Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n
After the assassination of Alexander Zakharchenko, the \u201cDNR\u201d underwent a sweeping power change in which most of the slain separatist leader\u2019s close associates and his deputy Alexander Timofeyev were replaced with people loyal to his rival Denis Pushilin. The longtime Minsk negotiator and parliamentary Speaker was named interim leader after the Kremlin made it clear that it won\u2019t support Dmitry Trapeznikov, who was declared leader short after Zakharchenko\u2019s death. Pushilin is also expected to win elections in November after the Kremlin dropped the idea of postponing them.<\/p>\n
All powers to Pushilin<\/strong><\/p>\n After a dramatic week, the \u201cDNR\u201d is entering a new political period under Denis Pushilin as its designated Kremlin-backed leader. Pushilin was pushed into the limelight on September 5, when Moscow political scientist Alexei Chesnakov said<\/a> that Zakharchenko\u2019s deputy Dmitry Trapeznikov had no legitimacy and all power should be given to parliament, which Pushilin chairs. Chesnakov formerly worked in the Kremlin under Vladislav Surkov and is widely believed to be a close confidant of President Vladimir Putin\u2019s key aide for eastern Ukraine.<\/p>\n On September 7, the deputies formally removed Zakharchenko from his post and duly voted<\/a> for Pushilin as interim leader. They also called<\/a> for holding elections on November 11 (a similar decision was taken the same day<\/a> by the separatist \u201cparliament\u201d in Luhansk).<\/p>\n While the formal reason for making Pushilin and not Trapeznikov interim leader was that the \u201cDNR\u201d constitution stipulate that the \u201cfirst deputy\u201d should become successor and none of Zakharchenko\u2019s three deputies held such a title, ensuing events resembled a political purge rather than an orderly transition.<\/p>\n On the same evening, Pushilin removed five cabinet members<\/a> from the separatist \u201cgovernment\u201d, all of them Zakharchenko associates. Apart from the \u201cMinisters\u201d of Justice, Industry, Transport and Agriculture, he fired \u201cRevenue Minister\u201d Alexander Timofeyev, believed to be the single most powerful figure under Zakharchenko.<\/p>\n Timofeyev, who also served as one of Zakharchenko\u2019s three deputies, has been at the centre of corruption allegations against the old separatist leadership. Immediately before his sacking, the Pushilin-loyal news website \u201cDAN\u201d published two<\/a> articles<\/a> in which businessmen accused Timofeyev of seizing company assets worth millions of roubles. In the subsequent article about the cabinet reshuffle, DAN referred<\/a> to Timofeyev as \u201cscandalous\u201d.<\/p>\n Crucially, Pushilin was publicly backed the \u201cMinistries\u201d of the Interior and State Security, who both control significant numbers of security forces. Trapeznikov also declared<\/a> his full support for the decision, although he was subsequently removed<\/a> from his post as deputy head of government.<\/p>\n In a clear sign that he had lost power, Timofeyev fled to Russia on September 7, together with Zakharchenko\u2019s advisor Alexander Kazakov. That evening, Kazakov complained on Facebook<\/a>, that not even the \u201cCommander\u2019s ninth day\u201d could be observed (nine days after a person has died Orthodox believers traditionally pray at the grave).<\/p>\n On September 9, the two were seen at a meeting<\/a> outside Moscow in the house of Zakhar Prilepin, the Russian writer who had also served as a Zakharchenko adviser.<\/p>\n Purges throw new light on Zakharchenko\u2019s killing<\/strong><\/p>\n The dramatic ouster of Zakharchenko\u2019s allies raises new questions about the separatist leader\u2019s assassination. While it was clear from the beginning that the organizers must have had some backing from inside the \u201cDNR\u201d \u2013 the deadly explosion occurred in central Donetsk in a caf\u00e9 reportedly owned by one of Zakharchenko\u2019s former bodyguards \u2013 the ensuing political purges make it much more likely that the killing was ordered by Moscow or internal rivals, because it adds considerable weight to the theory that getting rid of Zakharchenko was to pave the way for Pushilin.<\/p>\n It is an open secret that Zakharchenko and especially Timofeyev had made numerous enemies inside the \u201cDNR\u201d and in Russia.<\/p>\n The \u201cRevenue\u201d or \u201cIncome Minister\u201d, who also served as one of three nominally equal deputy heads of government, has for some time been accused of running large-scale graft schemes. According to a report<\/a> published by the Moscow-based Russky Reportyor online magazine this week, Timofeyev had angered Moscow by charging artificially high prices for the of transport of coal and metals to Russia. He was also made responsible for the misappropriation of Russian economic subsidies, smuggling and of resisting the removal of tariffs and other trade barriers with the Luhansk \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d.<\/p>\n Another source for Russian anger was insubordination on the battlefield. According to the report, \u201cDNR\u201d armed formations under Zakharchenko\u2019s direct command \u2013 among them the Republican Guard and Special Operations Regiment \u2013 were accused of pounding Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka with artillery fire against the Kremlin\u2019s will.<\/p>\n This narrative is also backed by reports<\/a> about the disbanding of the \u201cDNR\u201d Defence \u201cMinistry\u201d. According<\/a> to blogger turned separatist fighter Alexander Zhuchkovsky, the \u201cDNR\u201d will have a \u201cPeople\u2019s Militia\u201d without Ministry, just like the \u201cLNR\u201d. Zhuchkovsky added that the \u201cMinistry\u201d had been a purely ceremonial institution while real command lay with the First Army Corps, which is controlled by \u201cnorthern\u201d (i.e. Russian) officers.<\/p>\n The case for a planned power transfer from Zakharchenko to Pushilin is also backed by the long-standing rivalry between the two. In November, Zakharchenko ousted Pushilin from his executive position in the ruling \u201cDonetsk Republic\u201d movement (see Newsletter 24<\/a>) and in June, media speculation peaked that Pushilin would soon replace Zakharchenko as \u201cDNR\u201d leader (see Newsletter 32<\/a>).<\/p>\n All this does not explain why Zakharchenko \u2013 or indeed Timofeyev – would have to be killed in a risky operation. But, as has been argued<\/a> by Kremlin and security expert Mark Galeotti, it is entirely possible that Moscow decided not to interfere with an assassination by \u201ccriminal interests\u201d, or that it \u201cslipped a hint\u201d that such a killing would not be punished.<\/p>\n Questions also abound about Alexander Kostenko, who reportedly owns the \u201cCaf\u00e9 Separ\u201d, where a remote-controlled bomb hidden in a lamp killed Zakharchenko when he walked in on August 31.\u00a0 Kostenko is not only a former Zakharchenko bodyguard but heads the faction of \u201cDonetsk Republic\u201d in the separatist parliament – a position in which he must have worked closely with Pushilin in both his functions as Speaker and executive officer of \u201cDonetsk Republic.<\/p>\n On September, 4 Kostenko denied rumours that he had fled Donetsk by telling Russia\u2019s Interfax news agency \u201cI am here, I am not going anywhere and am giving evidence. I can say that there already are suspects\u201d. The quotes were fully published<\/a> on the parliamentary website, while \u201cDAN\u201d news published<\/a> only the quote about suspects, omitting any suggestion that Kostenko might have sought to leave Donetsk.<\/p>\n However, initial claims<\/a> that suspects had been detained in Donetsk proved unsubstantiated. The separatist Interior \u201cMinistry\u201d on September 5 retracted a search note for two suspects, saying<\/a> that they were not linked to the killing.<\/p>\n Assassination to justify elections?<\/strong><\/p>\n Instead, Russia and the separatists stepped up their accusations against Ukraine. Pushilin claimed in a TV interview<\/a> on September 10 that the investigation pointed to Ukrainian special services. And Alexei Chesnakov, the Kremlin-linked political scientist, suggested<\/a> that the West\u2019s failure to react adequately to the killing had triggered the decision to hold elections in both \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d.<\/p>\n \u201cAfter Zakharchenko\u2019s killing western capitals kept silence. And this silence was understood in Donetsk as a sign of Western approval for the terrorist methods of the Kiev regime,\u201d Chesnakov was quoted as saying by Russia\u2019s Tass news agency.<\/p>\n Chesnakov admitted, that considerations prior to Zakharchenko\u2019s death to cancel the elections were driven by diplomatic considerations. \u201cYes, there were doubts, they did not want to irritate Angela Merkel,\u201d he said. In August, both \u201cRepublics\u201d conducted campaigns not to hold elections, however there were signs that Zakharchenko was against this (see Newsletter 40<\/a>).<\/p>\n Ukraine and her western allies argue that elections in the separatist-held areas violate the Minsk agreement which stipulates that they should be held under Ukrainian law. The Kremlin and the separatists argue that Minsk only speaks of municipal elections, while the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d parliamentary and leadership elections do not fall under this category.<\/p>\n While it is not known who else will stand against Pushilin and Luhansk separatist leader Leonid Pasechnik, Chesnakov argued that Zakharchenko\u2019s violent death ensures that both will win. \u201cTerror cannot divide or frighten the people of Donbass. It pulls them together. Therefore, you can predict (their victory) with 99 per cent,\u201d he said, adding that their allies will win parliamentary majorities.<\/p>\n While both separatist leaders do not necessarily represent popular candidates – Pushilin worked for a major Russian Ponzi scheme before 2014, Pasechnik was a career officer for the Ukrainian intelligence service SBU \u2013 the almost complete control of political and information resources inside the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d makes \u201cmanaged\u201d elections an easy task. The recent purges of the \u201cLNR\u201d election commission (see Newsletter 40<\/a>) and the \u201cprimaries\u201d of October 2016, in which the ruling movements\u2019 candidates invariably won, serve as telling examples (see Newsletter 2<\/a>).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Written by Nikolaus von Twickel After the assassination of Alexander Zakharchenko, the \u201cDNR\u201d underwent a sweeping power change in which most of the slain separatist leader\u2019s close associates and his deputy Alexander Timofeyev were replaced with people loyal to his...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[244,245],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1533"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1533"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1533\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1534,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1533\/revisions\/1534"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1533"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1533"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1533"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}