{"id":1043,"date":"2018-06-13T17:25:26","date_gmt":"2018-06-13T15:25:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/?p=1043"},"modified":"2019-01-20T18:02:16","modified_gmt":"2019-01-20T17:02:16","slug":"developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-06-12-june-2018-newsletter-32","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-06-12-june-2018-newsletter-32\/","title":{"rendered":"Developments in \u201cDNR\u201c and \u201cLNR\u201c: 06. \u2013 12. June 2018 (Newsletter 32)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Written by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/p>\n<p><strong>Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The lingering speculation about the ouster of Russia\u2019s Donbass point man Vladislav Surkov has in turn triggered fresh speculation about a possible ouster of Donetsk separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko. In this politically charged atmosphere, the long-forgotten former &#8222;People&#8217;s Governor&#8220; of Donetsk Pavel Gubarev makes a comeback by openly accusing the \u201cDNR\u201d leadership of fabricating evidence against him. And the separatists\u2019 promise to form a customs union between the two \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d are troubled by a new tariff imposed by Luhansk on beer from Donetsk.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Speculation about Zakharchenko and his main rival<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\u201cDNR\u201d-leader Alexander Zakharchenko gave a press conference in Donetsk on June 5, ending <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ostro.org\/general\/politics\/articles\/548719\/\">speculation<\/a> in Ukrainian media about his whereabouts after not appearing in public for a whole week.<\/p>\n<p>However, observers noted that Zakharchenko did not travel to Crimea, where on the same day local leader Sergei Aksyonov hosted prominent separatists for an annual Russian-language festival. While \u201cLNR\u201d-leader Leonid Pasechnik attended, the \u201cDNR\u201d was represented by parliamentary speaker Denis Pushilin, who is seen as a competitor to Zakharchenko.<\/p>\n<p>On June 6, Crimean news site primechaniya.ru <a href=\"https:\/\/primechaniya.ru\/home\/news\/iyun-2018\/novym-glavoj-dnr-stanet-denis-pushilin-istochniki\/\">reported<\/a> that the &#8222;Chairman of the Donetsk People&#8217;s Soviet&#8220; Pushilin would replace Zakharchenko, citing anonymous sources in Donetsk. The report also speculated that \u201cLNR\u201d and \u201cDNR\u201d might be merged into a single separatist republic under Pasechnik.<\/p>\n<p>While the Russian Telegram-Channel <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/russica2\">Nezygar<\/a> repeated the\u201cPushilin replaces Zakharchenko\u201d rumour on June 7, leading Russian media did not report it. Instead, Zakharchenko was given a large <a href=\"http:\/\/av-zakharchenko.su\/inner-article\/Stati\/Glava-DNR-Aleksandr-Zaharchenko-v-pryamom-efire-v-programme1\/\">appearance<\/a> on a popular Russian state TV show (\u201cEvening with Vladimir Solovyov\u201d) the same evening, where he said that he is expecting a huge \u201cprovocation\u201d by Ukrainian armed forces.<\/p>\n<p>The speculation centered on the assumption that Vladislav Surkov, the influential aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, will no longer oversee the Kremlin\u2019s policies towards eastern Ukraine. Surkov was thought to back Zakharchenko over Pushilin in an intra-party struggle last autumn (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.civicmonitoring.org\/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-23-august-20-october-2017-newsletter-24\/\">Newsletter 24<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>Despite expectations, Putin has not announced any reshuffles in his administration since being re-elected in March. On June 10, Konstantin Dolgov, a blogger who moved from Donetsk to Moscow last year and has since often criticized Zakharchenko, said in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=s94Nnnv4_8A\" data-rel=\"lightbox-video-0\">a video blog<\/a> that Surkov continued to work in his office in the Kremlin administration.<\/p>\n<p>While Zakharchenko reappeared, his main rival inside the Donetsk \u201cPeople\u2019s Republic\u201d remained hidden from the public for more than a month. Alexander Khodakovsky, the one-time commander of the \u201cVostok\u201d brigade, has not posted anything on his social media channels since May 11. In the past, Khodakovsky published vast quantities of lengthy posts on <a href=\"https:\/\/vk.com\/id410606173\">Vkontakte<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/profile.php?id=100015381826523\">Facebook<\/a>, and also hosted a question and answer show on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/channel\/UCyKCusmu8Hz7eurEkZJop0A\/videos\">YouTube<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Whether Khodakovsky has been detained or just decided to take a break from his political activities is unclear. Alexander Zhuchkovsky, a separatist fighter who often publishes political posts on social media, <a href=\"https:\/\/vk.com\/wall151630709_92558?w=wall151630709_92558\">linked<\/a> Khodakovsky\u2019s disappearance to the recent pressure against \u201cSvobodny Donbass\u201d (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.civicmonitoring.org\/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-29-may-05-june-2018-newsletter-31\/\">Newsletter 31<\/a>) and suggested that \u201cDNR\u201d leaders, including Zakharchenko and his powerful \u201cIncome Minister\u201d Alexander Timofeyev were nervous about their uncertain political future because of the (perceived) power vacuum in the Kremlin.<\/p>\n<p>Denis Kazansky, a Kiev-based journalist originally from Donetsk, <a href=\"http:\/\/deniskazansky.com.ua\/kto_vmesto_zaharchenko\/\">pointed out<\/a> that while Zakharchenko has made himself numerous enemies in Donetsk, a power change could happen in various ways and at various times &#8211; ranging from a putsch like in Luhansk 2017 to leadership elections, which are expected to take place in both \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d in autumn 2018.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Gubarev claims to be accused of plotting against Zakharchenko<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In yet another sign of growing political nervousness in Donetsk, Pavel Gubarev, the almost-forgotten \u201cpeople\u2019s governor\u201d of the city\u2019s first pro-Russian protests in 2014, published a lengthy article accusing the \u201cDNR\u201d leadership of falsely suspecting him plotting a coup.<\/p>\n<p>In the text, <a href=\"http:\/\/dnr-live.ru\/vozmozhen-li-v-dnr-gosperevorot-gubarev\/\">published<\/a> on June 12 on the dnr-live.ru website, Gubarev writes that senior separatist leaders possessed printouts of a WhatsApp chat in which he allegedly discusses the necessity of overthrowing the current rulers.<\/p>\n<p>Gubarev denied the charges and stressed that the printouts were based on photoshopped screenshots. Moreover, he warns that the fabricated evidence might be used to censor his (online) TV channel <a href=\"http:\/\/novorossia-tv.ru\/\">Novorossiya TV<\/a> and to turn his political movement, Svodbodny Donbass, into a \u201cpuppet organization\u201d of tightly controlled deputies.<\/p>\n<p>His comments come less than two weeks after Svobodny Donbass complained that two of its members had been abducted, probably by \u201cDNR\u201d security forces who were accusing them of spying for Ukraine (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.civicmonitoring.org\/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-29-may-05-june-2018-newsletter-31\/\">Newsletter 31<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>While Gubarev undoubtedly shares the same pro-Russian convictions as the \u201cDNR\u201d leaders (he said in a <a href=\"http:\/\/odsd.ru\/news\/pavel-gubarev-budu-mnogo-govorit-i-mena-budut-slysat\">recent interview<\/a> that all of Ukraine belongs to Russia), his political analysis of the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d deserves attention because he indirectly admits the massive role played by Moscow.<\/p>\n<p>Thus, he argues that while it would be exaggerated to call the \u201cDNR\u201d a Russian puppet state \u201cour dependence on Russia cannot be denied\u201d and adds, citing US military strategist Edward Luttwak, that a homegrown putsch is impossible in the \u201cDNR\u201d because the source for its government\u2019s legitimacy lies \u201cnowhere near Donetsk\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>In a veiled reference to Russia, Gubarev adds that the putsch that deposed \u201cLNR\u201d leader Igor Plotnitsky in November wasn\u2019t carried out by Luhansk political elites but by \u201coutside forces\u201d. Plotnitsky, he writes, was ousted because he tried to concentrate all power in his own hands, engaged in massive embezzlement and in reprisals, including torture and killings, against his opponents. Gubarev concludes that in Donetsk and Luhansk a coup d\u2019etat can only happen from above (i.e. with direct support from Moscow), and that is what happened in LNR.<\/p>\n<p>Gubarev\u2019s conspicuous recent political activity is certainly not just linked to the autumn elections (he has not said if he is standing) but also to the (real or perceived) power vacuum in Moscow. Whether Gubarev can succeed in the often violent political scene in the \u201cDNR\u201d remains to be seen.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Separatists impose tariffs on each other<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Uneasy relations between the Donetsk and Luhansk \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d were highlighted last week when Ukrainian media <a href=\"http:\/\/novosti.dn.ua\/news\/282409-lnr-podnyala-tamozhennuyu-poshlynu-na-pyvo-yz-donecka\">publicized<\/a> a decree by the \u201cLNR\u201d Council of \u201cMinisters\u201d which says that beer from the \u201cDNR\u201d will be subject to a 5 per cent tariff until December 31.<\/p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https:\/\/sovminlnr.ru\/docs\/2018\/05\/30\/303_18.pdf\">decree<\/a>, dated May 29, contrasts with statements by Luhansk separatist leader Leonid Pasechnik, who has vowed to remove tariffs for goods from neighbouring Donetsk. During his first meeting with \u201cDNR\u201d leader Zakharchenko on January 31 in Luhansk, both leaders signed a letter of intent to form a customs union between them (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.civicmonitoring.org\/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-01-december-2017-04-february-2018-newsletter-26\/\">Newsletter 26<\/a>). The \u201cLNR\u201d <a href=\"http:\/\/novosti.dn.ua\/news\/278629-lnr-razreshyla-besplatno-vvozyt-tovary-s-sertyfykatom-dnr\">said shortly before<\/a> that it would lift all tariffs for goods produced in the \u201cDNR\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Three months later, Pasechnik <a href=\"http:\/\/novosti.dn.ua\/news\/280664-lnr-obyavyla-ob-otmene-granyc-s-dnr\">announced<\/a> that the \u201cLNR\u201d was \u201calmost completely\u201d lifting its customs border with the \u201cDNR\u201d. However, he cautioned that limitations would remain on alcohol and tobacco products.<\/p>\n<p>The fact that the \u201cLNR\u201d official media did not report about the new tariffs indicates that their purpose might really be to increase budget revenue and\/or to protect local industry.<\/p>\n<p>There is a brewery in Rovenki, but beer production in Luhansk ceased after the war. The city\u2019s separatist-controlled authorities <a href=\"http:\/\/lug-info.com\/news\/one\/luga-nova-planiruet-v-blizhaishee-vremya-nachat-proizvodstvo-piva-meriya-35301\">said<\/a> on May 17 that the local Luga-Nova plant would soon begin to produce beer.<\/p>\n<p>The \u201cDNR\u201d on the other hand, claimed last year to have <a href=\"https:\/\/dan-news.info\/ekonomika\/doneckij-pivzavod-planiruet-vypuskat-svyshe-6-mln-litrov-zhigulevskogo-v-mesyac.html\">restarted<\/a> the main Donetsk brewery \u201cSarmat\u201d with a (theoretical) capacity for 32 million litres per month.<\/p>\n<p>More broadly, tariffs between the \u201cPeople\u2019s Republics\u201d decry the separatists\u2019 idea of \u201cNovorossia\u201d and an ultimate union with Russia. After all, the conflict in Ukraine started over the question whether the country should join a Customs Union with Russia or sign a trade agreement with the European Union.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Written by Nikolaus von Twickel Summary The lingering speculation about the ouster of Russia\u2019s Donbass point man Vladislav Surkov has in turn triggered fresh speculation about a possible ouster of Donetsk separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko. In this politically charged atmosphere,&#46;&#46;&#46;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":586,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[202,210],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1043"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1043"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1043\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1044,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1043\/revisions\/1044"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/586"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1043"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1043"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/civicmonitoring.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1043"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}