Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n
Summary <\/strong><\/p>\n The separatists commemorated the first anniversary of Alexander Zakharchenko\u2019s killing by stressing the first \u201cDNR\u201d-leader\u2019s cult-like status. They largely ignored the latest diplomatic offensive by the Normandy Format powers, instead sticking to their narrative of integration with Russia. There were fresh reports that the issuing of Russian passports is not entirely voluntary. And efforts to unite \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d railway companies seemed to progress very slowly.<\/p>\n Zakharchenko cult confirmed in Donetsk<\/strong><\/p>\n On 31 August, separatist leaders stressed their bonds with Russia during memorial ceremonies on the first anniversary of the killing of former \u201cDNR\u201d leader Alexander Zakharchenko. At the unveiling of a black marble bust of Zakharchenko in central Donetsk, his successor Denis Pushilin promised<\/a> to \u201cimmortalize\u201d everything Zakharchenko did. At the end of the ceremony, Pushilin and his Luhansk colleague Leonid Pasechnik stood silent before the bust before – visibly on Pasechnik\u2019s initiative<\/a> \u2013 both made a sign of the cross.<\/p>\n At a later ceremony<\/a> at Zakharchenko\u2019s pompous grave, which has been adorned by two white angels and a life-size bust of the slain separatist leader, Pushilin said<\/a> that he will carry on Zakharchenko\u2019s work by moving towards integration with Russia: \u201cThe Republic is developing and continues to do what Alexander Vladimirovich (Zakharchenko) always said -to strengthen the integration with our big motherland \u2013 the Russian Federation.\u201d<\/p>\n The ceremony was attended by a handful of Russian MPs led by former Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov, who currently heads the A Just Russia faction in the State Duma. Federation Council Senator Sergei Mamedov recalled that<\/a> Zakharchenko had often said that he was fighting for Russia in Donbass – \u201cand nobody here should have any doubt of this\u201d, Mamedov said. Also present<\/a> was prominent Russian biker Alexander Saldostanov.<\/p>\n South Ossetian separatist leader Anatoly Bibilov was not at the ceremonies despite a prior announcement<\/a>, and sent an open letter<\/a> instead.<\/p>\n Pasechnik promises that killers will be caught<\/strong><\/p>\n When Pasechnik addressed the mourners, he claimed that Zakharchenko was killed by the \u201ccowardly\u201d hands of Ukrainian special services: \u201cGod sees everything – those guilty (of his murder) will be found and definitely punished,\u201d he said<\/a>.<\/p>\n While the separatists keep blaming Ukraine for the killing, they have produced no convincing evidence for their claim. The circumstances of the assassination, a remote-controlled bomb that went off when Zakharchenko entered his favorite caf\u00e9 in Donetsk, the ensuing removal of his loyalists from the separatist leadership and the forceful reaffirmation of Russian control over the \u201cDNR\u201d make it more likely that the killing was at least tacitly approved by the Kremlin (see the discussion in our Annual Report 2018<\/a>, p 6).<\/p>\n Separatists stress integration with Russia, ignore international diplomacy<\/strong><\/p>\n The separatists also failed to react to the latest round of high-level diplomacy and the possible holding of a Normandy Format summit (Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany). Official media in both Donetsk<\/a> and Luhansk<\/a> did not report about the G7 summit in Biarritz, where French President Emmanuel Macron said<\/a> on 26 August that conditions exist \u201cfor a useful summit\u201d already in September.<\/p>\n Instead, Donetsk separatist leader Denis Pushilin reiterated his narrative that the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d should join Russia at an unspecified future date. \u201cGiven ongoing integration processes, including the handing out of Russian passports, this is a matter of time\u201d, Pushilin said at a youth forum on 29 August<\/a>. \u201cSpiritually we have long been united with Russia,\u201d he added, but cautioned that \u201cthere are a number of geopolitical complications. As soon as the possibility arises, it will happen. We just have to wait\u201d, he said<\/a>.<\/p>\n In Luhansk, a senior official stressed that separatist leader Pasechnik orients his work according to \u201cthe Russian vector\u201d. \u201cEverything we do we consider with regard to Russian law, because .. this allows us to strive for the results that our republic achieved over (the past) five years,\u201d Pasechnik\u2019s aide Marina Filippova said on 28 August<\/a>.<\/p>\n Reports of pressure to accept Russian passports <\/strong><\/p>\n The issuing of Russian passports to inhabitants of the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d began in June, two months after president Vladimir Putin issued a controversial decree that allows holders of \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d passports to receive fast-track Russian citizenship without having to give up any other citizenship.<\/p>\n The Russian Interior Ministry said on 15 August<\/a> that it has received more than 60,000 applications and issued ore than 25,000 passports on the basis of the decree. The \u201cDNR\u201d said on 31 August<\/a> that more than 12,000 passports had been issued to its inhabitants.<\/p>\n Reports in Ukrainian and Russian media suggest that the passports are mainly given to separatist officials, members of the security services and armed formations. The Ukrainian news site ostro.org reported on 13 August<\/a> that the \u201cLNR\u201d is threatening emergency services staff in Kadiivka that they would lose their job if they do not apply for Russian passports, while raising their wages at the same time. \u00a0The report, which quoted an unnamed \u201cLNR\u201d law enforcement source, also said that owning businesses or buying and selling real estate will be illegal for Ukrainian passport holders from next year onwards, forcing more people to take separatist-issued passports.<\/p>\n The share of the local population that has accepted separatist-issued passports is thought to be just 15 per cent, despite the fact that these passports have been issued since 2015 in the \u201cLNR\u201d and 2016 in the \u201cDNR\u201d. This figure has also been taken as an indicator of the share of the local population that is loyal towards the separatists (see Newsletter 56<\/a>).<\/p>\n \u00a0\u201cDNR\u201d deletes links to secretive holding<\/strong><\/p>\n Meanwhile, the level of secrecy over the economy increased. The \u201cDNR\u201d, where key industrial assets are controlled by the secretive Vneshtorgservis holding, removed a lot of information about the holding\u2019s plants. Thus a list of enterprises<\/a> and sites about plants controlled by Vneshtorgservis vanished from the website of the \u201cDNR\u201d Chamber of Trade and Industry. \u00a0Also gone were any links to Vneshtorgservis<\/a> on the Industry and Trade \u201cMinistry\u201d official site.<\/p>\n Information about individual plants remained accessible in a less detailed list<\/a> on the vsednr.ru\/ (\u201cAll about the DNR\u201d) site, run by the Donetsk Information \u201cMinistry\u201d and on the DNR Live portal<\/a>, which is linked to former separatist leader and opposition figure Pavel Gubarev.<\/p>\n Vneshtorgservis is believed to be registered in the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, the only territory that has recognized the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d and is in turn recognized by Russia. The company has no public records and nothing is known about its present management since CEO Vladimir Pashkov became a \u201cDNR\u201d deputy Prime Minister overseeing the economy in April. Pashkov, a Russian citizen, reports to the secretive and powerful Prime Minister Alexander Ananchenko, who is also believed to be a former Vneshtorgservis executive.<\/p>\n Although the holding controls the nine biggest metallurgical plants inside the \u201cDNR\u201d, separatist leader Denis Pushilin did not mention<\/a> Vneshtorgservis in his official congratulations<\/a> for Metallurgy Worker\u2019s Day in July.<\/p>\n Pushilin obliges officials to inform him before travel<\/strong><\/p>\n Despite the official narrative of closer links to Russia, \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin decreed on 28 August that top officials must inform him in writing before they leave the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d, ie including to Russia. The decree published<\/a> on his website says that heads of ministries, state agencies and their deputies need to state the route and purpose of any travel outside the \u201cDNR\u201d. This includes not only Russia but also the \u201cLNR\u201d. Members of Pushilin\u2019s administration are exempt.<\/p>\n Travel restrictions were first introduced in early 2018, when the \u201cDNR\u201d banned<\/a> officials from entering government-controlled Ukraine, citing the risk of the SBU security service recruiting them as spies.\u00a0 It is not clear whether this restriction is still in place.<\/p>\n Slow railway service from Donetsk Central Station <\/strong><\/p>\n Meanwhile, the \u201cDNR\u201d on 19 August opened<\/a> the first passenger train service from Donetsk central station since it was closed for security reasons in 2014. The 30-kilometre ride to Olenivka, a frontline village just south of Donetsk, is painfully slow, taking 1.5 hours, according to official information and underlined by video<\/a> footage.<\/p>\n Similar slow progress is the case in efforts to unite both \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d railway companies. In March In March, \u201cDNR\u201d leader Denis Pushilin and LNR\u201d leader Leonid Pasechnik signed a corresponding memorandum (see Newsletter 54<\/a>), but both Donetsk and Luhansk continue to operate their own railways. The common railway company\u2019s founding on 25 July was only reported later by the \u201cLNR\u201d official site<\/a> and by the DNR Live<\/a> news site but otherwise largely ignored by \u201cDNR\u201d official media.<\/p>\n Efforts to create synergies or at least avoid rivalries between the two People\u2019s Republics\u201d have not been very successful in the past. Last year, the \u201cLNR\u201d introduced a tariff on beer from the \u201cDNR\u201d (see Newsletter 32<\/a>).<\/p>\n When the \u201cParliament\u201d in Luhansk changed the \u201cLNR\u201d constitution on 1 August to rename the Cabinet of Ministers \u201cGovernment<\/a>\u201d, separatist lawmaker Nelli Zadiraka explained<\/a> that the change aims to harmonize the \u201cLNR\u201d and Russia, where the executive is also called government. In fact, the \u201cLNR\u201d was more likely following the example of the Donetsk \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d, which introduced a similar name change in December, also saying that this was inspired by Russia (see Newsletter 49<\/a>).<\/p>\n However, while the \u201cDNR\u201d significantly boosted the powers of \u201cPrime Minister\u201d Ananchenko, there were no immediate signs of changes in the balance of power inside the \u201cLNR\u201d leadership.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary The separatists commemorated the first anniversary of Alexander Zakharchenko\u2019s killing by stressing the first \u201cDNR\u201d-leader\u2019s cult-like status. They largely ignored the latest diplomatic offensive by the Normandy Format powers, instead sticking to their narrative...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[244,245],"tags":[294],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1791"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1791"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1791\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1792,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1791\/revisions\/1792"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1791"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1791"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1791"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}