Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n
Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n Last week, it emerged that the Donetsk Transport \u201cMinister\u201d, reportedly under arrest, has been quietly replaced. And a prominent Russian writer said that he is giving up his job as a battalion commander in Donetsk, prompting more speculation about the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u2019s\u201d stability. Another drop in the only working mobile carrier highlighted the precarious state of the communications network.<\/p>\n Arrested \u201cminister\u201d quietly replaced<\/strong><\/p>\n Weeks after the reported arrest of Transport \u201cMinister\u201d Igor Andrienko, the Donetsk separatists quietly installed a successor. Rostislav Markelov, who hitherto served as one of Andrienko\u2019s deputies, was first mentioned as \u201ctemporarily acting transport minister\u201d in a statement<\/a> posted on the \u201cministry\u2019s\u201d website on July 2.<\/p>\n One day later, Markelov was mentioned<\/a> as \u201cminister\u201d by the official DAN news site for the first time. The official \u201cDNR\u201d portal followed suit<\/a> on July 4.<\/p>\n The portal also published the decrees, in which separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko sacks<\/a> Andrienko and appoints<\/a> Markelov. The decrees were dated June 26 and June 27 respectively, but it is not clear when they appeared on the website. Nor is it clear when the Transport \u201cMinistry\u201d removed its section<\/a> about Andrienko, or when Markelov\u2019s name was added to the \u201cDNR\u2019s\u201d official list of ministers<\/a>.<\/p>\n The media coverage differs sharply from the case Eduard Golenko, whose arrest on corruption accusations prompted several several reports<\/a> by the official DAN news site in February and March. The case of Andrienko\/Markelov was not mentioned by a single Donetsk-based outlet, not even by the dnr-live.ru portal, which was the only resource to report Andrienko\u2019s arrest (see Newsletter 34<\/a>).<\/p>\n Andrienko was reportedly publicly arrested in Donetsk on June 26, which was Zakharchenko\u2019s birthday. His last public statement as \u201cminister\u201d was a congratulatory letter<\/a>, in which he wishes Zakharchenko to carry on his \u201cwise leadership\u201d. Andrienko\u2019s current location is unknown. Social media posts have suggested<\/a> that he is being accused of large-scale graft in his \u201cministry\u201d.<\/p>\n This is not the first \u201cDNR\u201d Transport \u201cMinister\u201d that has been sacked. Andrienko\u2019s predecessor Semyon Kuzmenko was fired in March 2016. In May of this year, Kuzmenko said<\/a> that he was moving from Donetsk to Russia after being abducted and threatened by people working for Alexander Timofeyev, the powerful \u201cDNR\u201d Income \u201cMinister.<\/p>\n Timofeyev has also been linked to Andrienko\u2019s and Golenko\u2019s arrests. A recent analysis in the Ukrainian dsnews.ua portal suggested that Zakharchenko is getting rid of potential rivals in his entourage and that both Andrienko and Golenko have links to Rinat Akhmetov, the formerly Donetsk-based businessman widely seen as one of the most influential people in Ukraine.<\/p>\n The article suggests<\/a> that Zakharchenko and his close ally Timofeyev were embolded by the reappointment of Vladislav Surkov as the Kremlin\u2019s point man for Donbass in June.<\/p>\n Russian writer Prilepin gives up commander role <\/strong><\/p>\n The \u201cDNR\u201d was also hit by a prominent resignation when Zakhar Prilepin, the writer turned separatist commander, announced that he had given up his post as political commissar in one of the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u2019s\u201d battalion. Prilepin explained in a July 8 blog post<\/a> that he fighting along the frontline had died down and that his battalion had been turned from a special forces to a rocket formation.<\/p>\n Prilepin stressed that he would remain an advisor to \u201cDNR\u201d leader Zakharchenko and also a \u201cCurator\u201d to his battalion. He reiterated this in an interview<\/a> with video blogger Semyon Pegov the next day, where he stressed that his move means nothing for Zakharchenko\u2019s political future and argued that he simply could not devote enough time to his work in Donbass.<\/p>\n In an interview with Russia\u2019s RIA Novosti news agency on July 9, he announced<\/a> that he would work as a co-head for the election campaign of Vadim Kumin, the Communist candidate in the Moscow mayoral elections on September 9.<\/p>\n Video blogger Konstantin Dolgov, who has become a sharp critic of the separatist leadership since moving from Donetsk to Russia last year, argued in a July 11 blog post<\/a> that Prilepin was leaving Donetsk because his battalion was being disbanded because of ill discipline and that Zakharchenko might soon be relieved of his post.<\/p>\n Prilepin appeared in Donetsk in 2016, together with Alexander Kazakov, a Moscow-trained political consultant. Both became advisers to Zakharchenko and are believed to be close to the Kremlin\u2019s Surkov, making it likely that they are supposed to exert Russian control over the sometimes erratic separatist leader. However, the only time Prilepin fulfilled this role was arguably in July 2017, when he admitted that he was part of a small circle that devised Zakharchenko\u2019s \u201cMalorossiya\u201d speech \u2013 a call to unite Donetsk and Luhansk with Ukraine that received practically no backing (see Newsletter 23<\/a>).<\/p>\n Zakharchenko himself did not appear in public at all during the past week. His only public statement were comments<\/a> carried by RIA Novosti on July 5, in which he denied allegations by Ukrainian politician Yulia Tymoshenko that he had been in secret negotiations with the government in Kiev.<\/p>\n Vodafone outage highlights mobile phone risks<\/strong><\/p>\n On the morning of July 9, the Vodafone mobile phone network dropped in both the Luhansk and Donetsk \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d. The reason was apparently<\/a> an accident on government-controlled territory near Lysychansk in the Luhansk region.<\/p>\n The network was restored<\/a> after repair works were carried out on the same day, but the outage highlighted the precarious situation of Vodafone, the only properly working mobile operator in separatist-held areas.<\/p>\n The Donetsk \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d was cut off from Vodafone between January and April this year, longer than ever before since the start of the conflict in 2014. While the reason for the long outage was probably a payment dispute rather than technical issues (see Newsletter 26<\/a>), experts warn that the mobile communications infrastructure in the separatist-held areas is in very bad shape after more than four years without proper servicing.<\/p>\n The problem is being discussed at the regular meetings of the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk, which consists of Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and is also attended by separatist emissaries. Ukrainian delegation spokeswoman Daria Olifer said<\/a> after the July 11 meeting that a Vodafone representative had suggested carrying out an international audit of the company\u2019s remaining hardware in non-government-controlled areas. The Ukrainian side also demands security guarantees for Vodafone engineers carrying out repair or maintenance work in those areas and handing back company equipment located there.<\/p>\n At a previous meeting, the separatists suggested<\/a> a \u201croad map\u201d on how to service the Vodafone network under their control. And OSCE chief envoy Martin Sajdik has said<\/a> that \u201cmore time and considerable technical investments\u201d are required to restore high-quality communication services.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary Last week, it emerged that the Donetsk Transport \u201cMinister\u201d, reportedly under arrest, has been quietly replaced. And a prominent Russian writer said that he is giving up his job as a battalion commander in...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":586,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[202,210],"tags":[243],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1058"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1058"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1058\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1059,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1058\/revisions\/1059"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/586"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1058"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1058"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1058"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}