Written by Nikolaus von Twickel
Summary
While the military battle for Donbas continued, the annexatoin and integration of the “People’s Republics” into Russia’s political system progressed with the beginning of election preparations – with peculiar differences between Donetsk and Luhansk. The Kremlin also pressed for issuing Russian passports faster and introduced fresh sanctions for those who kept their Ukrainian citizenship.
United Russia poised to win elections
Despite the ongoing war and the imposition of martial law, Moscow plans to hold elections in the “People’s Republics” along with the annexed Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions this September. On 1 March, Russia’s Central Election Commission appointed members of the local election commissions in the four regions.
While these commissions can be expected to rubber stamp any form of undemocratic ballot-collecting as it did during the so-called referenda in September (see Newsletter 106), their make-up contained one interesting detail. Apart from representatives of Russian political parties, including the notoriously marginal Greens, only the “DNR” commission included members of Donetsk Republic and Free Donbas, the “movements” who acted as the only sanctioned political parties since 2014.
The “LNR” commission did not contain any members from the Peace to Luhansk and Luhansk Economic Union “movements”, raising the question if these quasi-puppet parties have already been dumped in favour of the (marginally less controlled) Russian parties. The fact that both movements have been mentioned very little recently on the official LITs news site suggests that the Kremlin’s election managers deem them to be too unpopular. Also, “LNR” leader Leonid Pasechnik, whose popularity is also doubtful, was passed over as party secretary of United Russia’s local chapter in October – unlike his Donetsk rival Denis Pushilin (see Newsletter 107).
With or without the “movements”, the Putin-backed United Russia party can safely expected to take dominant positions. Besides the fact that the “People’s Republics” official media devoted most of their space and airtime to reports about the ruling Kremlin party, United Russia began to register candidates for “primaries” to be held in May. Since no other parties are expected to do so, the three-month campaign ensures dominant media space in the run-up to the elections on 10 September.
All four annexed Ukrainian regions and several more in Russia are slanted to hold parliamentary and municipal elections on that day, but no direct leadership votes. Both the “DNR” and “LNR” hastily abolished the direct elections of their leaders by changing their constitutions on 30 December. However, in order make voting legal, the Kremlin needs to lift martial law by then.
“DNR” rate of issued Russian passports suddenly more than doubles
The “DNR” said on 10 March that 639,856 Russian passports – almost 640,000 – had been issued to its population and that 185,356 of them were issued after 30 September 2022, the day when Russia annexed the “People’s Republics” along with Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. This number translates into an issuing rate of roughly 37,000 per month – more than double the 14,000 passports per month issued between October and December (see our Annual Report 2022 p.7).
Unlike the “DNR”, the “LNR” did not publish any new passport figures. Luhansk leader Leonid Pasechnik had said in June 2022 that more than 284,000 Russian passports had been issued – just 34,000 more than in June 2021, when he spoke of more than 250,000 passports – meaning that the “LNR” had issued just 2,800 Russian passports per month.
To speed up the process, the “LNR” sent a mobile passport office located inside a lorry to villages. Whether this had any success was unclear. President Vladimir Putin complained on 20 March that waiting lines for Russian passports in the annexed Ukrainian territories were too long and that the issuing process needs to be sped up fast: “If (ministry officials) cannot do it, they need to learn, if they do not want to do it, they need to be transferred somewhere”, he said at a meeting with the Interior Ministry leadership.
Trouble with Ukrainian passports
The issuing of Russian passports to the local population began in 2019, after Putin decreed to make it easier for Ukrainian nationals to obtain them. However, both “DNR” and “LNR” practically never speak about the share of the population reached. If the numbers can be trusted, not even half of the real population (estimated at just above 2 million) has obtained Russian citizenship by now.
However, that citizenship is not the same as the citizenship of most Russians, who acquired it by birth. If a draft law submitted in November is adopted, an acquired citizenship can be taken away again if, for instance, a person is found to discredit the armed forces, something that can happen very easily in today’s Russia.
Also, Russia is penalizing those who retain Ukrainian citizenship after obtaining a Russian one. A new law which takes effect in June, bars any Ukrainian passport holders from a range of jobs in state service, the security forces and the defence industry. In order to lift those limitations, dual passport holders need to renounce their Ukrainian citizenship.
The fact that a Ukrainian passport is much more useful, eg. allowing visa-free travel in much of Europe, is prompting many who accept Russian citizenship to retain their Ukrainian one. This has also been the case in Crimea since the Black Sea peninsula’s annexation in 2014.
Key “DNR” minister sacked
The “DNR” on 27 February relieved Revenue Minister Shmelev of his duties. Shmelev, a former tax inspector in the neighbouring Russian region Rostov-on-Don, had only been appointed last summer. The Revenue Ministry has acquired notoriety for being at the heart of opaque cash flows inside the “DNR” ever since it was headed by Alexander Timofeyev, who was sacked after the assassination of “DNR” leader Alexander Zakharchenko in 2018.
The sacking of Timofeyev’s successor Yevgeny Lavrenov in March 2022 was seen as a step of the Kremlin taking direct control of the “DNR” finances, which largely depend on Moscow. Neither the “LNR” nor any other Russian region has a Revenue Ministry, which is responsible for tax revenues while the Finance Ministry oversees spending.
“DNR” leader Pushilin on 17 March appointed Konstantin Kalus, hitherto an official inside the ministry, as Shmelev’s successor.
