Written by Nikolaus von Twickel
Summary
Separatist leaders claimed a customs union between “DNR” and “LNR” as a road to economic boom, in what looked more like a ploy to cover up economic failure. Local participation in the Duma elections was praised as a milestone to “integration with Russia”, while the published figures for online and offline voting are dubious. The coronavirus pandemic worsened considerably, prompting the re-introduction of restrictions.
Customs union between Donetsk and Luhansk
The establishment of a customs union between both “People’s Republics” quickly became the most talked about development in eastern Ukraine for a long time. Separatist leaders claimed that this would usher economic growth and improved living conditions. Independent observers suggested that this would improve Moscow’s control without having to merge the two “republics”.
On 1 October separatist outlets published photos of workers dismantling checkpoints at the four crossing points over what until 2014 was an insignificant administrative line between two Ukrainian regions but later was labelled an “international boundary” and effectively closed for traffic und the pretext of the pandemic in 2020.
The move came after both separatist leaders Denis Pushilin and Leonid Pasechnik on 15 October signed an agreement during an online conference to establish such a union, which was duly ratified by both parliaments on 22 October. At an earlier online meeting on 6 September, the “republics” solemnly declared the creation of a joint economic space combined with a string of promises, including pay rises, the creation of 70,000 jobs as well as improvements in housing, infrastructure and living standards, all in the three-year period from 2022 to 2024.
However, the declaration really is a confession that earlier goals have been missed. Thus, “DNR” leader Pushilin promised back in January 2020 that wages and pensions would rise to the level of those in the neighbouring Russian region of Rostov by January 2022. Now, this goal is being moved to 2024.
According to official data, “DNR” average wages will more than double from currently 15,000 roubles (180 euros) to 35,000 roubles. However, the Rostov average wage is already closer to 40,000 roubles, while a Radio Liberty report said in June that real average wages in Donetsk were just under 10,000 roubles – meaning that wages in the “DNR” would actually have to quadruple.
Separatists admit new search for Investors
In another clear sign of economic gloom, “LNR” leader Pasechnik admitted during the 6 September declaration that both republics have to look for investors to develop their struggling industry. He did not explain why. The separatists officially announced in June that Yevgeny Yurchenko, a hitherto obscure Russian investor, had taken over much of the industrial assets hitherto controlled by the secretive Vneshtorgservis holding since 2017 (see Newsletter 90). Yurchenko then toured plants and promised stable wage payments.
But he has not been seen or heard since appearing at a ceremony for Metallurgy Worker’s Day with Pushilin on 17 July.
The fact that Moscow opted for two “People’s Republics” rather than one in eastern Ukraine is usually explained by the fact that it wants to formally adhere to the Minsk Agreement, which stipulates that Ukraine should remain territorially intact and was signed by both “heads of republics” at the time (although without their titles).
Ukrainian observers often argue that it is easier for Moscow to control two weaker entities than one large one. Oleksiy Arestovych, the spokesman of Kyiv’s delegation to the Trilateral Contact Group, suggested in a 3 October TV interview that the two “republics” also reflect inter-agency rivalry in Moscow: “Rumor has it that the “LNR” was controlled by the military intelligence service GRU while the “DNR” was under the “FSB”, he said, adding that Moscow had decided to bring the flow of goods and illicit profits under central control.
However, Donetsk-based economist Anton Guryanov argued that faced with an ongoing stalemate in the Minsk peace talks with Ukraine, Moscow had to do something to improve the dire economic situation. “It has become clear that the drowning will have to save themselves .. and that in order to seriously improve the economy you need to establish integration ..without waiting for Ukraine’s reaction,” Guryanov was quoted as saying in an article published by the Russian Kommersant newspaper on 30 September. The same article also quoted Moscow-based analyst Denis Denisov, who argued that lifting customs barriers would first and foremost improve the Kremlin’s control by removing corruption-prone bureaucratic hurdles. He added that this was unlikely to bring economic development and that a political union was unlikely at this point.
Separatists remain separate – even when visiting other separatists
Ongoing political differences between Luhansk and Donetsk could be seen on 20 September, when members from both “parliaments” visited separatist South Ossetia for “Republic Day” celebrations. While both delegations met with de facto President Anatoly Bibilov – first “DNR” and then “LNR”, their respective media outlets mentioned the presence of MPs from the other “People’s Republic” not at all or just in passing.
Similarly, “DNR” mouthpiece DAN did not mention the presence of “LNR” officials when it reported about the visit of a delegation from Donetsk to Syria on 30 September. The delegation, headed by Pushilin’s secretive first deputy chief of staff Gennady Lebed, took part in the Re-Build Syria trade fair from 29 September and 2 October.
On 7 October, the “LNR” Foreign “Ministry” said that it also had a delegation at the same trade fair. However, neither the “Ministry” nor the official outlet LITs mentioned the presence of “DNR” officials or the exact dates of the visit.
Separatists hail Duma elections amid doubts about local turnout
Separatist leaders and Russian officials unsurprisingly praised the participation of local inhabitants in the Duma elections in September as another milestone on the road to integration with Russia, but did not mention the turnout nor any democratic practices. Thus, Pushilin claimed on 23 September that more than 150,000 Russians from the “DNR” had voted – i.e. 67 per cent of the 221,850 eligible voters.
During the three election days from 17 to 19 September, Russian passport holders were allowed to vote online or in ballot stations in the neighbouring Rostov region. A report on the website of the Rostov branch of the United Russia party said that about 150,000 Russians from both “DNR” and “LNR” voted online – accounting for more than half of the 280,000 votes cast online in the region. Local election commission head Andrei Burov claimed on 20 September that another 49,800 voters from the “republics” had been bused to ballot stations in the Rostov region.
While online voting during this election was widely criticized as fraudulent and non-transparent, the claimed number of voters bussed from the “People’s Republics” also seemed dubiously high. The anonymous Telegram channel Donbass Case said that only a fraction of the claimed 800 busses and 12 trains actually drove across the border, and that just 2,723 out of 940,000 inhabitants of Donetsk voted in Russia.
According to official results, President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party got 51.59 per cent from the party list in Rostov – only slightly more than the party’s overall tally of 49.8 per cent. Voters without local residency – those from “DNR” and “LNR” – could only vote for party lists. The Rostov turnout was given with 48.8 per cent, slightly below the federal turnout of 51.7 per cent.
Alexander Borodai, the Moscow political consultant who in 2014 became the first “Prime Minister” of the “DNR”, stood on the Rostov party list, but it was not clear immediately if he will get a Duma seat. On 4 October his “Union of Donbass Volunteers” confirmed that Borodai had been elected when it congratulated him.
COVID death toll reaches new record
Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic worsened considerably, with hospitals being overwhelmed with patients and record death figures, even according to official figures. Thus, the “DNR” reported an unprecedented 356 deaths in the week up to 10 October. This was up from 302 in the week before, which again was almost double the 161 deaths reported for the week up to 26 September.
The “LNR” also showed a massive upward trend despite sticking to its tradition of reporting dubiously low figures. Weekly deaths in the “LNR” jumped from 92 in the week up to 19 September to 151 in the following week and to 172 by 3 October.
As of 10 October the “DNR” had officially reported a total of 5,386 deaths from COVID-19. Based on an assumed population of 1.1 million, this renders the “DNR” death rate per million at 4,896 – by far the worst in Europe, where the highest per capita death toll has now been recorded in Bosnia with 3,328 per million.
Social media users posted photos of many ambulances waiting outside a Donetsk clinic in order to deliver COVID-patients and large numbers of patients waiting for treatment and x-raying. The “DNR” and “LNR” began designating hospitals for COVID-treatment, including birth clinics, meaning that they would stop taking other patients.
The spike forced the “republics” to reintroduce restrictions on public life – albeit far from strict lockdowns. “DNR” leader Pushilin decreed on 24 September that restaurants can only fill half of their places, sports matches must be held without spectators and banning mass events with more than 50 participants. The “DNR” also prolonged school holidays to 21 days while in Luhansk at least 12 schools had switched to online lessons. The “DNR” kept their crossings with government-controlled Ukraine largely closed while the “LNR” imposed further restrictions on their only crossing point in Stanitsya Luhanska – people wanting to cross now need to be on previously approved lists.
Despite this, the Donetsk city administration said on 8 October that some 12,000 people participated in a large-scale subbotnik (public cleaning) and did not cancel planned concerts like one by Russian pop singer Oleg Gasmanov on 14 November.
Patchy information about vaccinations
The “DNR” said on 29 September that about 200,000 inhabitants have been vaccinated with the Russian-made Sputnik V and its single-dose variant “Sputnik Light” since vaccinations began in February. However, it was unclear if any more doses are available. The last shipments from Russia were reported on 28 July and 9 August, when the “DNR” said that it received 85,000 and 90,000 doses of Sputnik Light respectively (the “LNR” also received doses but did not say how many).
Donetsk health “minister” Alexander Oprishchenko said also on 28 July that 50,000 people had been vaccinated so far and that the “DNR” wanted to achieve herd immunity by winter, which would mean on 1 December. Even assuming a real population of just 1.1 million this seems an extremely ambitious task.
The fight against the pandemic is dogged in both Russia and Ukraine by low levels of trust in vaccines – according to a survey released in September, 56 per cent of Ukrainians say that they will not get vaccinated. Another complicating factor is that Ukraine does not recognize the Russian vaccines, which have been approved neither by the WHO nor by the EU. Russia, on the other hand, does not yet offer any vaccines to its population other than those produced domestically.
(edited 11 October 2021)
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(featured image by Jeroen Akkermans, used under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
