Written by Nikolaus von Twickel
Summary
The “People’s Republics” accompanied the massing of Russian forces along Ukraine’s eastern border in March and April with some propaganda – but there were few signs of significant military mobilization inside them. The COVID crisis continued to grip the region and there was little evidence that the official vaccination drive was having success. The economic slump lingers, and the separatists continued to arrest and sentence seemingly random people for “espionage”.
Donetsk and Luhansk began drafting recruits in April
On 1 April, Pushilin and his “LNR” colleague Leonid Pasechnik both announced military drafts – apparently the first since 2014. The synchronized announcements between Donetsk and Luhansk clearly indicate that this was an order from Moscow rather than a local initiative. However, both “republics” said that they were drafting 200 recruits for a six-month-period – making the move a purely symbolical one in military terms, especially compared to the more than 100,000 troops that were drawn up in neighbouring Russia and annexed Crimea.
“DNR” leader Denis Pushilin also visited military exercises on 30 March and attended a concert for fighters two weeks later.
The propaganda campaign parallel to the Russian deployment heated up on 3 April, when the “DNR” claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike had killed a child in a village outside Yenakiive. The incident was picked up in Moscow, where Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned of rising tension, the Investigative Committee opened a criminal case, and infamous TV host Vladimir Solovyev propagated the drone theory and “Ukraine kills children” narrative on his talk shows, despite that fact that a lot of evidence, like the location being a residential area far away from the frontline, pointed to an accident.
Over the next two weeks, Russian TV falsely reported the arrival of US and NATO troops in Ukraine, as documented by BBC Monitoring, while “DNR” commanders claimed that NATO instructors were training Ukrainian snipers in Mariupol and that well-equipped, unmarked soldiers speaking “a foreign language” had arrived outside Donetsk.
Russian and separatist officials also stuck to the narrative that Kyiv, not Moscow, was sending troops and provoking violence. Boris Gryzlov, the Kremlin’s envoy to the Trilateral Contact Group talks, on 17 March accused Ukraine of abandoning last summer’s additional ceasefire agreement and warned that any military adventures “will end very badly” for Ukraine. Dmitry Kozak, the Kremlin’s point man for eastern Ukraine, claimed that this was political theatre staged by President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in order to detract from domestic problems. “This is a PR move accompanied by an imitation of military threat,” Kozak said on 8 April. He added, however, that Russia would protect the “People’s Republics” in the case of a Ukrainian attack.
The whole episode ended on 22 April, when Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that most of the troops would return to their bases, although not military hardware and formations located in annexed Crimea.
The exact reasons for the Russian military build-up remains unclear, but it has often been linked to the start of the new US administration’s foreign policymaking and the Kremlin’s desire to remind the White House that it can easily reset the agenda in Ukraine. President Joe Biden’s first phone calls with Zelenskiy on 2 April and with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 13 April fell right in the middle of the crisis.
However, the Kremlin’s direct gain from this remains unclear. Its main immediate demand, that Kyiv begins direct negations with the separatists, was not met. When Pushilin and Pasechnik offered to meet with Zelenskiy along the contact line in parallel video addresses on 22 April, Ukraine responded hours later by reiterating its principal refusal. Two days earlier, Zelenskiy had suggested to meet with Putin “in any location in Donbass”.
Number of Russian passports crosses the half million mark
Meanwhile, the separatists drive to achieve integration with Russia wherever possible, continued unabatedly. The number of local inhabitants who hold Russian passports surpassed the 500,000 mark in mid-April, with 215,000 of them in the “LNR”, according to interior “Minister” Igor Kornet. As of 2 May, the number had risen to almost 530,000, according to a report by the Tass state news agency, which quoted Russian Interior Ministry figures.
However, Ukrainian ombudswoman Lyudmila Denisova said on 27 April that to her information the number of Russian citizens inside the “People’s Republics” stood at 583,000, among them 67,000 minors under 18. Denisova added that Ukraine expects this number to grow to more than 2 million until 2024. Similar figures were released earlier by the Ukrainian NGO Eastern Human Rights Group, who added that the Kremlin was trying to speed up the handing out of Russian passports.
The Kremlin’s policy of issuing passports fast-track to locals, which began in 2019, has been criticized as a breach of the Minsk agreement. It also raised fears that Russia could use the presence of its citizens as a pretext for another invasion.
Coronavirus case numbers high, vaccination numbers unclear
The COVID-pandemic also continued to grip Donetsk and Luhansk, despite grand promises of mass immunization with the Russian Sputnik V vaccine. The “DNR” said on 4 May that 263 tests carried out in the past 24 hours had found 107 infections – a positive rate of 40.7 per cent. The health “ministry” has said repeatedly that it has too few tests to show the real case numbers and was adding dozens of cases daily established “clinically” – i.e. by merely looking at symptoms. In addition to that, the “ministry” daily reports cases of “pneumonia”, thought to be suspected COVID-19 cases.
According to official “DNR” figures, a total of 2551 people have died of COVID-19 by May 5. Assuming a real population of 1.1 million (see Newsletter 83), this amounts to a cumulative death toll of 2,300 per 1 million people, almost as high as Czechia’s, one of the hardest hit countries worldwide.
Separatist leader Pushilin reiterated in an interview with Russian state news agency RIA Novosti on 3 May that the “DNR” wants to achieve herd immunity by vaccinating 1 million people by the end of the year. However, he refused how many people have been vaccinated so far, saying only that all members of the military (the “People’s Militia”) had received the necessary two shots.
The “DNR” has so far confirmed the arrival of just two parties with Sputnik V – in late January and early March – and Pushilin has suggested that each contained 25,000 doses. Because Sputnik V requires two shots, it would take another 1.95 million doses to reach Pushilin’s goal. But reports from Russia suggest that Sputnik V is in short supply, especially in the regions, where there are waiting lists. While Moscow is clearly banking on the propagandistic value of vaccine exports to countries in Europe and elsewhere, it would be surprising if it decided to send more vaccine to Donetsk and Luhansk at the expense of its own supplies.
The situation in the “LNR” is probabl similar. However, the case and death numbers released by the Luhansk separatists are so much lower than those in Donetsk that they can hardly be credible. As of 6 May, they reported just 408 deaths, just a fifth of the “DNR” figures, despite an estimated population of 0.8 million. As did Pushilin, “LNR” leader Leonid Pasechnik declared on 5 April that all members of the “People’s Militia” had been fully vaccinated – without saying how many militiamen and -women this means.
In a sign that authorities are worried about another spike in infections, the “DNR” health “ministry” recommended that citizens should behave carefully and practice social distancing during the upcoming May holiday season. The “LNR” even cancelled all public events save the victory day parade on 9 May.
More economic woes
Unsurprisingly, the economic crisis continued, too. In the “LNR” there were reports about another strike at the Alchevsk Metals Factory, also known by its Russian acronym AMK. Workers went on strike after receiving just 29 per cent of December’s wages and are planning a protest march to Luhansk on “Republic Day” 12 May, the Russian website Politnavigator reported on 23 April. According to the report, the factory, which employs some 10,000 people, is largely standing still because of a lack of raw materials. On 6 May, the anonymous Telegram channel “Secrets of the Lugansk Republic” reported that workers had rejected an offer from executives to pay them the full outstanding January wage and parts of February’s.
The Alchevsk Factory is part of the portfolio run by the Vneshtorgservis holding, which has been in financial trouble already before the pandemic began in spring 2020. The super-secretive holding is believed to be run by former Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Kurchenko, a close ally of former President Viktor Yanukovych. Both Kurchenko and Yanukovych fled to Russia in 2014.
In the “DNR”, the Donetsk Metals Factory (DMZ) was transferred in January from Vneshtorgservis to an unnamed investor. In March, the Ukrainian Novosti Donbassa news site reported that the investor was Igor Andreev, a local businessman who owns food production plants, including one for pelmeni, and the “Gerkules-Moloko” supermarket chain.
No news from prisoners
There was no news about those recent arrested in the “DNR”. Worries about the well-being of blogger and political commentator Roman Manekin were raised after his Vkontakte account was hijacked in late April. According to former separatist official turned dissident Andrei Purgin, Manekin’s account was used to send private messages with threats to his friends on the social network. Manekin’s Facebook page was apparently handed over to the anonymous Telegram channel “Donetsky Aborigen” in December.
Manekin was arrested and accused of espionage by the infamous State Security “Ministry” in December – see Newsletter 86. There was also no news about the other prominent arrested – former kickboxer, self-defence force leader and backer of separatist leader Pushilin, Roman Troshin, and Roman Leshchenko, a former administration head for slain separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko.
The practice of seemingly random arrests and handing down of long prison sentences, mainly for espionage, continued. On 23 April, a Donetsk court gave a 2.5-year jail sentence to a woman apparently for criticizing separatist leaders on social networks. In Luhansk, on 30 March, the top “LNR” court handed a 17-year sentence to a member of the separatist armed formation for espionage and terrorism. On 6 May, the same court Sentenced another man to 12 years for espionage. Both men had arrived in the “LNR” as part of prisoner swaps with Ukraine, raising the specter that future swaps will be dogged by suspicions against freed prisoners.
