Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n
Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n In another move towards political russification, both \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d announced to create assemblies that already exist in Russia. A spat between Ukraine and the separatists about the Minsk negotiations highlighted the different interpretations of the agreements signed in the Belarusian capital. And the \u201cLNR\u201d said that it wants to open a cultural centre in the heart of Africa.<\/p>\n Donetsk and Luhansk announce Russian-style assemblies<\/strong><\/p>\n Both \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d have announced the creation of two assemblies \u2013 a Public Chamber and a Youth Parliament – that closely resemble existing structures in Russia. Their timing and the complete absence of any public debate about them strongly indicate an initiative from outside \u2013 ie Russia.<\/p>\n The introduction of a Public Chamber, an unelected assembly with limited advisory and oversight functions, was first announced<\/a> by Luhansk separatist leader Leonid Pasechnik on February 18. His Donetsk colleague Denis Pushilin followed suit<\/a> on February 20. Each initiative was followed by abundant and fawning coverage in the official \u201cLNR<\/a>\u201d and \u201cDNR<\/a>\u201d media, which quoted experts and politicians praising the idea.<\/p>\n Their statements strongly suggest that both Public Chambers will be closely based on the Russian model. President Vladimir Putin set up Russia\u2019s Public Chamber in 2005, ostensibly to bridge the gap between civil society and the largely Kremlin-controlled parliament. However, the assembly with currently 168 members has been dominated by pro-Kremlin functionaries, doubling the role of the already subservient houses of parliament, the State Duma and the Federation Council.<\/p>\n The \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d (unicameral) parliaments are even less pluralistic than the Russian Duma. MPs in Donetsk and Luhansk belong to two \u201cmovements\u201d each who differ only in nuances from each other and are not known for openly criticizing their leadership. In a recent interview<\/a>, \u201cDNR\u201d opposition figure Pavel Gubarev described his Free Donbass movement as \u201can alternative view\u201d, not an opposition. The last elections, held in November 2018 despite sharp criticism from Ukraine and her allies, can hardly be described as free or fair (Gubarev was excluded – see Newsletter 48<\/a>).<\/p>\n Youth Parliaments for Donetsk and Luhansk<\/strong><\/p>\n The creation of a Youth Parliament was first announced<\/a> by \u201cDNR\u201d leader Pushilin on January 25, the day on which Russia observes St. Tatiana or Students\u2019 Day. Pushilin said that the new body should help to address the shortage of qualified staff for parliament and, more broadly, government and bureaucracy.<\/p>\n The \u201cLNR\u201d followed three days later, when Parliamentary speaker Denis Miroshnichenko was quoted by the LITs official news site<\/a> that formation of a Youth Parliament would begin in March. The site explained the delay by claiming that Miroshnichenko was speaking at the end of three days celebrations for Tatiana Day. Luhansk separatist leader Pasechnik backed the idea on February 20, when he said<\/a> that a Youth Parliament allows to attract young people to politics and that the Republic lacked people with initiative.<\/p>\n On February 28, the Donetsk separatist \u201cParliament\u201d passed a law<\/a>, according to which the Youth Parliament will consist of 50 members elected every two years. Voters and MPs must be between 18 and 35 years old. The \u201cLNR\u201d is likely to follow suit soon \u2013 albeit with a smaller assembly.<\/p>\n In Russia, the State Duma Youth Parliament<\/a> is headed by patriotic activist Maria Voropayeva, and there are Youth Parliaments in most of the country\u2019s more than 80 regions. Almost all of them were set up by regional elites with the aim of attracting young people to work for the government. Moreover, Russia\u2019s youth policies have long been characterized by a focus on patriotic education, highlighted by the Kremlin-sponsored youth movement Nashi (dissolved in 2013), which was a brainchild of Vladislav Surkov, who is now President Putin\u2019s top aide for policies in Donbass.<\/p>\n Row over separatists\u2019 status in Minsk<\/strong><\/p>\n The regular meetings of the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk, Belarus, were overshadowed by a row over the separatists\u2019 status in the group. Speaking in the Ukrainian Parliament on February 19, the government\u2019s chief negotiator Yevhen Marchuk argued<\/a> that the group\u2019s three sides were Ukraine, Russia and, as mediator, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). He added that the separatists were being asked to join the talks only if necessary.<\/p>\n Marchuk\u2019s comments were lambasted by the separatists<\/a> who argued<\/a> that they are the ones negotiating with Ukraine in Minsk, while both Russia and the OSCE are mediators. Russia also sees itself as a mediator and Kremlin chief negotiator Boris Gryzlov regularly accuses<\/a> Kiev of refusing to hold direct talks with the separatists.<\/p>\n However, the Minsk<\/a> agreements<\/a> clearly identify Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE as the three members of the Trilateral Contact Group. Because the \u201cRepublics\u201d are recognized by none of the above, the agreements speak only of \u201cCertain Areas\u201d of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Their (separatist) leaders Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky signed them, but without any position attached. The fact that both leaders were removed (Plotnitsky was toppled in 2017, Zakharchenko killed in 2018) has not affected the negotiations.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, their successors Pushilin and Pasechnik put out parallel<\/a> statements<\/a> on February 21, in which they appealed to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron to make Ukraine hold direct talks with them. Kiev immediately refused. Deputy parliamentary speaker and Minsk negotiator Iryna Herashchenko argued<\/a> that this would give \u201cthe Kremlin’s puppet regimes\u201d undue legitimacy, while negotiating with administrations not recognized even in Russia was illegal.<\/p>\n While the \u201cPackage of Measures<\/a>\u201d of February 2015 obliges Ukraine to \u201cbegin a dialogue\u201d about local elections and future political status on the first day after the sides have withdrawn their heavy weapons (a condition that has never been implemented), it does not say with whom this dialogue should be conducted.<\/p>\n Dialogue Luhansk-Congo<\/strong><\/p>\n In Luhansk meanwhile, the separatists celebrated a \u201cforeign policy\u201d success, when Foreign \u201cMinister\u201d Vladislav Deinego claimed on February 19<\/a> that the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d would open a \u201ccultural centre\u201d in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The centre would be the second \u201cLNR\u201d representation abroad (see Newsletter 35<\/a> about a representation in Sicily) and the first of the Donbass separatists to be opened outside Europe.<\/p>\n According to Deinego, the centre will be opened in the southern mining city of Kolwezi. However, he offered no information on how and when this will happen. Instead, he handed a power of attorney to the centre\u2019s founder, identified as Congolese Jean-Gustave Mukadi Musasa. Deinego said that he hoped Musase would \u201corganize dialogue\u201d between the DRC and the \u201cLNR\u201d and that Congo might soon open an office in Luhansk. He added that both Republics are currently in \u201ccomplicated situations\u201d.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary In another move towards political russification, both \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d announced to create assemblies that already exist in Russia. A spat between Ukraine and the separatists about the Minsk negotiations highlighted the different interpretations of...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[244,245],"tags":[132,133],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1729"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1729"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1729\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1730,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1729\/revisions\/1730"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1729"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1729"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1729"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}