{"id":2256,"date":"2022-12-23T14:41:55","date_gmt":"2022-12-23T13:41:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/?p=2256"},"modified":"2022-12-23T14:44:23","modified_gmt":"2022-12-23T13:44:23","slug":"newsletter108","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/newsletter108\/","title":{"rendered":"Developments in eastern Ukraine: 15 November \u2013 22 December 2022 (Newsletter 108)<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With entrenched stalemate on the battlefields, Russia pushed for further integration of the annexed Ukrainian regions. The heads of the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d for the first time got official personal meetings with President Putin in the Kremlin \u2013 during which they revealed how the war has made a bad situation worse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pasechnik admits coal mining crisis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the 20 December meeting with Putin, Luhansk leader Leonid Pasechnik revealed<\/a> that the Vostokugol coal mine holding is in financial trouble so deep that wages cannot be paid. Pasechnik explained that the holding can hardly keep up production because 58 per cent of its miners had been called up to fight in the war against Ukraine. One of the pits was working with just three miners instead of more than 300, he said. (Pasechnik had mentioned the missing miners back in November<\/a> and warned that the holding risked becoming unprofitable).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Vostokugol was formed as a \u201cstate\u201d holding in April 2020 after the \u201cLNR\u201d leadership closed unprofitable coalmines following a sharp drop in demand at the onset of the COVID pandemic. The closures were accompanied by unprecedented strikes and unrest over wage arrears and pay cuts (see Newsletter 85<\/a>). Ukraine\u2019s Luhansk region is the chief producer of anthracite coal, which has a very high energy density.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pasechnik basically begged Putin to pay more subsidies to keep the holding afloat \u2013 and complained that it was challenged by illegal private mines (kopanki<\/em> in local parlance) which, he claimed, operate profitable because they pay no or much fewer taxes. He did not explain, however, why local authorities could not solve the problem themselves by e.g. enforcing tax payments or lowering them. Putin said that subsidies could be paid for some time but stressed that the \u201cLNR\u201d should \u201canalyze\u201d, why its state mines were unable to operate efficiently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pushilin complains about labour shortages, border checks<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Like Pasechnik, \u201cDNR\u201d leader Denis Pushilin, who talked to Putin the same day, complained about staff shortages<\/a> due to the many months of forced mobilization, but only blamed Ukraine for having started the war in 2014. As an example, he pointed to communal services, where he said that up to 70 per cent of personnel were missing and asked for extra pay. Pushilin also said that water was rationed in Donetsk and other cities to just two hours every three days. He added that the Soviet-era central (district) heating was suffering from war-inflicted damages to water pipes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Donetsk has been the target of repeated attacks in the past months. Artillery attacks on December 5<\/a> and 6<\/a> killed at least ten civilians, including \u201cDNR\u201d MP Maria Pirogova and Viktor Isayev<\/a>, a judge of the \u201cDNR\u201d military court. Pirogova was the daughter of Maya Pirogova, a former \u201cDNR\u201d Information \u201cMinistry\u201d official and blogger, known for her radical anti-Ukrainian stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Early on 22 December, a rocket hit a leisure complex south of Donetsk, killing two persons and injuring at least two more. Among those injured<\/a> was prominent Russian nationalist politician Dmitry Rogozin and \u201cDNR\u201d Prime Minister Vitaly Khotsenko. While Khotsenko\u2019s injuries were minor, Rogozin wrote on Telegram<\/a> that he needed an operation. The former head of the Roskosmos space agency apparently celebrated his 59th<\/sup> birthday<\/a> when the attack came.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another issue raised by Pushilin are border checks between the \u201crepublics\u201d and Russia proper, which continue even in the third month after annexation and cause long traffic jams. While customs inspections have been abolished, vehicle inspections and passport controls remain in place. Pushilin explained in early October<\/a> that this would continue for the time being, first and foremost to detect \u201cweapons ammunition and explosives\u201d. In his meeting with Putin, he suggested to speed up controls by increasing staffing levels. The Russian President promised to solve the problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Four Senators appointed<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both the \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d on 20 December nominated their first senators to the Federation Council, Russia\u2019s upper house of parliament. Three of the four candidates (two for each \u201crepublic \u2013 one from the executive, one from the legislature) for the sought-after privilege were senior officials \u2013 former Prime Minister Alexander Ananchenko<\/a> and Foreign \u201cMinister\u201d Natalia Nikonorova<\/a> for the \u201cDNR\u201d and the longtime head of Pasechnik\u2019s administration Olga Bas<\/a> for the \u201cLNR\u201d. However, Pasechnik also appointed Daria Lantratova<\/a>, a Moscow-based senior United Russia official with no previous links to the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The appointments came surprisingly early and may be a sign that Moscow decided to force further political integration as military successes remain elusive. Russia\u2019s Kommersant newspaper reported five days earlier<\/a> that the senatorial nominations had been postponed at least until the \u201crepublics\u201d adopt new constitutions in the coming year, or until local elections will be held in September 2023. The report also quoted an unnamed source close to the Kremlin as saying that Senators should be both locals and sufficiently professional \u2013 and that \u201cthere are not many such people\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The appointments also displayed little regard for procedural rules. Thus, \u201cLNR\u201d Senator Olga Bas was given a seat in the Luhansk \u201cparliament\u201d on 2 December<\/a> \u2013 officially replacing MP Mikhail Golubovich who resigned without explanation three days earlier<\/a>, but more ostensibly to adhere to the Russian constitution, which stipulates that regional parliaments can only appoint their own members as Senators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201dDNR\u201d did not even bother to make Ananchenko an MP, at least no such decree could be found online, nor was he listed in the ruling Donetsk Republic movement\u2019s list of MPs<\/a>. Instead, the official DAN news site just reported<\/a> his appointment without any further information, while parliamentary speaker Vladimir Bidyovka claimed in a 20 December Telegram post<\/a> that Ananchenko actually was an MP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since his appearance in Donetsk in 2018, Ananchenko has been linked to the secretive Vneshtorgservis holding, then a Russian-run vehicle to operate local industrial assets. When Vneshtorgservisa was disbanded in 2021, Ananchenko\u2019s fortunes faded and he was replaced by Khotsenko as Prime Minister in June 2022 (see Newsletter 103<\/a>). His appointment as Senator can be safely interpreted as a sinecure including immunity from prosecution \u2013 something the Federal Council has over time become infamous for<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Foreign \u201cMinistries\u201d soldiering on<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A similar point can be made about Nikonorova, whose role a Foreign \u201cMinister\u201d had become even more insignificant after Russia annexed the \u201cDNR\u201d. However, her ministry continued to operate as if annexation never happened. On its website, the \u201cministry\u201d reported on 16 December<\/a> that some of its staff participated in a \u201cdigital diplomacy\u201d forum in the Russian city of Samara. On 12 December<\/a>, Nikonorova addressed<\/a> the \u201cRussian People\u2019s World Council<\/a>\u201d in Stavropol, a quasi-religious forum headed by Russian Patriarch Kirill, which was devoted to \u201cHoly War\u201d  and the \u201cTransfiguration of Russia\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the \u201cDNR\u201d offered no explanation, the \u201cLNR\u201d Foreign Ministry explained on 15 November<\/a> that it would continue to perform its duties until the Russian Foreign Ministry establishes a local representation next year. The Luhansk ministry also did not publish a 11 November decree<\/a> by \u201cLNR\u201d Pasechnik about its own dissolution (see Newsletter 107<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Difficulties with the annexation\u2019s implementation were also highlighted by Russia\u2019s Central Election Commission. After its 21 December session, the body did not publish how many voters live in the \u201cnew territories\u201d (i.e. the annexed Ukrainian districts), not least because many residents do not have Russian passports, the Russian Kommersant newspaper reported<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Switch to Russian vehicle number plates and drivers\u2019 licenses begins<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cDNR<\/a>\u201d and \u201cLNR<\/a>\u201d announced on 16 December that they would begin switching all vehicles, their documentation and drivers\u2019 licenses to Russian ones. First plates with 181 for the \u201cLNR\u201d<\/a> were handed out on 21 December. However, drivers and vehicle owners were given three years\u2019 time until 1 January 2026 to get full Russian documentation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russian Interior Ministry earlier decreed<\/a> that number plates for the DNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d will carry the codes 80 and 81 (181) respectively.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary With entrenched stalemate on the battlefields, Russia pushed for further integration of the annexed Ukrainian regions. The heads of the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d for the first time got official personal meetings with President Putin in...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":2157,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[245],"tags":[294],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2256"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2256"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2256\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2257,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2256\/revisions\/2257"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2157"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2256"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2256"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2256"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}