Written by Nikolaus von Twickel
Summary
While they reported record COVID-death figures, the “People’s Republics” launched an unprecedented campaign against the OSCE Mission, which was followed by a military escalation in the south of the Donetsk region.
Ukraine destroys howitzer with combat drone
The “DNR” reacted unusually restrained on the news that Ukraine had used a Bayraktar TB2 combat drone to destroy an artillery weapon. The Ukrainian Defence Ministry said on 26 October that it had eliminated a 122-mm howitzer of the “Russian-terrorist forces” outside the village of Boikivske (Telmanovo) south of Donetsk with the Turkish-built drone. It added that the howitzer had been used for a 25 October attack on the government-held village of Hranitne, killing a Ukrainian serviceman and injuring another.
The incident marks the first time that such a drone has been used in the war and drew criticism from Russia, who argued that it violated the Minsk Agreement, while Germany and France warned that this might cause further escalation.
While the Agreement does not prohibit the use of national drones (only foreign ones are banned), the additional “Measures to strengthen the ceasefire” of July 2020 explicitly ban the “operation of any types of aerial vehicles”. Kyiv argued that it violated nothing because it followed the communication rules for the return of fire laid out in the additional measures and stressed that Russia had violated the Agreement by using heavy artillery.
However, “DNR” mouthpiece DAN did not confirm the attack, merely quoting “Foreign Minister” Natalia Nikonorova as saying on 27 October that reports about a Bayraktar attack were “being investigated”, while the armed formations (“People’s Militia”), usually super-ager to accuse Ukraine of every possible transgression remained silent on this. On 31 October DAN published a lengthy report in which Russian military analyst Alexei Leonkov argues that the “republics” should use surface-to-air missile systems like Strela-10 and Osa to defend themselves against Bayraktar attacks. These Soviet-developed systems are used by both Russia and Ukraine and Leonkov merely said that they “exist in the republics” without saying who stationed them there.
Ukraine accused of crossing contact line
Instead, separatist leaders focused on accusing Ukrainian forces of taking Staromarivka, a frontline village in the same area. “Foreign Minister” Nikonorova said on 26 October that Ukrainian forces had attempted to take the village. One day later, “DNR” leader Denis Pushilin said on Russian state TV that government forces had succeeded.
While the Ukrainian military denied the claim, the censor.net outlet reported on 30 October that Staromarivka had indeed been taken by soldiers of an infantry brigade. Oleksiy Arestovych, the spokesman for Ukraine’s delegation to the Minsk Contact Group talks explained one day later that the soldiers had carried out “an operation to protect civilians” that was misinterpreted by the opponents as an offensive. A local government official, Volodymyr Veselkin, said earlier, that Ukraine requested for a local ceasefire to send coal and other humanitarian aid to the villagers. The Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on 29 October detected two pontoon bridges in the Kalmius river next to Hranitne, which would have been used to bring troops to Staromarivka and could have triggered the artillery attack.
Staromarivka is a small village south of HranitStaromarivka is a small village south of Hranitne, located on the opposite (eastern or left) bank of the Kalmius. Because the river forms the “contact line” between the warring sides at this point, Staromarivka is nominally non-government-controlled – although there are no “DNR” military positions inside it. Locals go to neighbouring Hranitne for shopping and to school their children. The village’s position in limbo is also reflected in the Monitoring Mission reports by the OSCE, which in March 2018 and April 2016 called Staromarivka “government-controlled”, while referring to it as “non-government-controlled“ in May and October 2018.
OSCE Monitors held in hotel
The episode followed an earlier round of tensions when the OSCE Mission members in Donetsk where held up by pro-Russian activists outside their hotel, who set up a protest camp effectively preventing the Mission from patrolling for more than one week between 15 and 23 October.
The camp ostensibly aimed to raise awareness for the arrest of a separatist fighter by Ukrainian forces. However, the detainee was not from Donetsk nor from the “DNR” but from the “LNR” – and similar detentions have happened in the past without consequences. Andrey Kosyak was detained on 13 October during an operation to clear vegetation at the (unopened) crossing point in Zolote. The Ukrainian side accused him of gathering reconnaissance of government positions. Kosyak, a local from Alchevsk who had obtained a Russian passport, was also accused of committing a murder back in 2010.
The fact that the protest to free Kosyak was staged (apparently teachers were ordered to take part) in Donetsk rather than at the OSCE Mission in Luhansk points to a concerted propaganda campaign – for which circumstances in Donetsk were deemed more favorable than in Luhansk. The reason for the campaign remains unclear – but it is probably no coincidence that it happened during a visit by US Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland to Moscow. The Kremlin has in the past been accused of using its leverage in eastern Ukraine to pressure Washington and the West, eg when it massed troops along the border with Ukraine in spring (see Newsletter 87). When the camp was unceremoniously dissolved on 23 October – under the pretext of COVID-restrictions, no meaningful concessions had been made.
New COVID-records in Donetsk
Despite some restrictions to public life, COVID-death figures continued to soar in both Donetsk and Luhansk. As of 1 November, the “DNR” reported 6,697 deaths, which corresponds to 6,088 deaths per 1 million inhabitants, assuming a real population of 1.1 million. For comparison, Bosnia-Herzegowina, Europe’s hardest-hit country, had a death toll of 3,522 per 1 million.
The “DNR” death toll hit a new record on 16 October, when the weekly tally according the separatist health “Ministry” reached 471. In the following week, that number fell to 381, only to rise again to 459 in the week up to 31 October. As before, the official case numbers (a total of 86,823) reflected only a fraction of real numbers because of a severe shortage of tests – which the “Ministry” acknowledged in its daily positive rates of 40 per cent and higher.
The “DNR” had introduced further restrictions on 25 October, including a ban on public events with spectators and limits on clubs, theatres and cinemas to fill their premises with just 50 per cent and allowing only vaccinated, tested or recovered. However, gyms and restaurants seemed to be only partially affected.
Deaths in the “LNR” also soared to new heights. The Luhansk separatists reported an unprecedented 407 fatalities in the week up to 17 October, almost as many as the much larger “DNR” did in the same week. The subsequent weekly figures where 275 and 263 respectively.
The “LNR” numbers are all the more startling because the Luhansk separatists have reported dubiously low numbers throughout the pandemic, with usually just a handful of daily deaths – until this September. In an analysis published on 22 October, the Ukrainian Realnaya Gazeta writes that one third of all COVID deaths in the “LNR” happened in the first 20 days of October.
Vaccine troubles
The situation with vaccinations remains equally dire. According to the Realnaya Gazeta report, the “LNR” has vaccinated just 121,000 people by the end of September – some 17 per cent of an assumed real population of 700,000. The “DNR” had vaccinated 225,000 by late August, 20 per cent of a population of 1.1 million. Worse, most of those vaccinated, 79,000 in the “LNR” and 175,000 in the “DNR” received the single-dose Sputnik Light vaccine (the rest got Sputnik V).
Sputnik Light is basically the first dose of the two-component Sputnik V vaccine. It was launched this summer amid reports of production problems for the second Sputnik component. The Russian Health Ministry on 30 October acknowledged doubts about its efficiency when it recommended that Sputnik Light should be used only for booster vaccinations, i.e. third doses, because it does not immunize strong enough against the prevailing Delta variant.
Moreover, reports on social media suggested that even Sputnik Light was hard to get in the “People’s Republics”. The “DNR” health “ministry” said on 20 October that a fresh shipment from Russia would arrive in November.
Former health “minister” makes dire demographic predictions
The COVID-catastrophe is believed to put extra strain on the “People’s Republics” who have been suffering massive population decline and brain drain since 2014. Former “DNR” health minister Olga Dolgoshapko, who now acts as an adviser to Pushilin, said in an interview published on 22 October that the population decline in 2020 was stronger than in the war years 2014 and 2015 and warned that the figures for 2021 will be even worse.
Dolgoshapko explained that the crude birth rate (births per 1,000 population) in the “DNR” for 2020 was 3.8, while the crude death rate (deaths per 1,000) was as high as 15.7 – meaning that the rate of natural increase (actual natural decrease) is minus 11.9, more than double the rate of Bulgaria (- 5.8) , Latvia (-4.8) and Lithuania (-4.7), who were at the bottom of a 2017 league table.
If that trend is not broken, the population will continue to die out. “In 95 years, Donbass will be without people,” Dolgoshapko is quoted as saying.
Number of Russian passport holders probably above 600,000
The “DNR” said on 26 October, that 824,000 people had received “republican” passports. Restrictions gradually introduced by the separatist de facto authorities are making life more and more difficult for Ukrainian passport holders. Possession of separatist-issued passports is also mandatory for receiving a Russian passport. However, by 25 October Russian passports had been issued to just 333,000 locals, less than half those eligible.
The “LNR” said in June that more than 250,000 of its inhabitants have received Russian passports. Assuming that issuing for the “LNR” has continued, the overall number of Russian citizens in both “republics” is now most likely above 600,000.
