Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The latest ceasefire was holding better than initially expected, but that did not stop the separatists heaping accusations against Ukraine. The numbers of coronavirus infections remained high in the \u201cDNR\u201d, but the separatists blamed infection levels in Ukraine for their unwillingness to open their checkpoints with government-controlled areas, causing more and more civilians to be trapped in no-mans-land. The separatist also hardly mentioned the anti-government protests in Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ceasefire holding better<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 10 August, the Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) said<\/a> that it recorded no ceasefire violations between 7 and 9 August \u2013 three consecutive days and an unprecedented situation since the Minsk Package of Measures was agreed in 2015. On 10 August, the Mission recorded<\/a> just a single explosion in the Donetsk region and no violations in the Luhansk region, meaning that in the latter region it recorded no ceasefire violations for six days in a row<\/a>. On 11 August, the Mission recorded<\/a> five violations and on 12 August, the OSCE observers again recorded<\/a> no violations at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 13 August, the Mission recorded<\/a> 36 ceasefire violations in the Donetsk region and 34 in the Luhansk region, but said that most of them were live fire exercises held by the separatist armed formations relatively far behind the front line. On 16 August \u201cLNR\u201d leader Leonid Pasechnik claimed<\/a> that a separatist fighter had been killed by a Ukrainian sniper the night before. However, the government troops said<\/a> that they recorded no ceasefire violations at all that day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The ceasefire, which was brokered by the Trilateral Contact Group consisting of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, had a rough start on 27 July, when the sides accused each other of numerous violations. However, the violence quickly declined significantly compared to the period before the truce began. The OSCE said<\/a> that it recorded a total of 256 violations between 27 July and 9 August, a fraction of the 8,094 violations recorded in the two weeks before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine and the separatists did, however, accuse each other of violating the truce without shooting \u2013 by carrying out works to improve military positions<\/a>, which they argued<\/a> is banned under the agreement. \u201cDNR\u201d leader Denis Pushilin accused Ukraine of sabotaging the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) as the ceasefire\u2019s control mechanism, when he claimed<\/a> that the Ukrainian side does not answer calls.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pandemic getting worse<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic showed no signs of going away, especially in the Donetsk \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d, which on 14 and 15 August<\/a> reported 42 and 27 new cases in the past 24 hours respectively, bringing the overall number of cases to 2,084, including 117 deaths. The Luhansk separatists on 15 August<\/a> reported 630 cases, including 15 deaths.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to numbers communicated by the respective health \u201cministries\u201d, the DNR recorded<\/a> 143 new cases and 4 deaths in the 7 days up to 14 August and 163 new cases and 8 deaths in the week before. The (smaller) \u201cLNR\u201d recorded 7 cases and no deaths in the week up to 14 August. The exact number of cases in the week before is not known because the Luhansk separatists did not report any new figures between 23 July and 6 August.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on an estimated population of 2.5 million, the \u201cDNR\u201d had 0.9 cases per day and 100,000 inhabitants in the first and 0.8 cases per day and 100,000 in the second week \u2013 minuscule in comparison to Ukraine\u2019s 23 and Russia\u2019s 24. This is somewhat surprising, given that both \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d were late to introduce quarantine restrictions and have highly aged populations. Ukraine has alleged that the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d are underreporting coronavirus cases, an accusation that the separatist have denied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin said on 15 August<\/a>, that the situation was \u201cstable\u201d and that there is no reason to expect another surge in infections. However, the relatively high number of deaths as a fraction of infections in the \u201cDNR\u201d – 5.6 per cent \u2013 might be a sign that the situation is more serious than the official numbers suggest. In Russia, that figure is just 1.7 per cent, in Ukraine 2.1 per cent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Donetsk Health \u201cMinistry\u201d ostensibly mentions the number of cases among \u201carrivers from Ukraine\u201d (government-controlled areas) in its daily reports \u2013 what looks like an attempt to blame Ukraine, although the \u201cministry\u2019s\u201d numbers clearly show that the number of arrivals is relatively small compared to the overall case numbers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n COVID19-numbers in the neigbouring government-controlled areas, which are thought to have similar-sized populations, also remained lower, despite recent rises. As of 15 August, the Donetsk region reported<\/a> a total of 1.074 infections and 14 deaths, while the Luhansk region recorded<\/a> 179 cases and one death.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Travel restrictions leave people stranded in no-mans-land<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, severe restrictions for people wanting to travel to government-controlled areas remained in the \u201cDNR\u201d. The separatists have argued that the level of infections in Ukraine is too high to reopen its de-facto border with government-controlled areas \u2013 while the borders with Russia, where infection rates are by no means lower, remained open.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The separatists in the \u201cDNR\u201d have opened just one of four crossing points, but only Mondays and Fridays \u2013 allowing entry only to people previously approved by a special committee and letting out only people with registration in the rest of Ukraine. Those who are let in through this \u201chumanitarian corridor\u201d wait some ten hours to pass three checkpoints, only to undergo a mandatory two-week observation in a local hospital \u2013 after which they need to spend another two weeks in self-isolation at home, according to a report published by Radio Svoboda<\/a> on 12 August.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These restrictions are causing a growing number of people to get trapped between the checkpoints \u2013 having passed government checkpoints but being refused entry to the \u201cDNR\u201d. With no money to return, many elderly people are forced to spend weeks in makeshift shelters in mined territory under the eyes of armed formations, according to a 10 August report<\/a> by the Ukrainian Novosti Donbassa website.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the hardship, this cumbersome \u201ccorridor\u201d into the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d is on average taken by 300 to 450 people, according<\/a> to \u201cDNR\u201d officials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In another twist, the \u201cDNR\u201d has not opened the \u201cboundary\u201d with the \u201cLNR\u201d. Separatist-controlled media have not reported this, put on 5 August a petition<\/a> to open the border was posted on the website of Donetskaya Respublika, the \u201cDNR\u201d de-facto governing party. The exact reason to keep the border shut was unclear but the most likely explanation is to prevent people from entering government-controlled Ukraine via the \u201cLNR\u201d, whose only checkpoint in Stanytsia-Luhanska is open. \u201cDNR\u201d authorities are threatening violators with fines of up to 30,000 roubles and the confiscation of their vehicles, according to<\/a> the anonymous Lugansk Inside Telegram channel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russian convoy arrives<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 30 July, the first Russian convoy since December arrived in Donetsk and Luhansk. According to separatist officials, the lorries brought medical aid, 65 tons to Donetsk<\/a> and 76 tons to Luhansk<\/a>. As it did with past convoys, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry sent a protest note<\/a> to Moscow for violating Ukrainian sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia\u2019s aid convoys have been mired in controversy since their beginning in 2014, because neither Ukrainian customs officers nor the OSCE Observer Mission<\/a> stationed at the Russian border with Ukraine are allowed to inspect them. The hitherto monthly convoys inexplicably stopped in December 2018, only to be resumed on a weekly basis in autumn 2019. They stopped again in December 2019. Neither Russia nor the separatists have commented on the convoy\u2019s mysterious schedule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In what is believed to be other Russian aid, the Donetsk Construction \u201cMinistry\u201d on 12 August presented 19 new road cleaning vehicles. The \u201cMinistry\u201d did not say where they came from, but \u201cMinister\u201d Sergei Naumets was quoted as saying<\/a> that they were part of 125 vehicles that have recently been acquired for communal authorities. Judging from past experience, it can be safely assumed that they were donated by Moscow. Last year, more than 100 new vehicles appeared in the \u201cLNR\u201d (see Newletter 70<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The only regular aid reaching the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d is from the Ukrainian offices of the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). On 13 August, those agencies sent two more convoys with a total over more than 100 tons of aid, according<\/a> to the Ukrainian border guard service. The two agencies already sent at least four convoys during July (see Newsletter 78<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the ICRC office in Kyiv, the organization delivered some 5,000 tons of humanitarian assistance in 262 trucks to the no-controlled areas between January and July this year \u2013 less than last year, when it sent 327 trucks with a total of 6,065 tons in the same time period. The lower numbers for this year are most likely explained by the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d decision to close their unofficial border with Ukraine because of the coronavirus pandemic in March.<\/p>\n\n\n\n ICRC visit to detainees in Donetsk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On Sunday, the \u201cDNR\u201d said that the head of the ICRC delegation to Ukraine, Florence Gillette, had arrived in Donetsk for a three-day visit. The separatists said nothing about the purpose of the visit, but according to the ICRC the delegation had been invited to visit detainees. \u201cThe ICRC was invited by local structures \u2026 to visit a place of detention and meet in private with two detainees,\u201d a spokesman said, adding that the ICRC hopes \u201cthat this development and first step will lead to growing access to detainees\u201d held in the \u201cDNR\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d have so far stubbornly refused to give the ICRC access to prisoners and have only allowed Swiss OSCE Ambassador Toni Frisch to conduct such visits. The leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany agreed at the Normandy Format summit in Paris in December to grant access to the ICRC and Gillette\u2019s visit could be the first step to implement this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Belarus<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Separatist-controlled media hardly mentioned the unrest in Belarus. Unlike the separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia<\/a>, they also sent no re-election congratulations to Alexander Lukashenko, whose future looked increasingly uncertain after one week of protests against what looked like massive vote rigging at the 9 August presidential election. \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin mentioned Belarus only when he criticized<\/a> the arrest of Russian video blogger Semyon Pegov in Minsk, an ardent supporter of the separatists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cLNR\u201d ministers vanish<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, there were signs of a fresh purge in the \u201cLNR\u201d leadership. Trade and Industry \u201cMinister\u201d Irina Derkach vanished from the \u201cgovernment\u201d website<\/a> (her name still appeared<\/a> on the \u201cministry\u2019s\u201d site) amid unconfirmed reports<\/a> that she had been detained and was being questioned by investigators. According<\/a> to the anonymous \u201cLugansk Inside\u201d blog, State Security \u201cMinistry\u201d officers arrested Derkach during a government meeting on 14 August.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Derkach served as \u201cminister\u201d only since last autumn, when she replaced now first deputy \u201cgovernment chairman\u201d Yury Govtvin, who in turn had replaced another fired minister, Dmitry Bozhich (see Newsletter 56<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Also ousted according to the government website was Coal and Energy \u201cMinister\u201d Pavel Malgin, who has been replaced<\/a> by Alexander Trofimenko, who formerly headed a mining safety watchdog. Like Derkach, Malgin was still in office according to his ministry\u2019s site<\/a>. Malgin had played a key role in ending two miners strikes this spring (see Newsletter 75<\/a>). According to the Ukrainian Eastern Human Rights Group, Malgin and a number of regional officials were ousted after financial audits conducted by Russian officials. The group also speculated<\/a> that Malgin was not loyal enough to Dmitry Kozak, the Kremlin\u2019s top official overseeing the People\u2019s Republics\u201d since the beginning of the year.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary The latest ceasefire was holding better than initially expected, but that did not stop the separatists heaping accusations against Ukraine. The numbers of coronavirus infections remained high in the \u201cDNR\u201d, but the separatists blamed...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[244,245],"tags":[294],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1968"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1968"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1968\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1969,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1968\/revisions\/1969"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1968"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1968"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1968"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}