Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n
Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n In the run-up to the 9 December \u201cNormandy Format\u201d summit in Paris, the separatists further raised the hurdles for reintegration into Ukraine. The secretive \u201cDNR\u201d Prime Minister appeared officially in public for the first time.<\/p>\n Disinformation campaign about \u201cdeportations\u201d intensifies<\/strong><\/p>\n The separatists stepped up their disinformation campaign aimed against reintegration with Ukraine, with official media in Donetsk and Luhansk publishing a string of \u201copinions\u201d that lambast Kyiv for apparently planning to resettle pro-Russian minded people from Donbass to other parts of Ukraine if there is reintegration.<\/p>\n The reports centered on a letter that was apparently sent by Ukrainian Security Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov to President Volodymyr Zelenskiy\u2019s administration. When Danilov said on camera that the letter was fake, the campaign only intensified \u2013 e.g. one \u201cDNR\u201d MP argued<\/a> that Kyiv\u2019s actions over the past five years prove that the letter must be true, another claimed that<\/a> Ukraine could credibly distance itself if it implements the Minsk agreement.<\/p>\n In a clear sign that the campaign was coordinated from above (Moscow), separatist-controlled news media in both “people’s republics” published similar reports on the topic on an almost daily basis \u2013 a site search<\/a> on the Donetsk news site DAN returned 25 items between 14 November and 5 December, while the Luhansk outlet LITs<\/a> had ten news items between December 1 and December 6.<\/p>\n A Radio Liberty report concluded<\/a> that the campaign shows that it is much harder to deny lies than to spread them. And Danilov said in a statement<\/a> that the fake letter was meant to weaken Ukraine\u2019s position in the upcoming negotiations. While the campaign indicates that Moscow and its separatist clients are making preparations for possible reintegration, it also shows clearly that they reject it and want to maximize the cost for such a scenario.<\/p>\n \u201cDNR\u201d lays claim to government-held areas<\/strong><\/p>\n Further raising the stakes before fresh negotiations, the Donetsk separatist parliament on 29 November adopted a new \u201claw<\/a>\u201d which defines the \u201cDNR\u201d state borders as identical with Ukraine\u2019s Donetsk region, thus reinforcing the separatists\u2019 claim to the region\u2019s government-controlled parts. While \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin argued<\/a> that the \u201claw\u201d was merely meant to address legal loopholes for customs and border guards, the timing suggests that it is meant to raise tensions before the summit. Pushilin also failed to explain how the \u201claw\u201d is compatible with a 2017 decree by his predecessor Alexander Zakharchenko, which defined the \u201ccontact line\u201d that divides the region in two halves as the state boundary (see Newsletter 19<\/a>).<\/p>\n Pushilin suggests making Russian sole state language<\/strong><\/p>\n On 2 December, Pushilin proposed<\/a> to make Russian the sole official language in the \u201cDNR\u201d. The Donetsk \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d says in its \u201cconstitution<\/a>\u201d that Ukrainian is a state language along with Russian – however, Ukrainian is practically never used in official communication or media. An exception was the website of former \u201cDNR\u201d leader Zakharchenko, who was assassinated in August 2018, which had a Ukrainian-language version. However, the site http:\/\/av-zakharchenko.su\/<\/a> has been offline for some time and Pushilin\u2019s site https:\/\/glavadnr.ru\/<\/a> is available only in Russian. The situation is similar in Luhansk, however, the \u201cLNR\u201d \u201cconstitution<\/a>\u201d (article 10) explicitly says that Russian is the sole language of official communication.<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s policy of allowing no state language besides Ukrainian has created tensions between Moscow and Kyiv long before 2014. In 2012, Ukraine allowed Russian to be used officially on a regional level, but that has since been reversed in a number of regions.<\/p>\n Secretive PM appears in public for the first time<\/strong><\/p>\n Meanwhile, the \u201cDNR\u201d leadership reduced its level of secrecy a little by showing its \u201cPrime Minister\u201d Alexander Ananchenko for the first time in public. Together with separatist leader Pushilin, Ananchenko appeared on camera<\/a> at a convention of the ruling Donetsk Republic movement on 21 November, where he spoke<\/a> about improving relations between the government and the movement, which acts as the de facto ruling party.<\/p>\n The influential Ananchenko, who is believed to have previously worked for the super-secretive Vneshtorgservis holding, which controls key plants seized by the separatists from their Ukrainian owners in 2017, has practically never appeared in public since being appointed head of the Donetsk separatist government in October 2018. On the \u201cDNR\u201d government website<\/a> his official biography still has no photo, as do the \u201cMinisters\u201d of the Interior and State Security, Alexei Diky and Vladimir Pavlenko.<\/p>\n Secrecy remains high in the neighbouring \u201cLNR\u201d, where official media did not report the promotion of longtime deputy Interior \u201cMinister\u201d Yury Govtvin to the powerful post of \u201cFirst Deputy Prime Minister<\/a>\u201d in October (see Newsletter 67<\/a>).<\/p>\n Donetsk parliament expels \u201copposition\u201d leader <\/strong><\/p>\n In another surprise move, the \u201cDNR\u201d parliament on 6 December expelled the leader of the quasi opposition party, the Free Donbass movement. Yevgeny Orlov was officially relieved of his mandate<\/a> for \u201closs of trust\u201d by a parliamentary ethics committee tasked with investigating MPs extra-parliamentary activities, the DAN news site reported<\/a>.<\/p>\n Orlov is already the second Free Donbass MP hit with expulsion. In April, his colleague Sergei Sverchkov was kicked out under the same pretext<\/a>. Sverchkov was apparently arrested in March<\/a> on accusation of accepting bribes from businesses. Nothing has been heard of him or of the case against him since. Sverchkov had criticized<\/a> the slow processing at \u201cDNR\u201d crossing points with government-controlled Ukraine.<\/p>\n Free Donbass, which has 25 of the 99 parliamentary seats, acts more as a mild corrective than a real opposition. Faction leader Alexei Zhigulin said in December 2018<\/a> that his movement would engage only in \u201cconstructive\u201d opposition by \u201csuggesting alternative decisions\u201d. The movement\u2019s most prominent figures, former separatist leader Pavel Gubarev and his wife Yekaterina, remain largely sidelined from politics.<\/p>\n The dnr-live news portal<\/a>, which is associated with Gubarev, did not report Orlov\u2019s expulsion. The website<\/a> of Free Donbass has not been updated since January.<\/p>\n Audio recording suggests trouble at pipe factory<\/strong><\/p>\n A new report suggested that the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d economic woes are not getting better. An audio recording<\/a> from the Silur pipe plant in Khartsyzk published on 23 November suggests<\/a> that the plant remains idle and workers have not been paid.<\/p>\n