Written by Nikolaus von Twickel
After the assassination of Alexander Zakharchenko, the “DNR” underwent a sweeping power change in which most of the slain separatist leader’s close associates and his deputy Alexander Timofeyev were replaced with people loyal to his rival Denis Pushilin. The longtime Minsk negotiator and parliamentary Speaker was named interim leader after the Kremlin made it clear that it won’t support Dmitry Trapeznikov, who was declared leader short after Zakharchenko’s death. Pushilin is also expected to win elections in November after the Kremlin dropped the idea of postponing them.
All powers to Pushilin
After a dramatic week, the “DNR” is entering a new political period under Denis Pushilin as its designated Kremlin-backed leader. Pushilin was pushed into the limelight on September 5, when Moscow political scientist Alexei Chesnakov said that Zakharchenko’s deputy Dmitry Trapeznikov had no legitimacy and all power should be given to parliament, which Pushilin chairs. Chesnakov formerly worked in the Kremlin under Vladislav Surkov and is widely believed to be a close confidant of President Vladimir Putin’s key aide for eastern Ukraine.
On September 7, the deputies formally removed Zakharchenko from his post and duly voted for Pushilin as interim leader. They also called for holding elections on November 11 (a similar decision was taken the same day by the separatist “parliament” in Luhansk).
While the formal reason for making Pushilin and not Trapeznikov interim leader was that the “DNR” constitution stipulate that the “first deputy” should become successor and none of Zakharchenko’s three deputies held such a title, ensuing events resembled a political purge rather than an orderly transition.
On the same evening, Pushilin removed five cabinet members from the separatist “government”, all of them Zakharchenko associates. Apart from the “Ministers” of Justice, Industry, Transport and Agriculture, he fired “Revenue Minister” Alexander Timofeyev, believed to be the single most powerful figure under Zakharchenko.
Timofeyev, who also served as one of Zakharchenko’s three deputies, has been at the centre of corruption allegations against the old separatist leadership. Immediately before his sacking, the Pushilin-loyal news website “DAN” published two articles in which businessmen accused Timofeyev of seizing company assets worth millions of roubles. In the subsequent article about the cabinet reshuffle, DAN referred to Timofeyev as “scandalous”.
Crucially, Pushilin was publicly backed the “Ministries” of the Interior and State Security, who both control significant numbers of security forces. Trapeznikov also declared his full support for the decision, although he was subsequently removed from his post as deputy head of government.
In a clear sign that he had lost power, Timofeyev fled to Russia on September 7, together with Zakharchenko’s advisor Alexander Kazakov. That evening, Kazakov complained on Facebook, that not even the “Commander’s ninth day” could be observed (nine days after a person has died Orthodox believers traditionally pray at the grave).
On September 9, the two were seen at a meeting outside Moscow in the house of Zakhar Prilepin, the Russian writer who had also served as a Zakharchenko adviser.
Purges throw new light on Zakharchenko’s killing
The dramatic ouster of Zakharchenko’s allies raises new questions about the separatist leader’s assassination. While it was clear from the beginning that the organizers must have had some backing from inside the “DNR” – the deadly explosion occurred in central Donetsk in a café reportedly owned by one of Zakharchenko’s former bodyguards – the ensuing political purges make it much more likely that the killing was ordered by Moscow or internal rivals, because it adds considerable weight to the theory that getting rid of Zakharchenko was to pave the way for Pushilin.
It is an open secret that Zakharchenko and especially Timofeyev had made numerous enemies inside the “DNR” and in Russia.
The “Revenue” or “Income Minister”, who also served as one of three nominally equal deputy heads of government, has for some time been accused of running large-scale graft schemes. According to a report published by the Moscow-based Russky Reportyor online magazine this week, Timofeyev had angered Moscow by charging artificially high prices for the of transport of coal and metals to Russia. He was also made responsible for the misappropriation of Russian economic subsidies, smuggling and of resisting the removal of tariffs and other trade barriers with the Luhansk “People’s Republic”.
Another source for Russian anger was insubordination on the battlefield. According to the report, “DNR” armed formations under Zakharchenko’s direct command – among them the Republican Guard and Special Operations Regiment – were accused of pounding Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka with artillery fire against the Kremlin’s will.
This narrative is also backed by reports about the disbanding of the “DNR” Defence “Ministry”. According to blogger turned separatist fighter Alexander Zhuchkovsky, the “DNR” will have a “People’s Militia” without Ministry, just like the “LNR”. Zhuchkovsky added that the “Ministry” had been a purely ceremonial institution while real command lay with the First Army Corps, which is controlled by “northern” (i.e. Russian) officers.
The case for a planned power transfer from Zakharchenko to Pushilin is also backed by the long-standing rivalry between the two. In November, Zakharchenko ousted Pushilin from his executive position in the ruling “Donetsk Republic” movement (see Newsletter 24) and in June, media speculation peaked that Pushilin would soon replace Zakharchenko as “DNR” leader (see Newsletter 32).
All this does not explain why Zakharchenko – or indeed Timofeyev – would have to be killed in a risky operation. But, as has been argued by Kremlin and security expert Mark Galeotti, it is entirely possible that Moscow decided not to interfere with an assassination by “criminal interests”, or that it “slipped a hint” that such a killing would not be punished.
Questions also abound about Alexander Kostenko, who reportedly owns the “Café Separ”, where a remote-controlled bomb hidden in a lamp killed Zakharchenko when he walked in on August 31. Kostenko is not only a former Zakharchenko bodyguard but heads the faction of “Donetsk Republic” in the separatist parliament – a position in which he must have worked closely with Pushilin in both his functions as Speaker and executive officer of “Donetsk Republic.
On September, 4 Kostenko denied rumours that he had fled Donetsk by telling Russia’s Interfax news agency “I am here, I am not going anywhere and am giving evidence. I can say that there already are suspects”. The quotes were fully published on the parliamentary website, while “DAN” news published only the quote about suspects, omitting any suggestion that Kostenko might have sought to leave Donetsk.
However, initial claims that suspects had been detained in Donetsk proved unsubstantiated. The separatist Interior “Ministry” on September 5 retracted a search note for two suspects, saying that they were not linked to the killing.
Assassination to justify elections?
Instead, Russia and the separatists stepped up their accusations against Ukraine. Pushilin claimed in a TV interview on September 10 that the investigation pointed to Ukrainian special services. And Alexei Chesnakov, the Kremlin-linked political scientist, suggested that the West’s failure to react adequately to the killing had triggered the decision to hold elections in both “People’s Republics”.
“After Zakharchenko’s killing western capitals kept silence. And this silence was understood in Donetsk as a sign of Western approval for the terrorist methods of the Kiev regime,” Chesnakov was quoted as saying by Russia’s Tass news agency.
Chesnakov admitted, that considerations prior to Zakharchenko’s death to cancel the elections were driven by diplomatic considerations. “Yes, there were doubts, they did not want to irritate Angela Merkel,” he said. In August, both “Republics” conducted campaigns not to hold elections, however there were signs that Zakharchenko was against this (see Newsletter 40).
Ukraine and her western allies argue that elections in the separatist-held areas violate the Minsk agreement which stipulates that they should be held under Ukrainian law. The Kremlin and the separatists argue that Minsk only speaks of municipal elections, while the “People’s Republics” parliamentary and leadership elections do not fall under this category.
While it is not known who else will stand against Pushilin and Luhansk separatist leader Leonid Pasechnik, Chesnakov argued that Zakharchenko’s violent death ensures that both will win. “Terror cannot divide or frighten the people of Donbass. It pulls them together. Therefore, you can predict (their victory) with 99 per cent,” he said, adding that their allies will win parliamentary majorities.
While both separatist leaders do not necessarily represent popular candidates – Pushilin worked for a major Russian Ponzi scheme before 2014, Pasechnik was a career officer for the Ukrainian intelligence service SBU – the almost complete control of political and information resources inside the “People’s Republics” makes “managed” elections an easy task. The recent purges of the “LNR” election commission (see Newsletter 40) and the “primaries” of October 2016, in which the ruling movements’ candidates invariably won, serve as telling examples (see Newsletter 2).
