Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n
Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n Separatist leaders and their official media showed no positive reaction to the latest conciliatory signals from Ukraine and continued their line of accusing Kyiv of war-mongering. They also paid little attention to the major prisoner swap, which included a key MH17 witness. Meanwhile, the \u201cLNR\u201d Interior Minister resurfaced after rumours that he has been arrested when he led an investigation into a mysterious explosion under a bridge.<\/p>\n Separatists lambast Kyiv over \u201cSteinmeier Formula\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n After the latest round of the Trilateral Contact Group talks in Minsk on 18 September, separatist leaders lambasted the fact that Ukraine had refused to sign the \u201cSteinmeier Formula\u201d, a step that they said had been agreed during a meeting of the \u201cNormandy Four\u201d leaders\u2019 political advisers in Berlin on 2 September.<\/p>\n \u201cDNR\u201d Foreign \u201cMinister\u201d Natalia Nikonorova, who represents the \u201cDNR\u201d at the talks, declared<\/a> that Kyiv\u2019s position made it unlikely that a summit in the Normandy Format \u2013 which includes Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France – could be held soon. Her \u201cLNR\u201d colleague Vladislav Deinego said<\/a> that Ukraine demonstrated that it had no will to implement the Minsk agreements. Boris Gryzlov, the top Russian envoy to the talks, argued<\/a> that Kyiv\u2019s refusal meant that no progress can be achieved in implementing the disengagement agreement because both must be agreed at the same time.<\/p>\n Ukraine argues<\/a> that it is ready to sign the \u201cSteinmeier Formula\u201d, but only if a number of conditions are fulfilled, among them a disengagement of all forces along the whole front line. An agreement<\/a> to disengage, i.e. withdraw 2 kilometres on both sides from the frontline, was signed back in 2016, and the sides agreed to implement it in three areas \u2013 Stanytsia, Zolote and Petrivske. However, that proved elusive until June, when a withdrawal finally happened in Stanytsia Luhanska (see Newsletter 59<\/a>). A footbridge in Stanytsia is the only crossing point into non-government-held areas in the entire Luhansk region, and disengagement is supposed to allow badly needed repair works. While the works have not begun, the local Ukrainian administration has set up a webcam<\/a> showing its side of the bridge.<\/p>\n Ukraine offers total disengagement<\/strong><\/p>\n The newly appointed Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Vadym Prystaiko, told the Rada\u2019s foreign policy committee<\/a> on 18 September that President Volodymyr Zelenskiy supports a disengagement along the entire frontline because if the agreement was implemented piecemeal, both sides \u201cwill be disengaging for 300 years\u201d. Such a step would be unprecedented in the seemingly intractable conflict, and it seems unlikely to happen soon, not least because it is just one of a number of conditions for Ukraine to enter a political settlement.<\/p>\n The \u201dSteinmeier Formula\u201d, named after former German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, lies at the heart of the political part of the Minsk agreement. Talks about its implementation have been ongoing in the Minsk Contact Group since 2016. The formula states that Ukraine should grant the separatist-held areas wide-ranging autonomy (special political status) preliminarily after local elections have been held there and permanently (by amending the constitution) after the vote has been approved by OSCE election observers. Local elections are a core element in the Minsk “Package of Measures\u201d, which stipulates that they should be held under Ukrainian law.<\/p>\n Ukraine and her western partners argue that Kyiv first needs to regain control of the areas. Kurt Volker, the US special representative for Ukraine, argued in a recent interview<\/a> that in order to hold free and fair elections, the occupation needs to end and Russian-controlled forces must leave.<\/p>\n However, separatist leaders regularly stress that they want union with Russia rather than return to Ukraine. During a meeting with (pro-Kremlin) journalists and bloggers in Moscow on 12 September, \u201cDNR\u201d leader Denis Pushilin said that<\/a> ideally Donbass should become a Federal District of Russia. On 19 September, while on a visit to the Georgian breakaway province South Ossetia, Pushilin said<\/a> that he does not believe that the conflict will end any time soon because new Ukrainian government was carrying out the same policies as under former President Poroshenko.<\/p>\n Prisoner swap largely ignored<\/strong><\/p>\n The separatists also said little about the high-profile prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine on 7 September, which brought the release of film director Oleh Sentsov and the 35 Ukrainian sailors who had been detained after the Kerch strait incident in November. \u201cDNR\u201d ombudswoman Daria Morozova merely issued a statement<\/a> in which she thanked Russia for achieving the release of Vladimir Tsemakh, the former separatist field commander thought to be a witness to the 2014 shooting down of Air Malaysia Flight MH17, for which international investigators<\/a> have blamed Russia.<\/p>\n Tsemakh was surprisingly freed by a Kyiv court on 5 September and subsequently flown to Moscow, apparently after Ukraine yielded to a Russian demand to include him in the swap of political prisoners. The 58-year old was kidnapped in June by government special forces in his home in Snizhne, a town east of Donetsk. According to a Radio Liberty report<\/a>, one Ukrainian soldier was killed and another was injured during the daring raid.<\/p>\n Tsemakh returned to his home in 10 September according<\/a> to his daughter, but the \u201cDNR\u201d did not give him a welcome reception. The last time he was mentioned by the official DAN news site was in a 7 September interview<\/a> with Kremlin insider Alexei Chesnakov, who claimed that Tsemakh was released upon a request from the Donetsk \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic.<\/p>\n \u201cLNR\u201d Interior Minister resurfaces by claiming terrorist attack<\/strong><\/p>\n Meanwhile, a mysterious explosion hit a major road bridge in Luhansk in the early hours of 19 September. The explosion, which damaged some of the bridge\u2019s pylons, was quickly denounced as a terrorist attack by “LNR\u201d Interior Minister Igor Kornet, who blamed Ukraine in a video from the scene posted<\/a> on his ministry website hours after the incident.<\/p>\n The \u201cminister\u201d claimed that a Russian aid convoy was supposed to pass the bridge later the same day. That convoy, which entered and exited eastern Ukraine<\/a> on just hours later, was just the second this year.<\/p>\n Kornet had been the subject of much speculation after unconfirmed reports<\/a> in Ukrainian media<\/a> earlier that he had been arrested. However, the pro-separatist news site Russkaya Vesna reported<\/a> on 16 September hat Kornet was in Moscow for \u201cimportant meetings\u201d.<\/p>\n The separatist Interior \u201cMinister\u201d rose to fame in November 2017, when he was at the centre of a coup that removed then separatist leader Igor Plotnitsky from power (see Newsletter 25<\/a>). Despite leading the rebellion against Plotnitsky in the \u201cLNR\u201d security forces, Kornet did not assume the leadership position afterwards, which was taken instead by the relatively unknown security chief Leonid Pasechnik.<\/p>\n The arrest rumours led to speculation about a leadership struggle between Kornet and Pasechnik. While the two have never openly quarreled, it is striking that Kornet, who had not appeared publicly for weeks, suddenly surfaced by leading an anti-terrorist investigation – while Pasechnik did not show up. The \u201cLNR\u201d leader, who did not join his \u201cDNR\u201d colleague Pushilin in South Ossetia, merely published a tweet<\/a> in which he called the explosion a \u201ccynical act of aggression\u201d. Even more curiously, his office did not deny the reports about Kornet\u2019s arrest, telling<\/a> the Russian RIA Novosti news agency merely that Pasechnik \u201cdoes not comment on rumours\u201d.<\/p>\n The possibility that the explosion was a PR ploy may also be backed by the fact that Kornet and not the State Security \u201cMinistry\u201d, formerly headed by Pasechnik, announced the investigation. In May, that ministry announced a joint investigation with Kornet\u2019s \u201cministry\u201d after another mystery bomb destroyed a major bridge in Krasny Luch, south of Luhansk (see Newsletter 30<\/a>). This time, the Security \u201cMinistry\u201d announced<\/a> the opening of a criminal case because of the explosion but did not mention the interior ministry, which reported the incident much earlier.<\/p>\n It should also be noted that the official \u201cDNR\u201d media gave much attention to the explosion in Luhansk. Speaking during a 19 September press conference in South Ossetia, Donetsk separatist leader Pushilin announced<\/a> that because of the blast in Luhansk, security would be stepped up also in the \u201cDNR\u201d.<\/p>\n \u201cMinister\u201d admits troubles in cable factory<\/strong><\/p>\n Meanwhile, the \u201cDNR\u201d admitted ongoing economic difficulties. During a visit of the Silur cable factory in Khartsyzk on 18 September, revenue \u201cMinister\u201d Lavrenov promised visibly skeptical workers<\/a> that outstanding wages would be paid within two weeks and that he hoped that production would restart soon.<\/p>\n The factory produces steel cables which are traditionally used in coal mines. However, production stopped earlier this summer amid reports that the separatist-controlled plant was handed to an obscure company in Russia (see Newsletter 62<\/a>).<\/p>\n Like other industrial plants in the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d, Silur suffers from a lack of raw materials and sales markets from since a wide-ranging trade blockade was imposed by Ukraine in early 2017. Lavrenov promised that raw materials would appear soon, but the report suggested<\/a> that management was looking into switching production from steel to aluminum.<\/p>\n These problems are thought to be widespread, however there is little concrete information about the state of the economy as the separatists have stepped up levels of secrecy. Thus, the DAN news site reported on 13 September<\/a> that industrial production had risen in the first half of 2019, but the underlying data<\/a> from the Economic Development Ministry\u201d contained no concrete numbers but only percentage figures.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary Separatist leaders and their official media showed no positive reaction to the latest conciliatory signals from Ukraine and continued their line of accusing Kyiv of war-mongering. They also paid little attention to the major...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[244,245],"tags":[243],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1794"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1794"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1794\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1797,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1794\/revisions\/1797"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1794"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1794"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1794"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}