{"id":2253,"date":"2022-11-14T16:21:26","date_gmt":"2022-11-14T15:21:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/?p=2253"},"modified":"2022-11-14T16:22:53","modified_gmt":"2022-11-14T15:22:53","slug":"newsletter107","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/newsletter107\/","title":{"rendered":"Developments in eastern Ukraine: 7 October \u2013 14 November 2022 (Newsletter 107)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Six weeks after Russia annexed them, the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d went through fresh government reshuffles, with more Moscow-trained professionals taking senior positions. The \u201cLNR\u201d Foreign Ministry and Prosecutor General\u2019s office were the first institutions to be dissolved with similar moves expected in the \u201cDNR\u201d. But it remained to be seen if and how incorporation into Russian state structures will affect local politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLNR\u201d dissolves Ministry, appoints Rosatom-linked Russians<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cLNR\u201d on 11 and 12 November disbanded its Foreign \u201cMinistry\u201d and Prosecutor General\u2019s office. The<\/a> decree<\/a>s about their dissolution were signed by Luhansk leader Leonid Pasechnik. They said that the processes will be organized two commissions \u2013 led by Foreign \u201cMinister\u201d Vladislav Deinego and prosecution official Alexander Mikhailichenko<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the case of the Prosecutor General, the two top positions have been vacant since 16 September, when \u201cLNR\u201d Prosecutor General Sergei Gorenko and his deputy Yekaterina Steglenko were killed<\/a> by a bomb blast in their office.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Foreign \u201cMinistry\u2019s\u201d website<\/a> was still accessible but displayed a notice that it would cease to exist within two weeks. The \u201cMinistry\u2019s\u201d Telegram channel<\/a> kept reposting content from Russian state sources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similar dissolutions were expected in the \u201cDNR\u201d. Curiously, Donetsk Foreign \u201cMinister\u201d Natalya Nikonorova traveled to Syria<\/a> and discussed post-annexation cooperation with President Bashar Assad on 21 October. \u201cDNR Ambassador\u201d to Moscow, Olga Makeeva, said on 21 October<\/a> that she was reorganizing her \u201cEmbassy\u201d to a representation of a Russian region. \u201cLNR Ambassador\u201d Rodion Miroshnik announced<\/a> on on 9 November that he was leaving his post and would begin \u201cnew projects\u201d (the \u201cLNR\u201d never bothered to open a representation in Moscow).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cLNR\u201d also appointed two more Russians to its energy \u201cMinistry\u201d: Ilya Yashin (unrelated to the Russian opposition politician) was announced as a new first deputy minister and Pavel Reich (Raikh) as deputy minister on 14 November<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to their official biographies, both Yashin and Reich previously worked for Atomstroyexport, the Russian company engaged in constructing nuclear facilities abroad. This surely is no coincidence \u2013 the current \u201cLNR Minister\u201d Konstantin Zavizenov was a director at Atomstroyexport befor moving to Luhansk in August (see Newsletter 105<\/a>). The Atomstroyexport connection is also a clear Kremlin footprint because it is a subsidiary of state nuclear holding Rosatom, which for many years was headed by Sergei Kiriyenko, who is currently the Kremlin official overseeing the occupied regions in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nine deputy prime ministers in Donetsk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russian officials were also promoted to influential positions in the \u201cDNR government\u201d: Rustam Mingazov and Yevgeny Solntsev were appointed<\/a> first deputy prime ministers on 11 November.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mingazov had been an official in the Russian Industry and Trade Ministry before moving to Donetsk in August as an advisor to \u201cDNR\u201d Prime Minister Vitaly Khotsenko, himself a former Moscow government official. Khotsenko and Mingazov had previously worked together in the Russian Trade Ministry and in the government of the southern Stavropol region, according to Russian media reports<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Solntsev is a former Russian Railways official who worked as an aide to Russian Construction Minister Irek Faizullin before moving to Donetsk in June, where he became one of Khotsenko\u2019s deputies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pushilin also confirmed two deputy prime ministers in office \u2013 Vladimir Yezhikov (a former official<\/a> in the Sevastopol city government) and Tatyana Pereverzeva (who had been overseeing budget since 2018) and elevated four officials to become deputy prime ministers in addition to their government posts: Chief of staff Denis Tsukanov, Energy Minister Andrei Chertkov, Industry Minister Vladimir Rushchak and Agriculture Minister Artyom Kramarenko.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Already on 8 November, Pushilin sacked<\/a> deputy prime minister Vladimir Antonov, who had been overseeing social policies, and replaced him with Larisa Tolstikova, who hitherto headed the Labour \u201cMinistry\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reshuffle means that Prime Minister Khotsenko will govern with a whopping nine deputies. Pushilin justified<\/a> the move with a need to give more competences to ministers \u2013 who, as he claimed, had often cited a lack of authority when faced with criticism about their work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia has in the past months transferred at least 23 officials to work in the \u201cgovernments\u201d of the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d, 14 of them in Donetsk. The transfers were explained with the need to implement \u201cactive integration\u201d with Russia and its system of government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Worries about Pasechnik<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, there were signs that \u201cLNR\u201d leader Leonid Pasechnik is falling out of favor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 21 October<\/a>, his Donetsk rival Pushilin got \u201celected\u201d to the job of regional secretary of Vladimir Putin\u2019s United Russia party. In Luhansk, however, Pasechnik put up a brave face<\/a> while \u201cLNR parliamentary speaker\u201d Denis Miroshnichenko got elected to that post, which marks an upward climb on the career ladder \u2013 the Kremlin has used United Russia as a key vehicle to build political support inside the occupied Ukrainian territories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was unclear if this is related or not, but unlike for Pushilin<\/a>, there was no public record<\/a> of Pasechnik congratulating Putin for his 70th<\/sup> birthday on 7 October.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s annexation of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions demoted Pushilin and Pasechnik from (self-proclaimed) \u201cheads of state\u201d to leaders (\u201cheads\u201d) of Russian regions, it also resulted in the word \u201cacting\u201d (Russian acronym \u0412\u0440\u0438\u043e) being added to their job titles decreed by President Vladimir Putin on 5 October<\/a> \u2013 until \u201celections\u201d will be held in September 2023. Both leaders are thought to have little real support among the local population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin exempts students \u2013 but not teachers – from draft<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also unclear was the state of the mobilization in the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d. \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin announced on 19 October<\/a> that mobilization was no longer being implemented and said that university students should be exempted like in Russia. On 13 November, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said<\/a> that President Putin had signed a decree to exempt students from both \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d. However, the Kremlin had apparently forgotten about the students\u2019 teachers \u2013 prompting the Duma to suggest later the same day<\/a> that university lecturers, too, needed to be demobilized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Earlier that day, Pushilin said<\/a> that Russia\u2019s Prosecutor General would look into the case of an 18-year old pupil who had been mobilized despite the fact that he was still at school. The case of Nikita Gladkikh got international attention after his mother Natalia said on<\/a> exiled Russian TV station \u201cDozhd\u201d that her son had been drafted during a school break and sent to Kherson under the guise of military training. However, there were no official comments in the \u201cLNR\u201d about the state of mobilization and neither Donetsk nor Luhansk announced an official end of the campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d had ordered a general mobilization back on 19 February, five days before Russia\u2019s invasion. The mobilization was subsequently implanted harshly and indiscriminately, leading to multiple complaints that Moscow was treating the local population as cannon fodder while it did not dare to mobilize its own people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin only announced a \u201cpartial\u201d mobilization for Russia on 21 September, when preparations for \u201creferenda\u201d and annexation in the occupied Ukrainian regions were already underway. He declared mobilization over<\/a> on 31 October, after Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said that 300,000 men had been mobilized. A report by the independent Astra Telegram channel on 9 November<\/a> said that at least 20 mobilized Russians are being held in cellars and illegal detention centres in the \u201cLNR\u201d for their refusal to fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

High \u201cDNR\u201d casualties continue<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Low morale and little military training continue to lead to soaring casualty figures among the armed formations of the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d, which apparently are now being integrated<\/a> into the Russian armed forces (known as \u201cPeople\u2019s Militias\u201d, they are thought to have been commanded by Russian officers all along).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to official figures released<\/a> by Donetsk ombudswoman Daria Morozova, the \u201cDNR\u201d suffered 105 killed and 441 injured servicepeople in the week up to 10 November, 102 killed and 364 injured in the week<\/a> before. Among those killed was \u201cDNR\u201d MP Milhail Zhukov, who died at the front south of Donetsk on 8 November<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the \u201cDNR\u201d reported 3,746 soldiers as killed and another 15,794 injured since the beginning of the year – very high numbers considering that the \u201cDNR\u201d forces probably number just above 10,000 (more than half of the combined separatist forces of 20,000) and that its population is believed to be just 1.2 million (see our Annual Report 2021<\/a>, p 8). Donetsk field commander and prolific blogger Alexander Khodakovsky suggested on 5 November<\/a> that up to 60 per cent of Russian losses in Mariupol \u2013 where \u201cDNR\u201d forces are thought to have taken the brunt of the fighting – had been cause by friendly fire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cLNR\u201d does not release any meaningful casualty figures.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary Six weeks after Russia annexed them, the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d went through fresh government reshuffles, with more Moscow-trained professionals taking senior positions. The \u201cLNR\u201d Foreign Ministry and Prosecutor General\u2019s office were the first institutions to...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":2146,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[245],"tags":[294],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2253"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2253"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2253\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2254,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2253\/revisions\/2254"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2146"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2253"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2253"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2253"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}