Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n While Moscow continued its russification drive in the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d, it failed to make significant military gains in the Donetsk region. No date for \u201creferenda\u201d about unification with Russia was set, and only Luhansk campaigned for holding one, not Donetsk. In a clear sign of labour shortages, \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin suggested that workers from North Korea should help rebuilding destroyed cities like Mariupol.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Already 21 Russians officially in \u201cgovernment\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 18 August, another eight Russians were appointed to government posts \u2013 five in Donetsk and three in Luhansk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cPrime Minister\u201d Vitaly Khotsenko, himself a recent import from Moscow, introduced the<\/a> five \u201cDNR\u201d candidates during a cabinet session on 18 August. Three of them come from Russian federal ministries \u2013 Denis Petkun and Rustam Mingazov from the Trade Ministry (where Khotsenko had previously worked), Vladimir Zverkov from the Economic Development Ministry. Mingazov was appointed an adviser to Khotsenko, Zverkov a first deputy to \u201cDNR\u201d Economic Development \u201cMinister\u201d Alxei Polovyan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Petkun was appointed a deputy heads of the \u201cgovernment\u201d central administration (\u201capparat\u201d) \u2013 along with Mina Akhverdieva, hitherto spokeswoman of the North Caucasus University in Stavropol, and Vadim Elizarov, an official in the Siberian Yamalo-Nenets autonomous region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201cLNR\u201d also got another three Russians \u2013 including two new \u201cministers\u201d. Separatist leader Leonid Pasechnik on 18 August<\/a> appointed Timur Samatov as Industry and Trade \u201cMinister\u201d and Konstantin Zavizenov as Energy \u201cMinister\u201d. Samatov had been a deputy industry and trade minister in his native Tatarstan, while Zavizenov was a director at state nuclear equipment and service exporter Atomstroyexport. The third Russian newcomer was Ruslan Dzhalyukov, who became head of the \u201cLNR\u201d anti-monopoly commission. Before, Dzhalyukov headed Russia\u2019s anti-monopoly service in the Moscow region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pasechnik explained<\/a> the appointments with the coming \u201cactive integration with Russia and the rebuilding of the economic potential\u201d, which meant a \u201cconsiderable widening of tasks\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After the latest appointments, the \u201cDNR\u201d boasts 14 Russians in key positions, including the \u201cPrime Minister\u201d and one of his deputies, four cabinet \u201cministers\u201d and three deputy \u201cministers\u201d. The \u201cLNR\u201d now has seven Russians \u2013 including a first deputy Prime Minister, three \u201cministers\u201d (trade, economic development and education) and two deputy \u201cministers\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the same week<\/a>, Russia also sent officials to political posts in the occupied regions of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv (the latter two remain partially under Ukrainian control).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Education: \u201cMinisters\u201d and schoolbooks from Russia<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that most appointments were in the field of economic management, education and culture, points to the areas of government which Moscow deems key for ensuring political control and transforming these territories in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The importance of schools and university as places of russification was underlined by the fact that the Kremlin in July replaced \u201cDNR\u201d minister\u201d Mikhail Kushakov with Olga Koludarova, hitherto an official in the Russian education ministry. In the \u201cLNR\u201d, Moscow even appointed a \u201cminister\u201d (former Crimean official Ivan Kusov) and two<\/em> deputies to run the local education ministry \u2013 among them Pyotr Ishkov, who previously oversaw<\/a> content and teaching methods in Russia\u2019s Education Ministry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Besides transferring officials from Russia, Moscow also dispatched senior officials to oversee planning for the upcoming school year. Thus, Russian education minister Sergei Kravtsov took part in a \u201cgovernment\u201d meeting in Luhansk on 8 August<\/a>, which focused on the opening of schools in newly conquered (\u201cliberated\u201d) areas. Donetsk even saw a visit of Kremlin aide Andrei Fursenko<\/a>, a close associate of President Vladimir Putin, who was Russian education minister from 2004 to 2012, to discuss the beginning of the school year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unsurprisingly, Russia is also providing books. \u201cDNR\u201d leader Denis Pushilin said on 21 August<\/a> that 2.5 million schoolbooks will arrive from Russia for the new school year beginning on 1 September.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pushilin: No referendum before complete \u201cliberation\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the ongoing talk about unification with Russia, no date for a much-anticipated referendum about this was set and the \u201crepublics\u201d stuck to different strategies: While the \u201cLNR\u201d set up a committee<\/a> to prepare for the vote and campaigned for a referendum by churning out almost daily reports<\/a> about its necessity on the official LITs news site, the \u201cDNR\u201d abstained from such campaigning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Donetsk separatist leader Pushilin reiterated in an interview<\/a> with the Russian Ukraina.ru site published on 19 August that a referendum could only be held after the complete \u201cliberation\u201d of the Donetsk region, and added that the frontline needed to be move \u201cbetween 40 and 70 kilometres\u201d beyond the region\u2019s borders, because of the range of \u201cnew US weapons\u201d \u2013 a reference to the HIMARS multiple rocket launch systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Subsequent media reports<\/a> from Russia and Ukraine suggest that the Kremlin has more or less abandoned plans to hold referenda on 11 September, the last day of the three-day Russian regional elections. However, United Russia party official Andrei Turchak insisted on 25 August<\/a> that referenda will be held, and an investigation published one day later<\/a> by the vyorstka.media outlet concluded that the Kremlin desperately wants such polls (albeit with doctored results) in order to demonstrate that annexation has broad popular support. The report quoted unnamed Kremlin sources that the referenda could be held as early as 14 September.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sergei Kirienko, the senior Kremlin official in charge of the occupied territories in Ukraine, claimed on 27 August<\/a> that more than 90 per cent of locals in the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d would vote for unification with Russia. Kirienko\u2019s claim has been interpreted<\/a> as a signal to Putin that the referenda could go ahead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Embassies in Moscow, no embassies in Donetsk or Luhansk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Donetsk and Luhansk also continued to differ in their implementation of \u201cinternational relations\u201d with Russia. While the \u201cDNR\u201d opened an embassy in a Moscow business centre in July<\/a>, the \u201cLNR\u201d one week later only published a decree to open<\/a> a mission with 18 staff. There was no news of its opening or address. \u201cAmbassador\u201d Rodion Miroshnik\u2019s first public event was held in the North Korean embassy on 10 August<\/a> \u2013 where he met Pyongyang\u2019s envoy Sin Hong-chol. North Korea recognized the People\u2019s Republics on 13 July (see Newsletter 104<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n More tellingly, there was no news about a Russian Embassy opening in Donetsk and Luhansk: Moscow, which has numerous officials on the ground, would not need such representations once it annexes the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d \u2013 while their Moscow missions can easily be converted into a Russian region\u2019s representation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDNR\u201d reports almost 100 deaths per week<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Russian offensive in Donbas has been stalling since the fall of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk in late June and early July, and Sloviansk and Kramatorsk remain Ukrainian strongholds in the Donetsk region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Because of high losses in the first phase of the war, the Russian military has \u2013 apart from mercenaries and volunteers – heavily relied on recruits from the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d, where forced mass mobilization has been ongoing since February.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After multiple reports and videos<\/a> about men being virtually kidnapped by recruiters went viral on social media, the issue was also picked up by Western media like German weekly Die Zeit<\/a>. And even official reports, like the updates on the \u201cLNR\u201d education \u201cministry\u201d Vkontakte<\/a> page show that practically only female participants at official events.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The US-based Institute for the Study of War even reported on 23 August<\/a> that Russia was sending interior troops to police the occupied Luhansk region because of waning support and growing unwillingness to fight among local residents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While such reports cannot be verified, casualties are certainly mounting. According to the website<\/a> of Ombudswoman Daria Morozova, 384 soldiers were killed and another 1,637 injured in the \u201cDNR\u201d alone during the four weeks<\/a> up to 26 August. This amounts to almost 100 deaths and more than 400 injuries per week and a total of 2,844 soldiers killed and 11,976 injured – very high numbers considering that the \u201cDNR\u201d forces probably number just above 10,000 (more than half of the combined separatist forces of 20,000) and that its population is believed to be just 1.2 million (see our Annual Report 2021<\/a>, p 8).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201eLNR\u201c does not publish any meaningful casualty figures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pushilin turns to North Korea because of labour shortages<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The losses of men will certainly hamper the future rebuilding of the region. Luhansk governor Serhiy Haidai said on 21 August that women have to work<\/a> in \u201cLNR\u201d coal mines, because of the labour shortages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pushilin indirectly confirmed labour shortages when he said in mid-August<\/a> that builders from North Korea, which recognized the People\u2019s Republics in July, could help in the reconstruction efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Earlier, a group of workers from Moscow\u2019s Mosvodokanal communal services company, recorded a video<\/a> in Shchastia in the Luhansk region, where they complained that they have not been paid. Their complaint forced the separatist-controlled LITs news site to run a story on 21 August<\/a> that Russian ombudswoman Tatyana Moskalkova had declared that the workers had been paid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another five foreigners on trial in Donetsk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, the \u201cDNR\u201d put another five foreigners on trial on on 15 August<\/a>, accusing them of being foreign mercenaries for Ukraine. The five \u2014 Mathias Gustafsson of Sweden, Vjekoslav Prebeg of Croatia, and Britons John Harding, Andrew Hill and Dylan Healy \u2014 all pleaded not guilty to the charges, which might carry the death penalty. The hearing was then postponed to early October<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201cDNR\u201d already sentenced two other British citizens and one Moroccan man to death in June (see Newsletter 103<\/a>). However, the sentences have not been carried out so far. A sixth captive from Britain, Paul Urey, died in Donetsk in July (see Newsletter 104<\/a>).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary While Moscow continued its russification drive in the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d, it failed to make significant military gains in the Donetsk region. No date for \u201creferenda\u201d about unification with Russia was set, and only Luhansk...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":2146,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[245],"tags":[294],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2244"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2244"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2244\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2245,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2244\/revisions\/2245"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2146"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2244"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2244"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2244"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}