Written by Nikolaus von Twickel
Summary
The apparent transfer of responsibilities for the “People’s Republics” inside the Kremlin – a potentially pivotal moment in their history – was mentioned nowhere in the separatist-controlled media. Instead, “DNR” leader Pushilin continued his aggressive rhetoric against Ukraine, while admitting fresh wage arrears. The issuing of Russian passports to local inhabitants continued unabatedly and Moscow also sent batches of communal service vehicles to Donetsk and Luhansk.
No mention of Kozak or Surkov
Arguably the biggest news for the “People’s Republics” in a long time, the handing over of the Kremlin’s Donbass portfolio from Vladislav Surkov to Dmitry Kozak, was not reported by their official media. The last time that Surkov was mentioned was on 31 December, when he sent New Year congratulations to separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Surkov, who had been the Kremlin’s responsible official for Donbass since 2014, announced on 25 January via his de-facto spokesman Alexei Chesnakov that he was resigning from state service because of a change in policy vis-a-vis Ukraine. Chesnakov added that Surkov would explain himself after one month of “meditation”.
The announcement came one day after President Vladimir Putin appointed Kozak a deputy head of his administration – a more senior position than Surkov’s, who is an aide to the President. Kozak had been a deputy Prime Minister before and oversaw the economic situation in the “People’s Republics” – while Surkov was responsible for politics and ideology. Kozak’s pragmatic policies often clashed with Surkov’s hard-line approach – a fact that was confirmed last summer, when Chesnakov accused Kozak of planning to “hand over Donbass” in return for a lifting of western sanctions (see our Annual Report 2019, p5).
However, it remained unclear how Kozak’s promotion would play out for the “People’s Republics” and the peace talks in general. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed on 11 February that Kozak had been given the Ukraine portfolio, but added that his exact duties will be defined later. For the time being, Surkov remained on the Kremlin website while there were no discernible policy changes.
Pushilin attacks Ukraine, admits wage arrears
In fact, “DNR” leader Denis Pushilin, widely seen as Surkov’s handpicked candidate, continued his aggressive stance versus Ukraine. In a 12 February interview with the Russian regnum.ru website, he accused President Volodymyr Zelenskiy of actually stepping up the war and of taking a destructive position in the ongoing talks. He also reiterated his mantra that the “people of Donbass” want to become part of Russia and that, as long this was not possible, the “DNR” should try to achieve “maximum integration” with Russia.
On 4 February Pushilin admitted in an interview with his own Information “Ministry” that the “DNR” lacked cash to pay wages and pensions – only to promise that this would not happen again in February. Pushilin claimed that the shortages were due to “external factors” like falling metals prices and accounting “technicalities”.
Workers and pensioners have been putting up with payment arrears for much of the past year, because the trade blockade is hitting the local steel and coal-based economy hard. The current situation is aggravated by the fact that the separatists introduced price hikes of up to 30 per cent for electricity and public transport. Pushilin’s admission is all the more embarrassing, because one month earlier he and his Luhansk colleague Leonid Pasechnik promised to raise wages and pensions within two years to the level of the neighbouring Russian region of Rostov-on-Don (see our Annual Report, p 8).
No Russian convoys
The financial difficulties might be linked to the fact that no Russian aid convoys arrived this year. The convoys are believed to bring, among other things, Russian cash to the “People’s Republics” – a fact that was confirmed by former separatist official Eduard Matyukha in November. They used to come monthly, but stopped arriving in January 2019, only to resume on a weekly basis in the second half of the year. The twelfth and last arrived in Donetsk and Luhansk on 19 December.
Russia did, however, send batches of brand-new communal services vehicles. “Ministries” and official media ran numerous reports of garbage collectors, tractors and agricultural vehicles being handed over to local administrations. The “LNR” alone said that it “bought” more than 100 vehicles in 2019.
Pashkov suddenly acting for Prime Minister Ananchenko
In another mysterious turn, deputy “DNR” Prime Minister Vladimir Pashkov was suddenly mentioned as “acting” Chairman of the Government (Prime Minister) in a report about a meeting with Pushilin and other separatist officials by the official DAN news site. The incident made headlines in Ukrainian media, who suggested that “Prime Minister” Alexander Ananchenko had vanished.
Ananchenko has a penchant for secrecy and has appeared in public only twice since his appointment in autumn 2018 – the last time during a theatre opening on 14 December in Donetsk (see Newsletter 68). Pashkov’s new position was not mentioned on the “government” website and the official “DNR” site, run by the Information “Ministry”, has not mentioned him at all since October.
Both Ananchenko and Pashkov are linked to Vneshtorgservis, the secretive holding company that runs key industrial plants in both “People’s Republics”. Pashkov was the company’s CEO before becoming deputy prime minister in April, while Ananchenko is said to have been an advisor to Vneshtorgservis management before joining the “DNR” government. Their entry into the “DNR” leadership has been linked to Kozak’s efforts to raise managerial experience there.
Pashkov’s sudden promotion closely resembles a similar move that happened in the “LNR” in November, when first deputy prime minister Yury Govtvin was suddenly introduced as acting prime minister, only to lose that title again weeks later (see Newsletter 67).
Number of Russian passports rises
Meanwhile, the issuing of Russian passports to local inhabitants continued unabatedly. The Donetsk “People’s Republic” said on 11 February that almost 75,000 inhabitants have received them since June, and that another 16,000 applications were pending. In December the “DNR” said that 51,000 passports had been issued and another 20,000 applications were pending. Thus, Russia issued some 12,000 passports per month to the “DNR” alone. No comparable figures were available for the “LNR”.
Earlier figures from the Russian Interior Ministry suggest that some 100,000 Russian passports were issued between June and November last year (see Newsletter 69). However, Russia’s top migration official, Valentina Kazakova, claimed in January that 227,000 passports had been issued to inhabitants of the “People’s Republics”. Neither the separatists nor Russian officials have explained why the number could have risen that much.
