Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n
\u201cDNR\u201d leader Alexander Zakharchenko was assassinated by a bomb on August 31 in Donetsk, in what is potentially the greatest shake-up since the Minsk agreement of 2015. While many feared or predicted an escalation, the Kremlin signaled that it would stick to the Minsk peace process despite the assassination. Zakharchenko\u2019s funeral became an interesting show of public support for the Donetsk separatists.<\/p>\n
Lamp bomb in Caf\u00e9 \u201cseparatist\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n Zakharchenko walked into the Caf\u00e9 \u201cSepar\u201d, short for \u201cSeparatist\u201d, in central Donetsk on Friday afternoon when a strong explosion went off that instantly killed one of his bodyguards and severely injured the separatist leader and nine other people.<\/p>\n The \u201cDNR\u201d leader died of head wounds on the way to hospital, according<\/a> to Alexander Kazakov, a Russian political consultant, who has worked as Zakharchenko\u2019s advisor since 2016. Kazakov stressed that Zakharchenko had decided spontaneously to visit the caf\u00e9, which is located close to his office. He added that stops in restaurants were a habit of Zakharchenko that became \u201ca headache\u201d for his bodyguards.<\/p>\n Among the injured was Zakharchenko\u2019s deputy Alexander Timofeyev, who goes by the nom de guerre \u201cTashkent\u201d and was widely seen as the most powerful figure in the \u201cDNR\u201d besides Zakharchenko and also as one of the most corrupt.<\/p>\n Timofeyev suffered severe burns in his face but left hospital to attend Zakharchenko\u2019s wake on Sunday. At the funeral, he was seen<\/a> standing towering with a shaven head and blackened face behind Zakharchenko\u2019s coffin.<\/p>\n Separatist-controlled and Russian media<\/a> later reported<\/a> that the explosive device was hidden in a lamp that hung from the ceiling at the caf\u00e9\u2019s entrance and that it was triggered remotely, presumably with a mobile phone.<\/p>\n These circumstances led most observers to conclude that Zakharchenko\u2019s assassins came from or at least had support from his close entourage. Russian media reports<\/a> said that the caf\u00e9, which had opened only last December, was owned by a former Zakharchenko bodyguard.<\/p>\n The owner was identified in social media posts<\/a> as Alexander Kostenko \u2013 a former bodyguard who has been a member of the separatist parliament since 2016<\/a> and now heads <\/a>the ruling \u201cDonetsk Republic\u201d movement\u2019s faction. As of Tuesday, it was unclear if Kostenko was being treated as a suspect by the \u201cDNR\u201d. Late on Friday a report from Russia\u2019s Interfax news agency said<\/a> that one of Zakharchenko\u2019s bodyguards had gone missing and that a search for him was ongoing.<\/p>\n The Interfax<\/a> report, quoting \u201cDNR\u201d sources, also said that \u201ca number of Ukrainian special agents\u201d had been arrested in Donetsk in connection with the explosion. Dmitry Trapeznikov, the Zakharchenko deputy who was appointed interim leader hours after the assassination, said later<\/a> that a number of arrested agents had confessed Ukraine\u2019s involvement.<\/p>\n However, the Russian news site Rosbalt reported<\/a> late on Sunday that all suspects have been released again and that Russian President Vladimir Putin has sent some “serious specialists” to Donetsk to find the assassins. The latter information was confirmed Monday, when Russia\u2019s Federal Security Service, or FSB, said<\/a> that its experts were already on the ground to investigate the killing.<\/p>\n The Donetsk State Security \u201cMinistry\u201d, which is known by its acronym MGB and said to be controlled directly by the FSB, only released a statement<\/a> saying that a special investigation task force had been formed.<\/p>\n Surkov skips the funeral<\/strong><\/p>\n Unsurprisingly, the \u201cDNR\u201d media did their best to describe the farewell ceremony<\/a> for Zakharchenko as a massive show of support for the separatists. While the official number<\/a> of more than 200,000 mourners in Donetsk might be exaggerated, certainly tens of thousands showed up, many of them having been bused from neighbouring towns like Horlivka<\/a>.<\/p>\n Surprisingly, the ceremony was not attended by a single representative from the Russian government. Kremlin aide Vladislav Surkov, who is believed to personally oversee everything in the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d, did not show up in person, instead sending four lines<\/a> of \u2013 admittedly very personal \u2013 condolences.<\/p>\n Surkov met Zakharchenko only one week ago for \u201cindependence celebrations\u201d in South Ossetia (see Newsletter 40<\/a>).<\/p>\n Overall, the number of foreign mourners was small. There were hardly more than a dozen VIPs from Russia, including Duma deputy Natalya Poklonskaya, Crimean leader Sergei Aksyonov, former \u201cDNR\u201d Prime Minister Alexander Borodai and prominent biker and Putin supporter Alexander Zaldostanov. Duma member Dmitry Sablin, who was born in Mariupol and is one of Russia\u2019s richest MPs, made his first public appearance<\/a> in Donetsk.<\/p>\n The Russian attendants were seemingly on private visits and \u201cDNR\u201d Foreign \u201cMinistry clearly avoided the term delegation when referring to them<\/a>.<\/p>\n Other than Russia, Georgia\u2019s separatist regions sent \u201cinternational\u201d guests, namely South Ossetia\u2019s de facto President Anatoly Bibilov and Abkhazia\u2019s deputy Prime Minister Astamur Ketsba<\/a> \u2013 whose lower rank is explained by the fact that unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia has not recognized the \u201cDNR\u201d as independent.<\/p>\n The Luhansk leader\u2019s low profile <\/strong><\/p>\n While the main figures of the Luhansk separatists \u2013 leader Leonid Pasechnik, parliamentary \u201cSpeaker\u201d Denis Miroshnichenko and Foreign \u201cMinister\u201d Vladislav Deinego \u2013 traveled<\/a> to Donetsk for Sunday\u2019s ceremony, Pasechnik kept a markedly low profile, making no public comments and appearing only briefly at the public wake but not at the funeral.<\/p>\n Footage published by the \u201cLNR\u201d Lugansk 24<\/a> Channel and later by the \u201cDNR\u201d Information \u201cMinistry<\/a>\u201d showed Pasechnik, wearing a green uniform, saluting Zakharchenko\u2019s coffin in the Donetsk Opera building. He was accompanied by Miroshnichenko and Anna Soroka, a deputy Foreign \u201cMinister\u201d who made a short statement afterwards.<\/p>\n Deinego, however, did not appear at all on the footage broadcast in Luhansk. But it was he and not Pasechnik, who stood prominently at Zakharchenko\u2019s grave during the funeral, making a short speech that was published by the \u201cDNR\u201d official website<\/a>: Deinego said that the \u201cbrotherly\u201d republics \u201cDNR\u201d and \u201cLNR\u201d would move closer together \u201cin face of the enemy who committed this vicious crime\u201d.<\/p>\n The Luhansk separatist leader, who came to power through a putsch in November, is widely seen as a man of the FSB, having served as an intelligence officer throughout his career, first in Ukraine and later as \u201cLNR\u201d State Security \u201cMinister\u201d.<\/p>\n Who is to blame?<\/strong><\/p>\n Zakharchenko\u2019s assassination is by far not the first but certainly the most high-profile killing of a prominent separatist since the war in Donbass began in 2014.<\/p>\n As in previous cases, the separatists blmed Ukraine. On Sunday, Denis Pushilin, the \u201cDNR\u201d chief Minsk negotiator and parliamentary \u201cSpeaker\u201d, called the<\/a> assassination an \u201copen provocation against Minsk agreement\u201d and \u201can act of aggression\u201d by Ukraine. An official statement<\/a> by the \u201cDNR\u201d military command released late on Friday said that this was \u201ca terrorist act committed by Ukrainian special forces under control of US special services\u201d.<\/p>\n However, the text also spoke of a \u201ctreacherous blow\u201d, confirming that the assassination was made possible through betrayal from Zakharchenko\u2019s own people. A similar suggestion came from Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, who said on Russian state TV<\/a> on Sunday that Zakharchenko had been killed \u201ctraitorously<\/a>\u201c.<\/p>\n All in all, the Kremlin\u2019s reaction was relatively restrained. While Maria Zakharova<\/a>, the always sharp-tongued Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, accused the \u201cKiev regime\u201d on the same day, Peskov merely said<\/a> that the killing was a provocation that would likely increase tensions. Neither he nor President Putin\u2019s condolences<\/a>, issued the same night, mentioned Ukraine at all.<\/p>\n And while hardline Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said<\/a> that the assassination \u201cnullifies\u201d the Minsk agreement, Peskov stressed<\/a> on Monday that Moscow would continue to stick by the agreement.<\/p>\n Ukraine, in turn, suggested that Zakharchenko had been killed either by Russia or by his rivals. Ihor Huskov, a senior official of the Ukrainian Security Service SBU, said<\/a> that the assassination could be \u201cthe result of criminal conflicts among the fighters, most probably over the allocation of seized businesses,\u201d. He added, however, that the SBU does not exclude an attempt by Russia\u2019s intelligence agencies to remove a much-hated figure, \u201cwho, according to our information, was obstructing the Russians\u201d.<\/p>\n Zakharchenko has indeed been the subject of massive speculation this year, centering on corruption allegations against himself and especially Timofeyev. Rumours about their imminent removal peaked in early June, amid uncertainty if Putin will keep Surkov as his point man for eastern Ukraine (see Newsletter 32<\/a>).<\/p>\n The situation seemingly calmed after Surkov\u2019s reappointment on June 13, but further signs of infighting appeared soon – the sacking of the \u201cDNR\u201d transport \u201cminister\u201d and the departure of Russian novelist-turned separatist commander Zakhar Prilepin (see Newsletter 36<\/a>). In August, Zakharchenko\u2019s obvious resistance to call off elections for this November (see Newsletter 40<\/a>) introduced new troubles.<\/p>\n Overall, the \u201cDNR\u201d has been more stable outwardly than the neighbouring \u201cLNR\u201d, where numerous recalcitrant commanders were killed until separatist leader Igor Plotnitsky himself was removed in last year\u2019s putsch (see Newsletter 25<\/a>). The killings in the \u201cDNR\u201d of Arseni Pavlov and Mikhail Tolstykh in 2016 and 2017 remain unsolved, but Ukraine seems an unlikely culprit because both were mid-ranking field commanders killed in extremely daring operations that required deep infiltration of the separatists\u2019 security structures.<\/p>\n While Zakharchenko clearly is a much more prominent and attractive target, his assassination also requires the sort of deep infiltration that seems unlikely given Kiev\u2019s intelligence agencies\u2019 performance in the war so far.<\/p>\n While it is too early to broadly analyse the consequences, there are grounds to assume that Zakharchenko\u2019s death won\u2019t change much. This reflects the conviction, held by most observers in Ukraine and the West, that all separatist leaders in both Donetsk and Luhansk are largely puppets for the Kremlin who is pulling the strings through mainly invisible \u201ccurators\u201d.<\/p>\n While it is hard to judge the exact degree of autonomy possessed by the likes of Zakharchenko and Timofeyev, it is clear that neither they nor their successors can seriously oppose Moscow, as long as Russia provides the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d with almost everything \u2013 from arms and ammunition to food and cash (see Newsletter 22<\/a>). This is another good reason for Kiev to think twice before killing a separatist leader.<\/p>\n Finally, the theory of internal opponents is as weak as these opponents are themselves.<\/p>\n