Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Separatist leaders claimed a customs union between \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d as a road to economic boom, in what looked more like a ploy to cover up economic failure. Local participation in the Duma elections was praised as a milestone to \u201cintegration with Russia\u201d, while the published figures for online and offline voting are dubious. The coronavirus pandemic worsened considerably, prompting the re-introduction of restrictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Customs union between Donetsk and Luhansk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The establishment of a customs union between both \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d quickly became the most talked about development in eastern Ukraine for a long time. Separatist leaders claimed that this would usher economic growth and improved living conditions. Independent observers suggested that this would improve Moscow\u2019s control without having to merge the two \u201crepublics\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 1 October separatist outlets published<\/a> photos<\/a> of workers dismantling checkpoints at the four crossing points over what until 2014 was an insignificant administrative line between two Ukrainian regions but later was labelled an \u201cinternational boundary\u201d and effectively closed for traffic und the pretext of the pandemic in 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The move came after both separatist leaders Denis Pushilin and Leonid Pasechnik on 15 October signed an agreement<\/a> during an online conference to establish such a union, which was duly ratified by both parliaments<\/a> on 22 October. At an earlier online meeting on 6 September, the \u201crepublics\u201d solemnly<\/a> declared<\/a> the creation of a joint economic space combined with a string of promises, including pay rises<\/a>, the creation of 70,000 jobs as well as improvements in housing, infrastructure<\/a> and living standards, all in the three-year period from 2022 to 2024<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the declaration really is a confession that earlier goals have been missed. Thus, \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin promised back in January<\/a> 2020 that wages and pensions would rise to the level of those in the neighbouring Russian region of Rostov by January 2022. Now, this goal is being moved to 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to official data, \u201cDNR\u201d average wages will more than double from currently 15,000 roubles (180 euros) to 35,000 roubles. However, the Rostov average<\/a> wage is already closer to 40,000 roubles, while a Radio Liberty report<\/a> said in June that real average wages in Donetsk were just under 10,000 roubles \u2013 meaning that wages in the \u201cDNR\u201d would actually have to quadruple.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Separatists admit new search for Investors<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In another clear sign of economic gloom, \u201cLNR\u201d leader Pasechnik admitted<\/a> during the 6 September declaration that both republics have to look for investors to develop their struggling industry. He did not explain why. The separatists officially announced in June that Yevgeny Yurchenko, a hitherto obscure Russian investor, had taken over much of the industrial assets hitherto controlled by the secretive Vneshtorgservis holding since 2017 (see Newsletter 90<\/a>). Yurchenko then toured<\/a> plants<\/a> and promised stable wage payments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But he has not been seen or heard since appearing<\/a> at a ceremony for Metallurgy Worker\u2019s Day with Pushilin on 17 July.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that Moscow opted for two \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d rather than one in eastern Ukraine is usually explained by the fact that it wants to formally adhere to the Minsk Agreement, which stipulates that Ukraine should remain territorially intact and was signed by both \u201cheads of republics\u201d at the time (although without their titles).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukrainian observers often argue that it is easier for Moscow to control two weaker entities than one large one. Oleksiy Arestovych, the spokesman of Kyiv\u2019s delegation to the Trilateral Contact Group, suggested in a 3 October TV interview<\/a> that the two \u201crepublics\u201d also reflect inter-agency rivalry in Moscow: \u201cRumor has it that the \u201cLNR\u201d was controlled by the military intelligence service GRU while the \u201cDNR\u201d was under the \u201cFSB\u201d, he said, adding that Moscow had decided to bring the flow of goods and illicit profits under central control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Donetsk-based economist Anton Guryanov argued that faced with an ongoing stalemate in the Minsk peace talks with Ukraine, Moscow had to do something to improve the dire economic situation. “It has become clear that the drowning will have to save themselves .. and that in order to seriously improve the economy you need to establish integration ..without waiting for Ukraine’s reaction,” Guryanov was quoted as saying in an article<\/a> published by the Russian Kommersant newspaper on 30 September. The same article also quoted Moscow-based analyst Denis Denisov, who argued that lifting customs barriers would first and foremost improve the Kremlin’s control by removing corruption-prone bureaucratic hurdles. He added that this was unlikely to bring economic development and that a political union was unlikely at this point. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Separatists remain separate \u2013 even when visiting other separatists<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Ongoing political differences between Luhansk and Donetsk could be seen on 20 September, when members from both \u201cparliaments\u201d visited separatist South Ossetia for \u201cRepublic Day\u201d celebrations. While both delegations met with de facto President Anatoly Bibilov \u2013 first \u201cDNR<\/a>\u201d and then \u201cLNR<\/a>\u201d, their respective media outlets mentioned the presence of MPs from the other \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d not at all<\/a> or just in passing<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Similarly, \u201cDNR\u201d mouthpiece DAN did not mention the presence of \u201cLNR\u201d officials when it reported about the visit of a delegation from Donetsk to Syria on 30 September<\/a>. The delegation, headed by Pushilin\u2019s secretive first deputy chief of staff Gennady Lebed, took part in the Re-Build Syria trade fair from 29 September and 2 October.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 7 October, the \u201cLNR\u201d Foreign \u201cMinistry\u201d said<\/a> that it also had a delegation at the same trade fair. However, neither the \u201cMinistry\u201d nor the official outlet LITs mentioned<\/a> the presence of \u201cDNR\u201d officials or the exact dates of the visit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Separatists hail Duma elections amid doubts about local turnout<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Separatist leaders<\/a> and Russian officials<\/a> unsurprisingly praised the participation of local inhabitants in the Duma elections in September as another milestone on the road to integration with Russia, but did not mention the turnout nor any democratic practices. Thus, Pushilin claimed on 23 September<\/a> that more than 150,000 Russians from the \u201cDNR\u201d had voted \u2013 i.e. 67 per cent of the 221,850 eligible voters<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During the three election days from 17 to 19 September, Russian passport holders were allowed to vote online or in ballot stations in the neighbouring Rostov region. A report on the website<\/a> of the Rostov branch of the United Russia party said that about 150,000 Russians from both \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d voted online \u2013 accounting for more than half of the 280,000 votes cast online in the region<\/a>. Local election commission head Andrei Burov claimed on 20 September<\/a> that another 49,800 voters from the \u201crepublics\u201d had been bused to ballot stations in the Rostov region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While online voting during this election was widely criticized<\/a> as fraudulent and non-transparent, the claimed number of voters bussed from the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d also seemed dubiously high. The anonymous Telegram channel Donbass Case said<\/a> that only a fraction of the claimed 800 busses and 12 trains actually drove across the border, and that just 2,723 out of 940,000 inhabitants of Donetsk voted in Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to official results<\/a>, President Vladimir Putin\u2019s United Russia party got 51.59 per cent from the party list in Rostov \u2013 only slightly more than the party\u2019s overall tally of 49.8 per cent. Voters without local residency \u2013 those from \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d \u2013 could only vote for party lists. The Rostov turnout was given with 48.8 per cent, slightly below the federal turnout of 51.7 per cent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Alexander Borodai, the Moscow political consultant who in 2014 became the first \u201cPrime Minister\u201d of the \u201cDNR\u201d, stood on the Rostov party list<\/a>, but it was not clear<\/a> immediately if he will get a Duma seat. On 4 October his \u201cUnion of Donbass Volunteers\u201d confirmed that Borodai had been elected when it congratulated him<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n COVID death toll reaches new record<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic worsened considerably, with hospitals being overwhelmed with patients and record death figures, even according to official figures. Thus, the \u201cDNR\u201d reported an unprecedented 356 deaths in the week up to 10 October. This was up from 302 in the week before, which again was almost double the 161 deaths reported for the week up to 26 September.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201cLNR\u201d also showed a massive upward trend despite sticking to its tradition of reporting dubiously low figures. Weekly deaths in the \u201cLNR\u201d jumped from 92 in the week up to 19 September to 151 in the following week and to 172 by 3 October.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As of 10 October the \u201cDNR\u201d had officially reported<\/a> a total of 5,386 deaths from COVID-19. Based on an assumed population of 1.1 million, this renders the \u201cDNR\u201d death rate per million at 4,896 \u2013 by far the worst in Europe, where the highest per capita death toll has now been recorded in Bosnia<\/a> with 3,328 per million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Social media users posted photos of many ambulances<\/a> waiting outside a Donetsk clinic in order to deliver COVID-patients and large numbers of patients<\/a> waiting for treatment and x-raying. The \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d began designating hospitals<\/a> for COVID-treatment, including birth clinics<\/a>, meaning that they would stop taking other patients.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The spike forced the \u201crepublics\u201d to reintroduce restrictions on public life \u2013 albeit far from strict lockdowns. \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin decreed on 24 September<\/a> that restaurants can only fill half of their places, sports matches must be held without spectators and banning mass events with more than 50 participants. The \u201cDNR\u201d also prolonged<\/a> school holidays to 21 days while in Luhansk at least 12 schools had switched<\/a> to online lessons. The \u201cDNR\u201d kept their crossings with government-controlled Ukraine largely closed while the \u201cLNR\u201d imposed further restrictions<\/a> on their only crossing point in Stanitsya Luhanska \u2013 people wanting to cross now need to be on previously approved lists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite this, the Donetsk city administration said on 8 October<\/a> that some 12,000 people participated in a large-scale subbotnik<\/em> (public cleaning) and did not cancel planned concerts like one by Russian pop singer Oleg Gasmanov on 14 November<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Patchy information about vaccinations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201cDNR\u201d said on 29 September<\/a> that about 200,000 inhabitants have been vaccinated with the Russian-made Sputnik V and its single-dose variant \u201cSputnik Light\u201d since vaccinations began in February. However, it was unclear if any more doses are available. The last shipments from Russia were reported on 28 July and 9 August, when the \u201cDNR\u201d said that it received 85,000 and 90,000 doses of Sputnik Light respectively (the \u201cLNR\u201d also received doses but did not say how many).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Donetsk health \u201cminister\u201d Alexander Oprishchenko said also on 28 July<\/a> that 50,000 people had been vaccinated so far and that the \u201cDNR\u201d wanted to achieve herd immunity by winter, which would mean on 1 December. Even assuming a real population of just 1.1 million this seems an extremely ambitious task.<\/p>\n\n\n\n