but unlike for Pushilin, there was no public record of Pasechnik congratulating Putin for his 70th birthday on 7 October.
Russia’s annexation of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions demoted Pushilin and Pasechnik from (self-proclaimed) “heads of state” to leaders (“heads”) of Russian regions, it also resulted in the word “acting” (Russian acronym Врио) being added to their job titles decreed by President Vladimir Putin on 5 October – until “elections” will be held in September 2023. Both leaders are thought to have little real support among the local population.
Putin exempts students – but not teachers – from draft
Also unclear was the state of the mobilization in the “People’s Republics”. “DNR” leader Pushilin announced on 19 October that mobilization was no longer being implemented and said that university students should be exempted like in Russia. On 13 November, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that President Putin had signed a decree to exempt students from both “DNR” and “LNR”. However, the Kremlin had apparently forgotten about the students’ teachers – prompting the Duma to suggest later the same day that university lecturers, too, needed to be demobilized.
Earlier that day, Pushilin said that Russia’s Prosecutor General would look into the case of an 18-year old pupil who had been mobilized despite the fact that he was still at school. The case of Nikita Gladkikh got international attention after his mother Natalia said on exiled Russian TV station “Dozhd” that her son had been drafted during a school break and sent to Kherson under the guise of military training. However, there were no official comments in the “LNR” about the state of mobilization and neither Donetsk nor Luhansk announced an official end of the campaign.
The “People’s Republics” had ordered a general mobilization back on 19 February, five days before Russia’s invasion. The mobilization was subsequently implanted harshly and indiscriminately, leading to multiple complaints that Moscow was treating the local population as cannon fodder while it did not dare to mobilize its own people.
Putin only announced a “partial” mobilization for Russia on 21 September, when preparations for “referenda” and annexation in the occupied Ukrainian regions were already underway. He declared mobilization over on 31 October, after Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said that 300,000 men had been mobilized. A report by the independent Astra Telegram channel on 9 November said that at least 20 mobilized Russians are being held in cellars and illegal detention centres in the “LNR” for their refusal to fight.
High “DNR” casualties continue
Low morale and little military training continue to lead to soaring casualty figures among the armed formations of the “People’s Republics”, which apparently are now being integrated into the Russian armed forces (known as “People’s Militias”, they are thought to have been commanded by Russian officers all along).
According to official figures released by Donetsk ombudswoman Daria Morozova, the “DNR” suffered 105 killed and 441 injured servicepeople in the week up to 10 November, 102 killed and 364 injured in the week before. Among those killed was “DNR” MP Milhail Zhukov, who died at the front south of Donetsk on 8 November.
Overall, the “DNR” reported 3,746 soldiers as killed and another 15,794 injured since the beginning of the year – very high numbers considering that the “DNR” forces probably number just above 10,000 (more than half of the combined separatist forces of 20,000) and that its population is believed to be just 1.2 million (see our Annual Report 2021, p 8). Donetsk field commander and prolific blogger Alexander Khodakovsky suggested on 5 November that up to 60 per cent of Russian losses in Mariupol – where “DNR” forces are thought to have taken the brunt of the fighting – had been cause by friendly fire.
The “LNR” does not release any meaningful casualty figures.
