Written by Nikolaus von Twickel

Summary

While the coronavirus crisis showed no signs of going away, the “People’s Republics” stepped up their aggressive rhetoric against Ukraine and put their armed formations on combat readiness. While the move is most likely propaganda to mark the first anniversary of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, there were signs that Moscow’s interest in its proxies is waning.

Donetsk and Luhansk raise combat readiness

Separatist leaders marked the first anniversary of President Zelenskiy’s inauguration on 20 May with sabre rattling and fresh accusations against Ukraine.

“LNR” leader Leonid Pasechnik began with in a statement issued on the evening of 19 May, where he said that his “People’s Militia” had been put on alert and threatened “more decisive steps” if Ukraine did not stop shelling. A day earlier, Pasechnik had claimed that shelling at the front-line village of Berezivske on 15 May had damaged an power line that delivers electricity to the Alchevsk Metals Plant, the biggest industrial enterprise inside the “LNR”.

That incident was corroborated by a spot report by the Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), whose staff had come under fire in Berezivske that day.

“DNR” leader Denis Pushilin followed suit on 20 May, when he blamed Ukraine for a deteriorating situation along the front line since 1 May and claimed that government forces had violated the ceasefire more than 250 times, killing one civilian and injuring 11. In an interview with the Russian propaganda website RIAFAN, he reiterated his claim that Zelenskiy “has blood on his hands” and that the outlook for reaching compromise with Kyiv was bleak. On 21 May, Pushilin stepped up his rhetoric, saying in a statement that all military units were battle ready.

However, the OSCE Monitoring Mission did not report any massive escalation. In a status report issued on 18 May, the Mission said that it recorded about 10,500 ceasefire violations between 4 and 17 May, compared to about 9,800 in the previous two-week period. (For comparison, in October 2019 that figure stood at 17,000).

The aggressive statements continued, however. On 26 May, the “LNR” said that infantry and tank units had been deployed to frontline positions. One day earlier, Pushilin was filmed donating blood at a Donetsk clinic and called on the population to donate blood because of the escalation along the front line. Neither the report on Pushilin’s website nor the official DAN news site’s report mentioned the more likely reason, common all around the world, namely that blood banks are running out of stock as people no longer donate because they fear being infected with coronavirus (see below).

Furthermore, neither Pushilin nor Pasechnik are thought to have any command of the separatist “People’s Militia”, which are led by professional Russian officers – a fact that was ridiculed by Igor Girkin, the Russian agent who served as “DNR” Defence “Minister” in 2014. In an online question and answer show on 22 May, Girkin, who is also known as Strelkov, quipped that both separatist leaders had as much authority over the armed formations as he does over the Bolshoi Theatre: ”none”.

No progress in talks despite Kozak visit to Berlin

The backdrop to the separatist sabre-rattles is the continuing impasse at the Trilateral Contact Group talks. Hopes of holding another “Normandy 4” summit of the leaders of France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia by late April were dashed – first by the failure to agree on a new ceasefire, more troop withdrawals and crossing points – and second by the  coronavirus crisis which forced the Contact Group negotiations into online format.

Much speculation centered on a surprise visit of Dmitry Kozak – the Kremlin’s new point man for eastern Ukraine – to Berlin on 13 May, where he held talks with Jan Hecker, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s chief foreign policy advisor. Despite Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s assurances that he was informed of the talks, the fact that no Ukrainian officials were present caused concern in Kyiv that a solution was being sought behind its back.

Kozak said after the Berlin talks that they had achieved a mutual understanding of further steps, which would be an impulse for upcoming negotiations. However, the ensuing Contact Group talks achieved nothing of this sort. After the round on May 27 Russian chief negotiator Boris Gryzlov accused Kyiv of preventing progress in every respect.

Adding a new twist to the already complex negotiations, Ukraine began to argue that the separatist envoys at the Contact Group cannot represent the local population because they hold Russian citizenship. Addressing an OSCE-meeting on 21 May, Ukraine’s Ambassador Yevhenii Tsymbaliuk presented copies of the Russian passports of “DNR”-leader Pushilin and his envoy Natalia Nikonorova as well as “LNR”-envoy Vladislav Deinego.

This notwithstanding, Ukrainian media speculated that Moscow is losing interest in Donbass. A documentary by “Donbass Public TV” aired on 23 May argued that the Kremlin introduced more compromising tactics well before the coronavirus pandemic – like by replacing the hardline ideologue Vladislav Surkov with the more pragmatic Kozak as chief strategist for Donbass.

More COVID-19-related deaths

Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic continued to spread inside the “People’s Republics”, although official figures suggest a smaller scale as initially feared.

The “DNR” said on 28 May that it had 469 cases, including 15 deaths. The “LNR” said that it had 393 cases, including six deaths. Assuming a remnant population of 2,5 million (more than 1 million people are thought to have left the “People’s Republics” since 2014), the overall case number of 862 translates into 34 cases per 100,000 inhabitants – much less than Russia’s 258 and even below Ukraine’s 53 cases.

However, the figures from the “People’s Republics” are significantly higher than those in the adjacent government-controlled areas of Ukraine, which despite a roughly similar population reported just 203 cases by 28 May – 158 cases (including 4 deaths) in the Donetsk region and 45 (including three deaths) the Luhansk region.

Both “Republics” introduced quarantine measures much later than Ukraine and Russia, leading to fears that coronavirus would spread rapidly among the extremely overaged local population (see Newsletter 74).

But “DNR” Health “Minister” Olga Dolgoshapko refuted Ukrainian accusations that the separatists were underreporting COVID-19-figures. “All these reports aim to tarnish the Republic”, she was quoted as saying by the official DAN news site on 27 May. Dolgoshapko admitted however, that three hospitals were currently closed or partially closed after infections spread among hospital staff. Earlier, the “minister” confirmed shortages of protective equipment for medical staff.

Among the seven dead were at least three doctors: The “LNR” said that a Luhansk head doctor died on 18 May and an otolaryngologist from Pervomaisk died on 5 May, while the Ukrainian Novosti Donbassa news site reported that a surgeon from Donetsk had died of COVID-19 on 25 May.

Dolgoshapko also claimed that the “DNR” has enough test kits, having just received a party of 10,000. She added that more than 3,000 tests had been carried out since mid-March. The “Minister” did not say how many tests are carried out in any given time period. The “LNR”, however, said on 20 May that it is testing on average 100 people per day and that it had already carried out some 5,000 tests – thus significantly more than the “DNR”. The separatists have admitted that their test kits come from Russia (see Newsletter 75).

Despite the rising infection numbers, the separatists began to relax some restrictions. Thus, the “DNR” said on 13 May that outdoor sports were allowed and that elderly people were no longer obliged to obey self-isolation, while the “LNR” announced that limitations on public transport will be lifted on 1 June.

Economic hardship

The separatists also continued to withhold information about the pandemic-induced quarantine’s stifling economic repercussions. There was virtually no information about the plight of the more than one million pensioners, many of whom depend on a second pension from Ukraine, which they cannot pick up since all crossing points were closed in March.

Reports that workers at the Stirol chemicals plant in Horlivka have not been paid for two years appeared only on social media. The “DNR” merely said in March that the plant, which used to employ 4,500 people, was being prepared for conservation, thus admitting that earlier promises to re-start production have failed (see Newsletter 51).

On 26 May Ukrainian media published an interview with a local television director, who had defected from the “DNR”. The man, who spoke under the pseudonym “Sergei” because he feared reprisals, said that the State Security “Ministry” prevented a strike among Stirol workers by summoning participants for questioning. “If people then continue to fight for justice, there will be a second, not very pleasant questioning,” he said. Known by their Russian acronym MGB, the State Security “Ministries” in Donetsk and Luhansk are infamous for using detention and torture in order to suppress dissent.

The defector added that the MGB also controls all local media outlets. A major strike at the “LNR”-controlled Nikanor-Novaya coalmine at the beginning of May was not mentioned by any separatist media. According to social media posts picked up by the Ukrainian Ostro.org news site, at least 32 of the strikers were later laid off without wage arrears being paid, while the remaining received threats from the MGB. The “LNR” announced in April that it will close unprofitable mines. On 14 May it said that at least 1,290 miners will be affected.

“DNR” leader Pushilin admitted fresh difficulties on 28 May, when he said that the Prosecutor General should control timely payment of wages to workers of the Donetsk Railway Company. He did not explain how prosecutors could make the company pay if it does not have any money. Furthermore, Pushilin’s statement suggests that last year’s promises of a merger of the Donetsk and Luhansk railways into a new Donbass Railway Company have not materialized (see Newsletter 63).

The end of Vneshtorgservis?

The financial strain has been linked to Vneshtorgservis, the secretive holding company that controls most industrial assets that were seized by the separatists in 2017. According to Russian media reports, Vneshtorgservis, or VTS, late last year had accumulated some 25 billion roubles debt versus coalmines and other plants in the “People’s Republics” (see our Annual Report 2019, p 8).

According to separatist officials, major VTS enterprises will form a new “state” holding called Energia Donbassa and controlled jointly by the “LNR” and “DNR”. In an interview published on 7 May, Luhansk separatist “Prime Minister” Sergei Kozlov said that Energia Donbassa will include Vostok Uglya, the state coal company which took control of Vneshtorgservis’ coalmines inside the “LNR”. It was unclear what this means for the future of VTS, a nominally private holding that has been linked to former Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Kurchenko. The anonymous Telegram channel “Lugansk Inside” claimed on 13 May that Kurchenko will continue control the state enterprises.

Trouble in the Information “Ministry”

Cracks in the “DNR” propaganda tactics appeared on 14 May, when separatist leader Pushilin formally reprimanded Information “Minister” Igor Antipov for allegedly inappropriate work of his “Ministry”. Tellingly, the disciplinary note was not published on the “Ministry” website dnronline.su.

The exact cause for Pushilin’s criticism remained unclear. One month earlier a scandal erupted over a talk show on a separatist-controlled TV channel, in which participants debated the reintroduction of Soviet-style punitive psychiatry against critical internet users. On 14 April, the next day, the show’s host Maya Pirogova announced that she had been laid off from the Information “Ministry”, where she had been a key figure for years.

Pushilin already indirectly criticized the “ministry” – which controls the official media – in December, when he called upon editors to make their outlets more interesting (Annual Report 2019, p 9).

The Donetsk separatist leader himself suffered a PR debacle on 27 May, when unknown hackers hijacked his Twitter account, publishing a tweet in which Pushilin says that the “DNR armed forces committed ceasefire violations by shelling residential areas and offers condolences to victims. The tweet was still online on 29 May.