Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Fears of an imminent Russian military offensive in Donbas were allayed somewhat by indications of manpower shortages. The \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d continued to act contrastingly when it comes to revealing their military losses while they acted in tandem by kidnapping local OSCE staff members amid a standoff about the Mission\u2019s status after its mandate expired.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Forces of \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d smaller than thought<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Two weeks after Moscow\u2019s decision<\/a> to withdraw its troops from Kyiv and to redeploy<\/a> them in Donbas, Russia continued attacking government-controlled cities, including civilian targets like Kramatorsk railway station, where more than 50 people were killed by a rocket on 8 April. However, a major Russian offensive against Ukraine\u2019s Joint Forces Operation in the region had not materialized and the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d did not claim to control more territory than two weeks earlier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Experts predicted that this would change only after the fight for Mariupol was over because Russia had not enough troops at its disposal. US military analyst Michael Kofman, who has predicted much of the conflict correctly over the past months, said in a podcast released on 11 April<\/a>, that Russia faced a serious shortage of troops in Donbas, especially infantry. He added that the separatists\u2019 forces<\/a> probably numbered only between 10,000 and 15,000 before the present conflict and that this number had been boosted to just \u201c20,000 plus\u201d thanks to the massive forced mobilization drive<\/a> that began on 19 February.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These numbers are well below those previously communicated by Ukrainian officials. Ukrainian General Serhiy Nayev said in December 2018<\/a>, that separatist troops number some 21,000 plus 11,000 Russians. In May 2021 Nayev said<\/a> that the separatists had 28,000 fighters \u2013 without specifying if this included Russian servicepeople.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The separatist \u201cPeople\u2019s Militias\u201d are organized as two separate army corps \u2013 one in Donetsk and another in Luhansk. In what is close to an admission of factual Russian command, the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d do not have defence ministries (the \u201cLNR\u201d never had one and the \u201cDNR\u201d Defence Ministry was quietly disbanded in 2018 \u2013 see our Annual Report 2018, p 9). Command and control of the formations lies with the Russian Eighth Combined Arms Army, based across the border in Russia\u2019s Rostov Region and apparently set up especially for the war in Donbass.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kofman argued that while Russia has far more heavy weapons, tanks and fighting vehicles than Ukraine, it lacks manpower \u2013 especially infantry \u2013 because Putin has shied away from a full mobilization and a declaration of war. Ukraine\u2019s situation is the opposite in that it has enough troops but a shortage of fighting kit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia\u2019s in many ways spectacular underperformance even prompted Igor Girkin, the Russian agent who started the war in 2014 by occupying Sloviansk with a group of armed men and later became the first \u201cDNR\u201d Defence Minister, to praise Kyiv: “Sadly I am seeing that the Ukrainian command is doing a better job from a military point of view than the Russian one”, he said in a video interview<\/a> published on 30 March.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Own losses revealed in Donetsk but not in Luhansk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n While the \u201ePeople\u2019s Republics\u201c undoubtedly remained under tight control from Moscow, they markedly differed from each other in their treatment of military casualties. While the \u201cLNR\u201d stuck to its longstanding policy of not reporting any own casualties \u2013 the daily \u201cPeople\u2019s Militia\u201d briefings<\/a> only talk about the Ukrainian side \u2013 the \u201cDNR\u201d reported own losses on a regular basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Donetsk military spokesman Eduard Basurin\u2019s daily briefings were carried by the official DAN news site<\/a>, in which he admitted a total of 40 killed fighters between 1 and 13 April. Basurin did not say where the losses happened, but Mariupol was practically the only place of active fighting in this period. The reports were accompanied by obviously vastly inflated claims of Ukrainian losses \u2013 between 78<\/a> and 98 per day<\/a> \u2013 and defections (Basurin claimed on 1 April<\/a> that 513 Ukrainians had switched sides), but even \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin engaged in public mourning when he awarded a medal<\/a> to the widow of a fallen officer on 13 April.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There were also rumours<\/a> that the Kremlin preferred recruits from the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d for risky operations because casualties from there would affect public opinion in Russia to a much lesser extent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201cDNR\u201d also set up<\/a> a \u201cState Defence Committee\u201d, which it claimed was modelled on the extraordinary committee set up by the Soviet Union in 1941. During the body\u2019s first session on 4 April, separatist leader Pushilin announced<\/a> \u201cdenazification laws\u201d, claiming that this was necessary to root out \u201cmanifestations of neonazism and nationalism\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cLNR\u201d eying new \u201ccitizens\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, the separatists began to expand their administrations into newly \u201cliberated\u201d areas. The \u201cLNR\u201d said on 6 April<\/a> that it had opened offices offering social payments in five settlements of the Luhansk region, including Starobilsk and Stanytsia Luhanska. Luhansk separatist leader Leonid Pasechnik said on 13 April<\/a> that he expects the \u201cRepublic\u201d to gain up to half a million new inhabitants \u2013 and claimed that \u201cLNR\u201d had 1.4 million inhabitants before 24 February. However, the real number is much lower, probably below 1 million \u2013 see our Annual Report 2021<\/a>, p. 8.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Separatists openly threaten OSCE staff<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The “People\u2019s Republics\u201d also issued serious threats against staff of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe\u2019s Monitoring Mission (OSCE SMM) and abducted one Mission member in Donetsk and Luhansk respectively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first abduction became known on 8 April<\/a>, when the \u201cDNR\u201d said that it had detained an OSCE employee for alleged \u201cillegal activities\u201d. The next day, Donetsk separatist leader Pushilin declared<\/a> the Mission illegal and its members undesirable\u201d, adding that all of its staff would have to leave by 30 April.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201cLNR\u201d followed suit with a three-day lag, typical for decisions taken in Moscow rather than locally, when its State Security \u201cMinistry\u201d said on 11 April<\/a> that it detained an SMM staffer on suspicion of treason. \u201cLNR\u201d leader Pasechnik said on 14 April<\/a> that the SMM would be banned after 30 April and claimed that the Mission had never helped to solve the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The OSCE began evacuating its international staff of more than 800<\/a> from all over Ukraine in February, but left equipment and many of its almost 500 national staff behind. The Mission\u2019s mandate expired on 31 March because Moscow vetoed its annual extension. While most participating states argue<\/a> that the Mission is now in an \u201cadministrative mode\u201d as long as negotiations over a future redeployment continue, Russia has argued that it must cease to exist immediately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n