Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The appointment of five Russian officials to key \u201cgovernment\u201d posts in Donetsk and Luhansk plus wide-ranging regional cooperation agreements triggered fresh talk that Moscow is planning to annex the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d. As Russia\u2019s military campaign to conquer Donbas continued, fresh evidence surfaced that recruits from Donetsk and Luhansk are taking the heaviest toll. Meanwhile, a Donetsk court sentenced three foreigners to death for fighting for Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russians take key positions in Donetsk and Luhansk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 8 June, \u201cDNR\u201d leader Denis Pushilin appointed<\/a> Alexander Kostomarov, hitherto a deputy governor in the Russian Ulyanovsk region, as a first deputy of his administration. Kostomarov, who has a long career inside the Kremlin-backed United Russia party, is destined to be a point man for managing a future accession of the \u201cDNR\u201d to Russia, according to media reports<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was unclear what this means for Gennady Lebed, who has been Pushilin\u2019s first deputy administration head since 2018<\/a>. The \u201cDNR\u201d said on 14 June<\/a> that Lebed was part of a delegation visiting Syria (see below).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Like in the Soviet Union, first deputies are often the most influential in Russian organizational hierarchies \u2013 and in the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d they usually are Moscow\u2019s watchmen, so-called curators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pushilin also dismissed<\/a> \u201cPrime Minister\u201d Alexander Ananchenko and the whole \u201cgovernment\u201d and appointed<\/a> two Russians – Vitaly Khotsenko as new \u201cPrime Minister\u201d and Yevgeny Solntsev<\/a> as one of his deputies. While Khotsenko was a department director in Russia\u2019s Industry and Trade Ministry, Solntsev is a former Russian Railways official who worked as an aide to Russian Construction Minister Irek Faizullin before his appointment to Donetsk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Just before his dismissal on 8 June, Ananchenko appointed<\/a> another Russian \u2013 Ilya Bubnov, a United Russia youth activist from Omsk \u2013 as a first deputy minister for Youth, sports and tourism. The new \u201cPrime Minister\u201d Khotsenko promised on 15 June<\/a> that all other \u201cDNR\u201d cabinet members will keep their positions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the \u201cLNR\u201d, Vladislav Kuznetsov, a former deputy governor in Russia\u2019s southern Kurgan region<\/a>, was appointed<\/a> a first deputy Prime Minister on 9 June. Unlike in Donetsk, the Russian appointee did not replace the incumbent head of \u201cgovernment\u201d, Sergei Kozlov. Nor did he replace Kozlov\u2019s first deputy Yury Govtvin, who even traveled<\/a> to the St Petersburg Economic Forum on 18 June. In 2019, Govtvin\u2019s secretive appointment led to speculation that it empowered a rival faction to \u201cLNR\u201d leader Leonid Pasechnik (see Newsletter 67<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Signs of Moscow taking more direct control<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Few believe that separatist leaders themselves were behind the appointments, which were widely seen as a sign that Moscow has insufficient trust in incumbent officials and wants to increase direct control over the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d \u2013 especially in a time when massive financial flows are expected from Moscow to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The desire to control local budgets is also the most likely explanation for the sudden and unexplained ouster<\/a> of \u201cDNR\u201d Revenue \u201cMinister\u201d Yevgeny Lavrenov, who was replaced by a little-known customs official in late March. The revenue \u201cministry\u201d has in the past been key for controlling incoming funds and was suspected to be at the center of massive corruption under Pushilin\u2019s predecessor Alexander Zakharchenko.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There were no signs that Pushilin and Pasechnik themselves will lose their jobs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Media reports<\/a> pointed out that both Khotsenko and Kuznetsov were typical products of the Kremlin\u2019s efforts to make state service more attractive \u2013 both graduated from the \u201cSchool of Governors\u201d and Khotsenko was a finalist of \u201cLeaders of Russia\u201d in 2018\/19 \u2013 a contest headed by Sergei Kirienko, the senior Kremlin official who now oversees the People\u2019s Republics and the newly occupied territories in Ukraine (see Newsletter 102<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that Kuznetsov and Kostomarov resigned from their previous posts in December<\/a> and October<\/a> respectively may be an indicator that they were groomed for their positions months before the invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that the new Russian officials served as deputy governors and in federal ministries also shows that jobs in occupied Ukraine are open to mainstream Kremlin-loyal elites \u2013 unlike in 2014, when Russians in \u201cDNR\u201d and LNR\u201d leadership positions were little-known political consultants like Alexander Borodai in Donetsk or Marat Bashirov in Luhansk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No referendum before the end of the war \u2013 Pushilin<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Another striking aspect of the appointments is the prominence of United Russia party activists, which points to more \u201cpolitical integration\u201d with Russia. However, fresh speculation<\/a> about referenda and subsequent annexation was not confirmed. \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin reiterated<\/a> on 16 June that a decision about a referendum would be taken only after the end of the \u201cSpecial Military Operation\u201d. His \u201cLNR\u201d colleague Pasechnik said in a separate interview<\/a> the same day that he was \u201c100 per cent sure\u201d that his people would overwhelmingly vote for accession to Russia in such a referendum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Latvia-based news site Meduza had reported on 9 June<\/a>, citing sources close to the Kremlin, that Moscow plans to annex the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and (currently partially occupied) Zaporizhzhia, by forming a new federal district for them (Russia is currently divided into eight federal districts). The annexation will take place after a referendum is held \u2013 either in mid-July or on 11 September, when Russia holds nationwide regional elections, the article said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Earlier reports suggest<\/a> that the Kremlin has been mulling referenda since March but has steadily postponed them (see Newsletter 100<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cVaryags\u201d not keen to come to Ukraine<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Meduza also quoted unnamed Russian \u201cpolitical technologists\u201d (a profession sometimes rendered as spin doctors in English) as saying that they were offered posts as deputy mayors tasked with overseeing politics, media and public life in occupied Ukrainian cities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While the main motivation to send outsiders (known as Varyags in Russian \u2013 after the Viking Varangians who ruled the medieval Kievan Rus) to these territories is certainly to lay power in trusted hands, there were signs that competition for jobs in the newly occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia is not exactly high. In Kherson, were Moscow installed local pro-Russian politician Volodymyr Saldo as de-facto governor, former \u201cDNR\u201d separatist figure Yekaterina Gubareva was presented<\/a> as Saldo\u2019s deputy on 17 June.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Gubareva, who was born in the Kherson Region, is the wife of Pavel Gubarev, a self-proclaimed \u201cPeople\u2019s Governor\u201d of Donetsk in the early days of separatist protests in 2014. She briefly served as \u201cForeign Minister\u201d and separatist MP but was largely sidelined after her husband was barred from running against the Kremlin\u2019s candidate Denis Pushilin in the \u201cDNR\u201d leadership elections 2018 (see Newsletter 46<\/a>). Gubarev is currently fighting<\/a> with Russian troops in Donbas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regional partnerships across Russia and the \u201crepublics\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Another strong indication that annexation is on the cards is the fact that more and more Russian regions are being tasked to oversee the rebuilding of individual districts inside the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d. Thus, St Petersburg on 1 June signed<\/a> an agreement with the Russian-appointed mayor of Mariupol to oversee the rebuilding of the port city, which was largely destroyed by Russian-led troops. Other Russian regions with partnerships in the \u201cDNR\u201d include Vladimir<\/a> (for Dokuchayevsk), Khabarovsk<\/a> (for Debaltseve) and the Pacific island of Sakhalin (for Shakhtyorsk).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Similar agreements were signed in the \u201cLNR\u201d, like between the (newly Russian occupied) Belovodsk district and Novosibirsk<\/a> and between Alchevsk<\/a> and Vologda. Moscow city, which is by far the richest Russian region<\/a> in terms of gross GDP, was doubly tasked<\/a> with aiding Donetsk and Luhansk. However, it was unclear where poorer Russian regions would take the money for the necessary rebuilding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The ouster of Alexander Ananchenko from the \u201cDNR government\u201d also heralded the final toll for Vneshtorgservis, the industrial holding which under Moscow\u2019s tutelage ran expropriated Ukrainian businesses in Donbass between 2017 and 2021. Ananchenko had been an adviser to Vneshtorgservis before becoming \u201cPrime Minister\u201d in 2018. His tenure together with former Vneshtorgservis CEO Vladimir Pashkov as deputy \u201cPrime Minister\u201d (who resigned in November) had become a symbol of a secretive industrial agglomeration believed to be controlled by former Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Kurchenko running the entire \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Kremlin in 2021 scrapped Vneshtorgservis after reports of financial mismanagement and growing labour unrest and set up another secretive holding called Southern Mining and Metals Complex (Yuzhny gorno-metallichesky complex)<\/em> known by its Russian acronym as YuGMK. Its director, hitherto obscure businessman Yevgeny Yurchenko, claimed on 17 June<\/a> that conditions for his business would certainly improve after he signed<\/a> agreements with Pushilin and Pasechnik about helping with rebuilding destroyed infrastructure at the St Petersburg Economic Forum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, any efforts to restart the economy will be crippled not only by the wide-ranging Western sanctions against Russia but also by massive labour shortages, given the ongoing mass mobilization in both \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n More evidence of \u201ccannon fodder\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n There was mounting indication that recruits from the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d were taking the brunt of the fighting despite having been forcefully mobilized with very little training. Numerous videos<\/a> circulating<\/a> on social media showing such soldiers bitterly complaining about dismal conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While this was nowhere mentioned in separatist-controlled or Russian media, the official \u201cDNR\u201d casualty updates from the office of ombudswoman Daria Morozova, showed that the Donetsk separatists alone had 2,128 servicemen and -women killed and another 8,897 injured by 16 June<\/a> \u2013 with weekly military deaths ranging between 62<\/a> and 74<\/a> soldiers \u2013 relatively high figures for a fighting force of about 20,000 and an overall population of just 1.2 million (see our Annual Report 2021<\/a>, p 8).<\/p>\n\n\n\n These high losses triggered fresh accusations<\/a> that Russia is using the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d as recruiting grounds for cannon fodder in order to avoid casualties among its own population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Death sentences<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The DNR\u201d made international headlines<\/a> on 9 June, when its \u201cSupreme Court\u201d sentenced two Britons and one Moroccan citizen to death for having fought in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Tt was unclear if the sentences will be carried out. The three men were given one month time after receiving the written sentence to file an appeal, the official DAN news site reported on 16 June. This and the fact that the \u201cDNR\u201d has apparently never carried out<\/a> a death sentence, makes it likely that the men will be used as bargaining chips and eventually be swapped against Russians captured by Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the family of Aiden Aslin, one of the two British captives, told the BBC<\/a> on 23 June that Aslin had been told that time was running out and that his execution would go ahead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Recognition from Syria?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, the \u201cDNR\u201d said on 16 June<\/a> that Syria had officially started procedures to recognize it as an independent state. The move came after a delegation led by Pushilin\u2019s aide Gennady Lebed (see above) and Foreign \u201cMinister\u201d Natalia Nikonorova visited<\/a> Damascus. The \u201cLNR\u201d sent no delegation but its leader Pasechnik claimed on the same day<\/a> that Syria and a number of other countries were ready to recognize the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was unclear why Moscow decided to dispatch two delegations from Donetsk to Damascus in the middle of a war \u2013 a group led by \u201cDNR\u201d culture \u201cMinister\u201d Mikhail Zhyoltyakov visited earlier in June<\/a> and delegations from Donetsk and Luhansk had been there in autumn 2021 (see Newsletter 95<\/a>). One explanation could be a planned tribunal against captured Ukrainian soldiers in Donetsk \u2013 Nikonorova said<\/a> that she invited Syrian officials to attend.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary The appointment of five Russian officials to key \u201cgovernment\u201d posts in Donetsk and Luhansk plus wide-ranging regional cooperation agreements triggered fresh talk that Moscow is planning to annex the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d. As Russia\u2019s military...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":2146,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[245],"tags":[294],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2234"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2234"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2234\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2235,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2234\/revisions\/2235"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2146"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2234"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2234"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2234"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}