Written by Nikolaus von Twickel
Summary
The eight-year history of the “People’s Republics” culminated in their annexation by Russia – along with Kherson and parts of the Zaporizhzhia region – on 5 October, when President Vladimir Putin signed laws about their accession to the Russian Federation. This was preceded by rushed “referenda” held in all Russian-occupied territories between 23 and 27 September. The pace of events was clearly determined by Kyiv’s successful counteroffensive in Kharkiv and overshadowed by more Ukrainian military successes in Donbas and the Kherson region.
This newsletter will continue to update readers about the two Ukrainian regions, assuming that life and politics there will differ from Russia for as long as their occupation lasts.
“DNR” and “LNR” to become Russia’s first People’s Republics
The annexation treaties between Russia and the “DNR” and “LNR”, which were ratified by the Duma and the Federation Council on 3 and 4 October respectively, say in Article 2 that both will enter the Russian Federation as “People’s Republics”. This is a first, because Russia’s officially 85 federal subjects so far included republics, oblasts, krais and federal cities, but no “People’s Republics”, a term widely seen as a PR move coined by Vladislav Surkov, who was relieved of his duties as the Kremlin’s point man for Ukraine in early 2020. The treaties also stipulate a procedure for the inhabitants’ citizenship similar to the one for Crimea in 2014: They automatically become naturalized Russians unless they officially declare to opt out within one month’s time.
While some 700,000 locals are thought to have accepted Russian passports since Moscow began to actively distribute them in 2019, those who kept their Ukrainian passports now face a difficult choice, as German political scientist Fabian Burkhardt pointed out – either they become foreigners (and potential enemies of the state) in their own country, or they sign up to Russia’s repressive laws, which now apply to the annexed Ukrainian territories (albeit the “People’s Republics” have been more repressive than Russia for much of the past 8 years). This dilemma probably affects more than 1.5 million people – those inside the “People’s Republics” who had no Russian passports as of February 2022 (the real number of inhabitants was believed to be just over 2 million – see our Annual Report 2021 p 6 and 8), plus an unknown number of Ukrainians that remain in the areas conquered by Russia after 24 February. The Russian Foreign Ministry said on 4 October that the issuing of passports would be sped up.
Considerable confusion remained about the borders, in which Russia has annexed the four Ukrainian territories. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 3 October that the “People’s Republics” were being annexed in their 2014 boundaries (that is all of the Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk regions), despite the fact that Russian troops do not control them in full, and that that Moscow would “consult with local populations” of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions about where exactly their borders – i.e. Russia’s self-proclaimed borders – would be. On Russian State TV, the “LNR Ambassador” to Moscow Rodion Miroshnik admitted on 5 October that the North and Northwest of the “republic” were in danger of being retaken by Ukraine.
Other aspects of the annexation remain in limbo, with a more than three-year “transition period” until 1 January 2026 and a nebulous rule that laws passed during the past eight years are only valid as long as they do not contradict the Russian constitution.
While officials in the “republics” have been talking about “integration with Russia” for years, it remains to be seen how the new reality will spell out in practice – especially how the hitherto separatist leadership fares and if Moscow is ready to veto previous legislation seen as out of line with the Kremlin.
The republics had been nudged towards annexation during the past months, when Moscow packed local governments with more than 20 Russian officials, including a “Prime Minister”, several “ministers” and deputies. This already marked the end of the government system in place since late 2014, where practically all positions were filled with locals, while Russians acted as “curators” in the background, often anonymously.
Hasty referenda with no legitimacy
The annexation was justified with the results of “referenda”, which were held in the Russian-controlled areas of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Their hasty preparation spoke volumes about Moscow’s desperate motives. Both local and Russian officials had argued throughout August and early September that for security reasons referenda should be held only after the Donetsk region has been “liberated” (i.e. conquered) in full (see Newsletter 105).
However, concerns about the safety of civilians quickly flew out of the window after the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region shifted the frontline dangerously close to the “LNR”: Late on 19 September, the “Public Chambers” in Luhansk and Donetsk suddenly appealed to “LNR” and “DNR” leaders Leonid Pasechnik and Denis Pushilin to hold referenda “immediately” – upon which decrees were signed the next morning, just three days before “voting” began. The dangers of voting during a hot war were turned around into crude propaganda – e.g. when the “DNR” claimed that two election commission members were injured during shelling in Horlivka.
While some preparation had undoubtedly taken place, local authorities made little effort to dispel doubts about the votes’ legitimacy. While videos and photos showed armed men herding voters and/or accompanying mobile ballot boxes, nobody explained how voter lists had been brought outside the “People’s Republics” – where the “DNR” alone claimed almost 450,000 participated – meaning in Russia. As in previous “elections”, foreign Kremlin-sympathizers were presented as “observers” who claimed that they detected no violations.
Official results presented after five-day “voting” (the two last days were quickly declared public holidays) appeared Stalinist – 99.23 per cent pro-“unification” in the “DNR” and 98.42 per cent in the “LNR”, while also revealing inexplicable differences: Official turnout in the “DNR was given at 97.51 per cent, while the number in the “LNR” was a comparably miserable 92.6 per cent – and regional results inside the “LNR showed little to no variation.
An analysis by the Ukrainian news site Novosti Donbassa on 28 September concluded that the turnout and participants’ numbers must be largely made up – e.g. because they claim numbers higher than their own population statistics, even though very few residents remain in the destroyed cities of Mariupol and Sievierodonetsk. Interestingly, the official results for the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, which have been (partially) occupied only since March, were significantly lower – 93.11 per cent in Kherson and 87.05 in Zaporizhzhia.
The “referenda” were unanimously condemned as a sham by the EU, NATO and Western governments. Unsurprisingly, the only foreign appraisal came from North Korea, whose communist leadership declared on 4 October that it was sure that they were held “according to UN standards”.
Critics pour scorn over nomenclature
The poorly organized referendum-annexation process and Russia’s ongoing military underperformance triggered criticism from the hard-line Russian nationalist camp which had been largely sidelined from power in the “People’s Republics”.
Thus Andrei Purgin, a former separatist official who turned a dissident in 2015, called the referenda “a special administrative operation” without legitimacy or popular support. Pavel Gubarev, the earliest leader of the Donetsk “People’s Republic”, in a Telegram post attacked the “DNR” nomenclature that attended the annexation ceremony in Moscow, calling them “casual nobodies, whose place is in prison, not in the Kremlin / grimaces his face in disgust /”.
The same nationalists also poured vitriol over the massive Ukrainian-Russian prisoner swap of 21 September, in which Russia freed 215 hostages, among them many members of the Azov regiment, regularly labeled a Nazi formation by Kremlin propaganda. Ukraine, in turn, released just 55 soldiers and pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk. Igor Girkin (aka Strelkov), the ex-FSB officer who launched the hot phase of the war in Donbas in 2014, called Medvedchuk a “bastard” and accused him of bearing responsibility for the military losses by having misinformed the Kremlin about the real situation in Ukraine.
Pushilin silent on released foreigners
Pushilin tried to defend the seemingly unfair swap by arguing that returning own fighters was his main motivation to agree to the deal. Pushilin did not elaborate why he was fine with receiving just 5 “DNR” fighters and 50 Russians in return and argued that Medvedchuk was a prized ally for his role in enabling previous prisoner swaps.
The “DNR” leader did not mention that among those released to Ukraine were 10 foreigners, including three that had been sentenced to death for being “mercenaries” by a Donetsk court in June (see Newsletter 103). Britons Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner recalled being beaten and abused in interviews after their release. The third foreigner freed from death row was Moroccan Brahim Saadoun.
Also on the official list of released prisoners published by the government in Kyiv were five foreigners who the “DNR” had put on trial in August on similar charges – Mathias Gustafsson of Sweden, Vjekoslav Prebeg of Croatia, and Britons John Harding, Andrew Hill and Dylan Healy (see Newsletter 105).
OSCE staff sentenced
It was clear however, that this is not the last potential swap. The “LNR” on 19 September – just before the prisoner exchange – sentenced two former local staff members of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Luhansk to 13 years in prison for alleged espionage. Dmitry Shabanov had worked as a security assistant for the Mission, while Maxim Petrov was an interpreter, local media reported. The OSCE criticized their detention and the so-called legal proceedings against them as “completely unacceptable” and called the charges fabricated.
A third former Mission member is believed to be in detention in Donetsk.
